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ON THE PREVENTION OF CROSS-VM CACHE-BASED SIDE CHANNEL 
ATTACKS 
ABSTRACT 
The state-of-the-art Cloud Computing (CC) has been commercially popular for shared 
resources of third party applications. A cloud platform enables to share resources among 
mutually distrusting CC clients and offers cost-effective, on-demand scaling. With the 
exponential growth of CC environment, vulnerabilities and their corresponding 
exploitation of the prevailing cloud resources may potentially increase. While it provides 
numerous benefits to the CC tenant, however, resource sharing and Virtual Machine 
(VM) physical co-residency raising the potential for sensitive information leakages such 
as side channel (SC) attacks. In particular, physical co-residency features allow attackers 
to communicate with another VM on the same physical machine and leak the confidential 
information due to inadequate logical isolation. We investigate SC attacks involving the 
CPU cache and identify that traditional prevention mechanisms for SC attacks are not 
appropriate for prevention of cross-VM cache-based SC attacks. We go on to demonstrate 
the prevention mechanisms, however, the existing prevention techniques either require 
the client to change the software or the underlying hardware and suffer from performance 
degradation leading to reduce cache usage and increase overhead. To address this problem 
and improve performance, we investigate that new technique such as dynamic cache 
partition is necessary to mitigate these sorts of attacks in a cloud environment which is 
hypervisor-based and does not need the client to change their software and the underlying 
hardware. Finally, we propose new hypervisor-based mitigation technique, implementing 
them in a state-of-the-art cloud system which guarantees the security and performance 
feature of the system. The proposed prevention mechanism is evaluated using various 
benchmarking experiments. The evaluation results show that merging our proposed 
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method into hypervisor can prevent cross-VM cache-based SC attacks without affecting 
the performance of hypervisor. Our dynamic partitioned (HBP-DCP based) hypervisor 
improves the bearable load by increasing the number of request per second by 45% and 
by decreasing the average response time by 5.58%. Moreover, improve cache utilization 
that each VM has access to by increasing cache read/modify/write, cache read, and cache 
write bandwidth in combine by 53.5% and increasing the cache access time by 15.53%, 
as a result substantially increase the efficiency as significant. 
Keywords: Cloud Computing, Cache-based SC Attacks, Cross-VM SC Cache-based SC 
Attacks, Countermeasure, Dynamic Cache Partition 
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PENCEGAHAN SERANGAN SALURAN SISI BERASASKAN SILANG-VM 
CACHE  
ABSTRAK 
Kajian semasa dalam bidang Pengkomputeran Awan (CC) secara komersialnya telah 
popular dalam perkongsian sumber aplikasi pihak ketiga. Platform awan membenarkan 
perkongsian sumber di antara pelanggan CC yang saling tidak mempercayai dan 
menawarkan penskalaan yang kos efektif dan berdasarkan permintaan. Dengan 
pertumbuhan persekitaran CC yang pesat, kelemahan dan eksplotasi yang berkaitan 
antara sumber awan semasa, berpotensi boleh meningkat. Walaupun ia menyediakan 
pelbagai faedah kepada penyewa pengkomputeran awan, perkongsian sumber dan fizikal 
mesin maya (VM), ia boleh meningkatkan potensi untuk kebocoran maklumat sensitif 
seperti serangan saluran sisi. Secara khususnya, ciri-ciri fizikal residensi bersama 
membolehkan penyerang untuk berkomunikasi dengan VM lain pada mesin fizikal yang 
sama dan membocorkan maklumat sulit yang disebabkan oleh kekurangan pengasingan 
logik. Kami menyiasat tentang serangan saluran sisi yang melibatkan cache CPU dan 
mengenalpasti bahawa mekanisma pencegahan tradisional bagi serangan saluran sisi 
tidak sesuai untuk pencegahan serangan saluran sisi berasaskan silang-VM cache. Kami 
memilih untuk menunjukkan mekanisma pencegahan, walau bagaimanapun, teknik-
teknik pencegahan sedia ada sama ada memerlukan pelanggan untuk menukar perisian 
atau perkakasan asas akan menyebabkan kemerosotan prestasi yang boleh mengurangkan 
penggunaan cache dan meningkatkan overhed. Bagi menangani masalah ini dan 
meningkatkan prestasi, kami menyiasat teknik baru iaitu pemetakan cache secara 
dinamik. Ia adalah perlu untuk mengatasi serangan di dalam persekitaran awan yang 
berasaskan hypervisor tanpa perlu menukar perisian dan perkakasan pelanggan. Akhir 
sekali, kami mencadangkan mitigasi baru berasaskan hypervisor, melaksanakannya 
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dalam sistem awan yang mengikut aliran semasa bagi menjamin keselamatan dan ciri-ciri 
prestasi sistem. Mekanisma pencegahan yang dicadangkan dinilai dengan menggunakan 
pelbagai eksperimen penandaarasan. Keputusan penilaian menunjukkan bahawa 
penggabungan kaedah cadangan kami ke hypervisor boleh mencegah serangan SC 
berasaskan silang-VM cache tanpa menjejaskan prestasi hypervisor. Pemetakan secara 
dinamik (berasaskan HBP-DCP) hypervisor telah meningkatkan tanggungan beban 
dengan pertambahan jumlah permintaan setiap saat sebanyak 45% dan pengurangan 
purata masa respon sebanyak 5.58%. Selain itu, ia juga meningkatkan penggunaan cache 
di mana setiap VM mempunyai akses dan peningkatan jalur lebar bagi operasi 
baca/kemaskini/tulis cache sebanyak 53.5%, peningkatan masa capaian cache sebanyak 
15.53% dan keputusan ini menunjukkan kecekapan meningkat secara purata. 
Keywords: Pengkomputeran Awan, Serangan SC, Serangan saluran sisi berasaskan 
silang-VM cache, tindak balas, Pemetakan cache dinamik 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
This chapter introduces the basis of the research work carried out in this thesis. The 
background of our initial research domain, Cloud Computing (CC) and Side Channel 
(SC) is provided. It explains the key motivations in the establishment of a research 
problem of the thesis leading to highlight our research problem and objectives. The 
research problem is highlighted from a broad perspective in the form of statements of the 
problem. The research aim and objectives are highlighted in the domain of side channel 
attacks in CC. Furthermore, the research methodology employed to address the research 
problem is presented. 
The structure of the remainder of the chapter is as follows: Section 1.1 presents the 
background knowledge of the field of research namely CC, cache-based SC attack, and 
cross-VM SC attacks. Section 1.2 presents the motivation of inspiring the research 
provided in this thesis. In Section 1.3, the established research problem is presented. 
Section 1.4 provides the research aim and objectives. In Section 1.5, the research 
methodology employed to address the research problem is defined. Finally, Section 1.6 
presents the layout of the rest of the thesis. 
1.1 Background 
Cloud Computing (CC) can be defined as a new paradigm that delivers computing 
and IT as services. The cloud resources on-demand concept has attracted end users to 
utilize various CC services, such as “Software, Platform, and Infrastructure” as-a-service 
(“SaaS, PaaS, and IaaS”) at low cost (Zhang, Cheng et al. 2010). As a new paradigm, CC 
acquires more importance and brings unique features and vulnerabilities in today 
Information Technology (IT) industry. Specifically, it introduces multi-tenancy to 
facilitate the users to share computing physical resources provisioned over the Internet 
and offers cost-effective, on-demand scaling to the CC tenants. Moreover, it establishes 
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the new concept in computing namely mutually distrusting co-resident clients as a valid 
execution state. Although mutually distrusting co-resident and multi-tenancy provide 
numerous benefits to the CC tenants, this paradigm introduces a new concept known as 
client’s co-residence and VM’s physical co-residency. However, the security 
vulnerabilities arise from these well-known concepts because it enables a new form of 
sensitive information leakage. One of the security vulnerability to CC is the SC attacks 
which exploit the information leakage channel at the micro-architectural level. The CC 
infrastructure relies on the virtualized servers that provide the required logical isolation 
between guest VMs through sandboxing. However, this isolation was described to be 
imperfect in the past research work which exploited the information leakage channel to 
extract the sensitive information across co-located VMs. Co-residence clients and 
physical co-residency of VMs allow the attacker’s VM to communicate with the victim’s 
VM running on the same physical device that by design they are unable to have access 
(Ristenpart, Tromer et al. 2009).  
Since CC is not equivalent to physically separated systems and due to an inadequate 
logical isolation, it facilitates the co-located malicious VM to use the SC attacks to leak 
sensitive information about the victim VM functionality and exploit the correlation 
between the software and hardware. SC attacks use the unconventional methods including 
cache access and timings to extract and transfer confidential data in a way that violate 
security policies have been identified as a major issue in implementing cryptographic 
algorithms. Although cryptographic algorithms provide security to the sensitive 
information from attackers by encrypting and decrypting sensitive data. However, CC is 
a big concern for cryptographers because they are putting their data and program out there 
away from their trusted computers (Ristenpart, Tromer et al. 2009). The encryption keys 
of the cryptographic algorithms e.g., Advance Encryption Standard (AES) are extracted 
by the attackers using simple spying processes by the attacker to analyze information 
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about cache lines, which have been accessed. In addition, AES in various well known 
cryptographic libraries namely OpenSSL, polarssl, and libcrypto are vulnerable to 
information leakage attacks, when running in different hypervisors’ including XEN and 
VMware used by cloud service providers. The current VM in the processor analyzes this 
cache information. Although the cache data is protected, the metadata about cache is not 
fully protected (Tromer, Osvik et al. 2010). 
Since SC attacks are physical attacks, they require the fundamental characteristics of 
computation including power consumption, timings it takes to run a program and 
exploitation of hardware to extract the secret information of the cryptographic algorithms 
(e.g., encryption key). This attack typically works by creating the correlation between the 
functionality of the underlying hardware in the physical device and the software. 
Moreover, this correlation can be used to exploit the co-located VMs by interpreting the 
internal execution of the software program from the observed phenomena of hardware at 
a specified time. This allows SC attack to be conducted in an environment where the 
attacker and the victim have access to the same hardware in the absence of any prevention 
mechanism. In order to exploit the physical properties of the machine, the attacker and 
victim have to access the same hardware by using hardware and software SC attacks. 
Although in a traditional system, gaining access to the same physical device as a target 
was a difficult task in establishing SC attacks. However, CC environment makes it easy 
to accomplish SC attacks. In a non-virtualized environment, it is difficult to launch the 
SC attack as compared to in a virtualized environment. This is because, in a virtualized 
environment, the attacker and the victim are co-located on the same physical machine. 
Since SC attacks are used to extract the cryptographic information, thereby, can be 
implemented on all those devices which used cryptography concepts for securing their 
data such as smart cards, mobile phones, tablets, personal computers, and servers (Fisk, 
Fisk et al. 2002).  
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SC attacks are categorized into various types according to the specific piece of 
hardware medium they target and exploit and have been discussed in Chapter 2 in detail. 
Since CPU caches are the high interacting and sharing devices between processes and are 
always been targeted by the adversaries. Therefore, it enables us to categorize the SC 
attacks in this thesis, specifically cache-based SC attacks and the prevention mechanism 
based on the exploited hardware medium and physical characteristics of computation.  
The state-of-the-art literature shows that a large number of cache-based SC attacks 
have been studied in the past in non-virtualized multilevel systems including database, 
Operating System (OS) and networking (Zander, Armitage et al. 2007). For instance, 
Bernstein’s proposed SC attack based on the cache access time variation (Bernstein 
2004). The author used the access time information (whether the data is being accessed 
from the cache or from main memory) to extract AES key. Moreover, the co-residency 
feature of CC makes cache-based SC attacks more effective in the virtualized 
environment. In 2009, the first cache-based SC attack became visible in the community 
when Ristenpart et al. (Ristenpart, Tromer et al. 2009) successfully implemented this 
attack in the virtualized environment by using the co-residency feature. Because of these 
information leakage channels, information security in a public or shared cloud 
environment is a general concern that must be considered.  
Since these attacks are always implemented by using the hardware or software 
channels, therefore, the defensive mechanisms for such attacks are also implemented on 
the hardware channel as well as through software (Zhang, Juels et al. 2012). Although 
hardware-based prevention mechanisms provide security from SC attacks, these 
mechanisms require changing the underlying hardware. The changing of hardware would 
take longer time as well as expensive and the SC attacks would be succeeded before the 
changing of hardware. Therefore, the software-based prevention mechanism is required 
which prevents the SC attacks before occurring and which is hypervisor-based that 
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comply with the cloud model and does not need to change the software and the underlying 
hardware. 
1.2 Motivation 
CC is a rapidly growing technology in terms of both research work and commercial 
applications. Over the last five years, CC has grown exponentially from its origin to the 
existing vast research and application development industry. It is predicted that CC 
market will grow approximately to over $45.90 billion by 2018. Despite the 
characteristics such as dynamic provisioning, multi-tenancy, scalability, and ease of 
integration as shown in Table 2.1 in detail, CC is vulnerable to SC attacks because of its 
easy accessibility and distributed infrastructure. In spite of this threat to CC, the users of 
the cloud are increasing day by day as shown in Figure 1.1.  
 
Figure 1.1: Year wise Progression of Cloud Computing Usage (Irazoqui, Inci et al. 
2014) 
Figure 1.1 shows the gradual increase from standard technology to virtualized 
environment. Moreover, it shows an increase in the number of cloud users compared to 
physical machine users. The statistic shows that from 2013 to 2017, there is 
approximately one billion increase in the number of online users of cloud-based service 
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through all over the world. The increase in cloud-based service users is estimated from 
the fact that in 2013 the cloud users was 2.4 billion and it is predicted that it would be 
approximately exceeded to 3.5 billion in 2018 (Portal 2016).  
According to a recent Tech News report (NEWS 2015), Apple announced a major 
vulnerability to the security of iPhones that some Canadians attacked the iPhones and 
iPads with malware that could extract their iCloud passwords and other personal 
confidential data. Similarly, according to Digital Forensics Association (DFA), from 
2009 to April 2016, the lost records’ quantity in data breaches ranged from 1 to 
140,000,000 with an average of 407,926 (DFA 2016). Even if a packets contains only 
single bit can be covertly transmitted , 26 GB of data could be leak on a large Internet 
Site through SC attacks (Zander, Armitage et al. 2007). Moreover, the CERT statistics in 
2017 indicated a 50% increase in the information leakage from insider attackers and 
reported more than 40 % of SC attacks (Cert. 2017.). These reports prove that the effect 
of SC attacks are unavoidable. This is the reason that motivated researchers to explore 
information leakage channel namely SC attacks in cloud environment. 
CC is a distributed computing paradigm that enables on-demand access to a shared 
pool of scalable computing resources. As a new design paradigm in computing, the goal 
of CC is computing consolidation and multi-tenancy. Multitenancy employs 
virtualization to share computing physical resources among CC customers. Since CC 
provide the logical isolation to cloud resources through sandboxing mechanism across 
guest VMs and does not provide the physical isolation. Therefore, data is vulnerable to 
information leakage due to the concept of co-residence clients and physically co-
residence VMs provided by CC (Irazoqui, Eisenbarth et al. 2015). Unlike other multilevel 
systems (i.e., OSs, databases, networking etc.,), CC allows attackers to access the same 
hardware and perform malicious activities among their own users. Specifically, attackers 
exploit the physical characteristics of computation and hardware side-channels to access 
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the place such as cache that by design is restricted to them and gain the information. To 
limit this leakage channel, the cache must be divided across the VMs through software 
mechanism. 
Unlike encryption, which protects confidential information from being decoded by 
unauthorized persons, SC attacks aim to attack the encryption systems and to hide the 
occurrence of communication. Since the evidence of the existence of communication is 
sufficient to detect the physical properties of computation. So encryption is unable to 
prevent attackers from detecting the pattern of communication (Zander, Armitage et al. 
2007). Therefore, cloud provider, criminals, terrorist company, or government 
organization have the interest to hide their confidential communication. 
The Cloud features affected by cross-VM SC attacks are data outsourcing, multi-
tenancy, and co-residency. Presently, more than 79% of organizations attempt to utilize 
data outsourcing, because approximately 75% of the total ownership cost is assigned to 
manage of in-house huge storage. Since any co-resident VM can perpetrate cross-VM 
attacks through a covert channel. Therefore, end-users trust will be declined on cloud-
based application. 
Although there are several defensive mechanisms such as firewall, cryptography, and 
access control, however, these are unable to protect cloud environment from SC attacks. 
Moreover, some prevention mechanisms need to change the client software and the 
underlying hardware. Therefore, there is a need for a prevention mechanism for cross-
VM cache-based SC attacks which is software-based and does not need to change the 
client software and the underlying hardware. In this thesis, the software-based prevention 
mechanism is proposed. Our proposed prevention mechanism for cross-VM cache-based 
SC attacks, need to be followed by the two key points of the cloud model. First, it does 
not need to modify the software on the client-end of interfaces it intends to run and second 
it does not require the modification of underlying hardware. 
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1.3 Statement of the Problem 
Although side-channel attacks have existed in the multilevel system including 
databases and OSs in the past (Osvik, Shamir et al. 2006), the novel co-residency feature 
of CC makes them more effective in virtualized environment. Due to shared technology, 
the attacker is no longer required to gain unlawful or restricted access to the victim’s 
hardware, which bypasses the first line of defense against such attacks. Because a side-
channel requires the exploitation of the underlying hardware and software, each defensive 
mechanism must also be specifically adapted for the underlying hardware and software 
channel. Therefore, it enables us to categorize side-channel attacks and the defensive 
mechanism based on the hardware and software channel they exploit. Since each channel 
provides unique vulnerabilities. The CPU cache is one of the most frequently used pieces 
of shared hardware and often deals with sensitive data. Thus it become one of the most 
common targets for use in a SC attack as it can more easily be used to extract useful data 
at a high rate. An attack made over this channel is referred to as a cache-based SC attack. 
Multiple prevention mechanisms are available to prevent cache-based SC attacks in 
multiprocessing systems including OS, databases, and networking. However, these 
existing mechanisms are unable to prevent the cross-VM cache-based SC attacks, as the 
cloud facilitates the users with the shared resources (Kim, Chandra et al. 2004, Percival 
2005). Determined adversaries have the ability to place malicious hosts in the cloud 
environment on the same machine as a target host (Ristenpart, Tromer et al. 2009). The 
malicious hosts are then able to monitor and manipulate the shared cloud resources, 
including caches and other hardware resources in order to leak critical information from 
the target hosts. In a cloud environment, the prevention mechanisms are divided into 
hardware-based and software-based prevention mechanisms, and hardware-based are 
implemented on the hardware level (Kim, Chandra et al. 2004, Percival 2005). However, 
hardware based countermeasures are unable to provide an immediate solution to the 
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problem. They will take the time to develop and are failed to protect the existing 
hardware. In addition, hardware-based prevention mechanisms are expensive and need 
special design hardware to support cache control, or need individual cache, need to 
disable the cache, or need to change the replacement policy of cache (Osvik, Shamir et 
al. 2006). Consequently, for immediate mitigation of SC attack, software-based 
prevention solutions are required. Because software-based solution can be implemented 
in the already existed architecture. Therefore, there is a need for a software-based 
mechanism for the prevention of cross-VM cache-based SC attacks.  
One of the software-based prevention mechanism for cross-VM cache-based SC 
attacks is static partition which use the page coloring technique to partition the entire 
cache into static parts for various VMs during boot time. Page coloring allows the 
hypervisor to limit the cache usage of any application and VMs. However, this method 
can only configure the cache usage of each virtual machines at boot time and once the 
VM is created we cannot change its configuration. For instance, if we partition the entire 
cache into 16 parts during boot time and currently one VM is executing, then only one 
part would be assign to that VM and the remaining 15 parts will be idle. We cannot change 
the entire cache partition according to running VMs during execution. Moreover, static 
cache partition degrades the performance in term of bearable load, cache utilization, and 
cache access time. The VMs are only allowed to allocate the memory at boot time from 
the same partition that belonging to the same VM. 
Since a single VM running in a 4-way partitioned system, therefore, one-quarter of 
the total memory is assigned to that VM may lead to wasted resources. Consequently, the 
memory resources are maximized even balancing of loads. Therefore, there is a need for 
a preventive mechanism for SC attacks which dynamically partition the entire cache for 
each VM upon the creation of new VM. Once the VM is created then we would be able 
to configure the entire cache for various VMs. For instance, if one VM is created then the 
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whole cache memory is assigned to that VM on a dynamic basis. If two or three VMs are 
created then the cache memory is divided into 2 or 3 partitions accordingly and would be 
assigned to those VMs. Moreover, prevention mechanism of SC attacks, need to be 
followed by the two key points of the cloud model. First, it does not need to modify the 
software on the client-end of interfaces it intends to run and second it does not need the 
modification of underlying hardware.  
Our goal is to provide a defense capable of preventing cache-based side-channels in 
the Cloud while not interfering with the Cloud model and without degrading the system 
performance. Using the code base of an open source hypervisor, Xen (Project 2016), we 
have conducted our solution based on dynamic cache partition demonstrate to inhibit 
cache-based side-channels from occurring within a Cloud server. In our solution, all cache 
monitoring and cache partitioning operations are done transparently within the hypervisor 
or VMM. Therefore it is applicable to commodity operating systems such as Windows, 
of which the source code is unavailable. Second, because guest OSes are black boxes to 
the VMM, this single mechanism is portable across all the OSes supported by the VMM. 
Our solution is implemented in the hypervisor, therefore it provides cache partitioning 
both within and across OSes and also provides more flexibility and opportunities for the 
whole-system optimization. 
1.4  Statement of Objectives 
This research is undertaken with the aim to prevent cache-based SC attacks across 
VMs and in CC with minimum overhead in terms of bearable load, cache utilization, and 
cache access time. The research aim is accomplished by addressing the following 
objectives:  
 To study the existing SC attacks in virtualized and non-virtualized environment 
involving CPU-cache to gain an insightful understanding to the performance 
limitations of current state-of-the-art prevention mechanisms for these attacks. 
 11 
 To investigate the identified problem by conducting the cross VM cache-based 
SC attacks in the real environment and applied the existing prevention mechanism 
based on the static cache partition and unveiling the impact of existing prevention 
mechanism on the load, cache utilization, and cache access time as well as on the 
cloud model. 
 To propose a prevention mechanism based on the dynamic cache partition for the 
prevention of cache based SC attacks across VMs that leads to an efficient cache 
utilization among various VMs. 
 To evaluate and validate the performance of our dynamic cache based prevention 
mechanism considering three metrics namely: computing load, cache utilization, 
and memory access rate and compare it with the state-of-the-art prevention 
mechanisms. 
1.5 Research Methodology 
The research carried out in this thesis used the following four main steps in order to 
achieve the four objectives defined in Section 1.4. The proposed research methodology 
along with the detail description of research objectives corresponding to each research 
phase is given in Figure 1.2. 
 The state of the art SC attacks in CC with emphasize on cache-based SC attacks across 
VMs are reviewed in the first phase. The SC attacks are generally categorized based 
on the computing location, on the way of implementation, and on the way of accessing 
the modules. Moreover, the SC attacks based on the computing location are classified 
into: intra-VM, cross-platform, and cross-VM SC attacks. Similarly, the SC attacks-
based on the implementation are divided into sequential and parallel SC attacks. In 
addition, the SC attacks based on the way of accessing the module is further divided 
into invasive, non-invasive, and semi-invasive attacks. Since all the aforementioned 
attacks have been discussed in the non-virtualized environment including database, 
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networking and OS for many years. Therefore, in this research work our focus is on 
the cache-based SC attacks in the virtualized environment (e.g., Cross-VM cache-
based SC attacks). The aim of this thesis is to explore the SC attacks involving CPU-
cache and their mitigation techniques in a state-of-the-art cloud system to improve 
security in CC. We also categorized the cross-VM cache-based SC attacks according 
to the hardware medium they target and exploit, the ways they access the module and 
the method they use to extract the confidential information. Through a comprehensive 
literature review, we identify the most significant research problem to cross-VM 
cache-based SC attacks to address in this research. 
 Identifying the advantages 
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existing work
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 Classifying the literature 
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Figure 1.2: Research Methodology 
 The second phase of this research involves the investigation of the identified problem 
and verification of its significance through experimental analysis between two VMs 
using Xen hypervisor in a real CC environment. By real implementation of cache-
based SC attacks between two VMs in Xen and VMWare hypervisor, we analyzed 
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that these attacks are extracting the secret cryptographic key via cache information 
and are very dangerous in the virtualized environment. The static cache partition at 
boot time as a solution to these attacks is exercised to reveal degradation in the 
performance in terms of load, cache utilization, and cache access time. 
 In the third phase of this research work, we implement and design HBP-DCP 
(Hypervisor-based Prevention Mechanism using Dynamic Cache Partitioning) 
prevention mechanism that prevent cross-VM cache-based SC attacks to alleviate the 
identified problem. HBP-DCP consists of two algorithms: one for cache monitoring 
and one for page allocation to each requested VMs. These algorithms are embedded 
into the source code of page allocator of existing hypervisor. The basic objective of 
cache-based SC attacks is that target VM1 traces the cache access and access time 
variation of the victim VM2 to extract the secret information of secret cryptographic 
key of the encryption algorithms (e.g., AES, DES). To prevent the cache access 
between VMs e.g., victim VM1 from attacker VM2, our proposed HBP-DCP 
prevention mechanism divide the cache into partitions on dynamic basis that no VM 
would access the partition assigned to another VM. In addition, it divide the cache 
into different color on dynamic basis and assign the specific color to each VM. 
 We implemented and evaluated the performance of our proposed HBP-DCP 
prevention mechanism through benchmarking experiments in the last phase of our 
research. A set of standard computation benchmarking along with matrix 
multiplication and customized benchmark are used to evaluate the performance of our 
proposed HBP-DCP prevention mechanism. A real testbed environment is created by 
using Xen hypervisor. Load testing, cache utilization, and memory access rate are the 
performance evaluation metrics in this experiment. We synthesize the result of these 
three parameters using modified (dynamic partitioned /HBP-DCP/secure): the case of 
our solution) with the result of the unmodified (default/insecure) and the static 
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partitioned hypervisor. Moreover, we devised a statistical model to analyze and 
validate the result of performance evaluation metrics. The statistical model is devised 
using regression model which is a predominant observation-based modeling and 
analysis method. The statistical model is validated using split-sample validation 
approach. The empirical results of our performance evaluation are validated through 
the statistical regression model.  
1.6 Thesis Layout 
The research entitled “On the prevention of cross-VM cache-based SC attacks” is 
comprising of an extensive study. Therefore, the thesis has been divided into chapters for 
a clear reader understandability. The thesis is comprised of 7 chapters and the layout of 
the thesis is presented in Figure 1.3. 
Chapter 2 aims to review the research undertaken in the field of cross VM cache-
based SC attacks. The chapter describes knowledge about the CC and the vulnerability of 
SC attacks to identify and classify the SC attacks across VMs and in CC. Moreover, in 
this chapter, cross-VM cache-based SC attacks are focused and the detail about the 
prevention mechanism for these attacks are provided which discover the deficiency of the 
existing solution. We provide qualitative critical analysis in the aforementioned research 
direction based on the metrics derived from the proposed taxonomy. The research 
problems are identified by the literature review expose the need for the prevention 
mechanism based on the dynamic cache partition for the cross-VM cache-based SC 
attacks. Furthermore, several research issues are identified for the future research 
direction. 
In Chapter 3, we conducted the cache-based SC attacks in the cloud environment in 
single VM and across VMs. Using series of experiments for conducting these attacks by 
using the Prime + Probe and Flush + Reload techniques in Linux and across VM, we 
analyzed that CC is vulnerable to the dangerous information leakage attacks.  
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Chapter 4 describes HBP-DCP mechanism for the prevention of cache-based SC 
attacks across VM in the CC environment. The objectives and assumption undertaken by 
the technique are presented. Moreover, the schematic presentation of the proposed 
prevention mechanism is presented and each component of the technique is described in 
detail. The significance of the proposed technique is highlighted and the performance 
evaluation parameter is derived. 
Chapter 5 reports on the performance evaluation methodology for the HBP-DCP 
technique. The experimental setup is explained with accompanying benchmarks and the 
devices. The data collection method regarding the experimental and evaluation methods 
namely statistical modeling and benchmarking is described that have been utilized to 
evaluate and validate the proposed technique performance. The benchmarking application 
is described and the technique to evaluate the statistical modeling is also demonstrated. 
In Chapter 6, we present the result of the experimental performance evaluation of the 
HBP-DCP technique to prove its efficiency and significance. The experimental 
evaluation is based on three parameters, namely load, cache utilization, and memory 
access rate. We compare and contrast the result of benchmarking with the statistical 
model result to validate the performance of the proposed method. 
Finally, Chapter 7 concludes this work by revisiting the aim and objective of this 
research that how it is fulfilled. The main contribution of the research is summarized and 
the significance and the method proposed in this thesis are highlighted. The future 
research directions and limitations conclude the chapter. 
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Figure 1.3: Summary of Chapters Presented in this Thesis 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter presents a literature review on the cache-based cross-VM SC attacks and 
countermeasure for these attacks. The purpose of this chapter is to detail the literature 
work related to our problem domain in order to identify the potential research issues in 
the field of SC attacks and their countermeasures in virtualized environment. The primary 
research issues identified through the literature review is that with the exponential growth 
of CC environment, vulnerabilities and their corresponding exploitation of the prevailing 
cloud resources may potentially increase. CC supports multi-tenancy, physical co-
residency features which enable resource sharing among mutually distrusting CC clients 
and offers cost-effective, on-demand scaling. Although, these features provides numerous 
benefits to the CC tenant, however, resource sharing and VMs physical co-residency 
enable a new form of sensitive information leakage such as SC attacks. Unlike encryption, 
which protects information from being decoded by unauthorized persons, SC attacks aim 
to attack the encryption systems and to hide the existence of communication. Initially, SC 
attacks were identified as the main threat on multi-level secure systems i.e. OS, database, 
and networks. More recently the focus of researchers has shifted toward SC attacks in 
CC. The target of this article is to explore SC attacks, especially cache-based cross-VM 
SC attacks and countermeasure in CC and how they compare to traditional SC attacks 
and countermeasure. The taxonomies are devised with reference to cache-based cross VM 
SC attacks and countermeasures for these attacks. Qualitative comparison of the state-of-
the-art research works is detailed in each section. The chapter also provides the basic 
knowledge of the technical elements found in the thesis such as cache-based SC attacks, 
Cross-VM cache-based SC attack, and countermeasures for these attacks.  
The rest of this chapter is organized is as follows: Section 2 discusses the background 
detail of cache-based SC attacks and to classify the cache-based SC attacks into different 
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types. Section 3 describes the SC attacks in the cloud environment. Section 4 provides 
the prevention mechanism for cross-VM SC attacks followed by the discussion on the 
existing cross-VM SC attacks and proposed countermeasure. Finally, Sections 6 conclude 
this chapter by comparing existing approaches and providing a general design approach 
for prevention of SC attacks. 
2.1 Background 
This section describes the background detail about the CC, cache-based SC attacks, 
and previous work related to SC attacks in the cloud. It also describes techniques to 
implement cache-based SC attacks. Since the cloud users use the same hardware and the 
computational properties of hardware channel namely power consumption and time are 
mostly used for these types of attack. Since a cache is the most accessed hardware, most 
targeted hardware channel for SC attacks, therefore, this study includes a detail 
description of cache-based SC attacks and their typical prevention techniques. 
Although there are existing surveys which explored SC attacks in detail (Osvik, 
Shamir et al. 2006). However, they investigated the cache-based SC attacks in the non-
virtualized environment including database, networking, and OS. To the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first survey which explores the cross-VM cache-based SC attacks 
as well as cache-based SC attacks in CC and proposed some countermeasures in the 
virtualized environment. The aim of this thesis is to explore the SC attacks involving 
CPU-cache and their mitigation techniques in a state-of-the-art cloud system to improve 
security in CC. We categorized the SC attacks according to the hardware medium they 
target and exploit, based on the ways of accessing the module and the method used to 
extract the confidential information. We also investigate countermeasures for their 
prevention, required to improve the security in CC. 
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2.1.1 Cloud Computing 
CC can be defined as a new paradigm that delivers computing and IT as a service as 
shown in Figure 2.1. The cloud resources on-demand concept has attracted end users to 
utilize various CC services, such as “Software, Platform, and Infrastructure” as-a-service 
(“SaaS, PaaS, and IaaS”) at low cost (Zhang, Cheng et al. 2010). However, CC is a big 
concern for cryptographers because they are putting their data and program out there away 
from their trusted computers (Ristenpart, Tromer et al. 2009). Therefore, security in CC 
is a critical issue given the distributed infrastructure and user-friendly nature of this 
technology. Cyber threats to the cloud environment are different from the threats to 
traditional systems (Security 2010). 
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Figure 2.1: Layered Model of Cloud Computing 
As cloud service providers offer their customer unlimited use of shared cloud 
resources, this makes the cloud environment vulnerable to attacks. Furthermore, CC 
facilitates end users with a set of API and software interfaces, opening a window for 
intruders. As company delivers services (SaaS, PaaS, IaaS) from cloud provider in a 
scalable way, they provide an opportunity for intruders to gain an inappropriate level of 
control over the cloud resources and this shared technology of CC enables intruders to 
extract information in the form of SC attacks. Table 2.1 describes the characteristics of 
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CC. CC introduces a multitenancy feature, however, this new concept of co-residence 
client and physical co-residency enables hardware and software covert and SC attacks.  
Table 2.1: Characteristic of CC 
Characteristics Description 
Dynamic provisioning Mobile users execute their application in a flexible way without 
any advance reservation for cloud resources  
Scalability The deployment of mobile applications meet the unpredictable 
demand  
Multi-tenancy Multi-tenancy provides sharing technology of cloud resources 
Ease of integration Multiple cloud services from different cloud service providers 
can be integrated to meet user demands 
 
Despite these characteristics, CC is vulnerable to SC attacks because of its easy 
accessibility and distributed infrastructure. Although there are several defensive 
techniques such as firewall, cryptography, and access control, however, are unable to 
protect cloud environment from SC attacks. Therefore, there is a need for a preventive 
mechanism for SC attacks. 
2.1.1.1 Virtualization 
Besides the benefits of multi-tenancy and physical co-residency, CC has another 
characteristic called virtualization. Virtualization involves the abstraction of the physical 
machine to OSs in multiple VM on the same physical device isolated by the Virtual 
Machine Manager (VMM) or hypervisor. In virtualization, the hypervisor namely the 
XEN and VMware are responsible for the communication between VM as shown in 
Figure 2.2. Although the hypervisor uses sandboxing techniques to provide logical 
isolation across guest VMs for modern virtualization, this logical VM isolation is not 
equal to physical isolation. It is also not sufficient if the attacker uses the SC attacks to 
circumvent them because VM uses the same hardware, which is a serious threat to VM 
logical isolation (Ristenpart, Tromer et al. 2009). The literature shows that attackers can 
use the SC attacks to acquire detail about the memory access pattern of another program 
such as the cryptographic algorithm that performs the encryption with an unknown private 
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key. These SC attacks affect and observe the cache state and then analyze the effect on 
the encryption’s execution time, during, or after the execution of encryption. Since the 
VM resides on the same physical hardware, it is at risk to SC attacks in virtualized 
environment and this has been a known problem for the last 10 years (Ristenpart, Tromer 
et al. 2009). For instance, Ristenpart et al. (Ristenpart, Tromer et al. 2009) successfully 
implemented the cache-based SC attack in the virtualized environment for the first time 
and violate and break through the logical isolation supplied by a sandboxing mechanism. 
In fact, he is not only able to co-locate two VM on the identical physical device but also 
able to extract the key stroke by a victim VM. As described in the following section, the 
prevention mechanism of SC attacks need to be followed by the two key points of the 
cloud model.
 
CPU
Memory
Shared Resources
Virtual Machine Monitor (Hypervisor)
VM1
MEMMEMMEM
OPS2OPS1 OPS3
App3App2App1
VM3VM2Side Channel 
Attacks
 
Figure 2.2: Virtualization 
2.1.1.2 Cloud Model 
We refer the cloud model in this thesis as a specific relationship that the CC has 
established with its users and the underlying hardware. The two key points that have been 
highlighted by the cloud model has become commonplace in the CC environment (IBM 
2012). According to the first key point, the users have no knowledge or permission to 
change the cloud software they intend to run and is always able to run canonical software 
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on the cloud. The second point is that the users always run the software that does not need 
to change the underlying hardware of cloud because the cloud is built on the canonical 
hardware. According to these two key points of the cloud model, any modification to the 
CC must comply with the listed two points. Therefore all the solution comply with the 
cloud model if: 
 If it does need any modification in the underlying hardware 
 If it does not need the clients to change their software which they intend to run 
on the cloud 
If a solution is developed according to these two points then it complies with the cloud 
model and can be easily applied to the CC environment without altering the already 
established functionality of CC. We design our solution server based to keep in mind the 
above mentioned two point and therefore transparent to the clients and the underlying 
hardware. The client does not need to change their software as well as does not required 
to change the underlying hardware. 
2.1.2 Side Channel Attacks 
Traditionally, in cryptography, cryptographic devices are thought of as black boxes. 
It means that the only way attackers can gain access to these devices. Since the data and 
computation are by giving them input and receiving the output of the computation, what 
is going on within the devices is completely hidden from the attackers. Attackers use 
physical attacks e.g., SC attacks to gain more information about the data used in the 
devices. Over the last decade, side channels that transfer confidential data in a way that 
violate security rules have been identified as a major issue in implementing cryptographic 
algorithms. Although overt channels utilize the system's secure data object to transmit 
confidential information in a way that does not violate the security rules. These channels 
use the data object to hold the information including buffers, files, shared memories, and 
thread signals. These data objects are normally viewed as a data container. On the other 
 23 
hand, covert or side channels use system resources or entities to transfer information 
between subjects that are not normally viewed as a data container. In this chapter, a survey 
is conducted on the cross-VM cache-based SC attacks. 
SC attacks are the physical attacks that use the physical process to extract the secret 
information of the cryptographic algorithms such as encryption key. The computation is 
a physical process that involves the use of all kinds of physical characteristics of 
computation such as the timings it takes to run a program, the characteristic of the power 
consumed during a program execution, electromagnetic radiation, acoustics, and 
temperature to leak the confidential information. This attack typically works by creating 
the correlation between the functionality of the underlying hardware in the physical 
device and the software and this correlation can be used to infer the internal execution of 
the software program at a specified time. Although the state-of-the-art literature studied 
these attacks for numerous years in the context of a multi-level embedded system and 
smart cards, the literature showed that the microprocessor is also vulnerable to these 
attacks (Bernstein 2005, Percival 2005, Osvik, Shamir et al. 2006). Traditionally, to 
accomplish a physical attack in multilevel embedded systems (e.g., database and OS) is 
a difficult task because it requires gaining physical access to the system. However, in a 
virtualized environment, because of resources sharing, gaining access to a system is very 
easy.  
Smart cards are the most targeted device for SC attacks and because of the noisy nature 
of these attacks, it is very difficult to collect sensitive information and gain physical 
access or proximity. However, a virtualized environment makes it possible to gain 
physical access to the system. The more traditional attacks are used to attack and extract 
the information from a general-purpose computer e.g., Attacks that authorize an attacker 
to acquire physical access to the secret data of the entire system by exploiting flaws in 
OS. SC attacks can be implemented on all devices including mobile phone, PC, tablet, 
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and server, which use a cryptographic algorithm for securing information. For instance, 
the web browser has an embedded cryptographic algorithm called RSA, which is widely 
used by the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) today for secure communication and electronic 
data transfer over the Internet. Moreover, these attacks are generally categorized into 
hardware-based channel including power analysis, bus probing and a software-based 
channel including timing attacks, cache attacks, and memory attacks.  
2.1.3 Taxonomy of Side Channel Attacks 
SC attacks can be categorized into different types based on the computing location 
(virtualized and non-virtualized), the implementation, and the ways of accessing the 
module. The detail of each category is given in the following sections as well as in Figure 
2.3. 
2.1.3.1 Side Channel Attacks based on the Computing Location 
These attacks are categorized based on virtualized and non-virtualized environments 
as shown in Figure 2.3. In addition, the attacks are also classified on the basis of whether 
the victim and the attacker have existed in the same cores or in different cores as shown 
in Figure 2.4. The SC attacks have been studied in a multiprocessing system including 
the database, OS, and in networking for many years. In these systems, the SC attacks are 
implemented on the same OS and on same cores and also on the different cores in the 
same OS. However, in virtualized environment, the attacks are implemented on the 
different guest OS either on the same or on different cores. 
(a) Intra-VM Side Channel Attacks 
These are also called process level SC Attacks. Malicious processes P1 and P2 
are positioned in the same OS in the domain unit (Dom U) and in the same hardware with 
different security levels. In the single VM, one higher level secure process P1 (attacker) 
leaks the confidential information from the process P2 having a low-security level 
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(victim) using the SC attack. These attacks can be implemented in the guest VM where 
the attacker and the victim have existed in the same or on different cores in the single 
guest VM. However, process level SC attacks for the traditional personal computer have 
been surveyed for many years, and several mature defensive mechanisms and analysis 
techniques have been mentioned in the literature (Brickell, Graunke et al. 2006). The state 
of the art literature shows several defensive mechanisms for intra-VM or process level 
attacks (Bernstein 2005, Aciiçmez 2007, Acıiçmez, Brumley et al. 2010). The detail of 
each one is given in Table 2.2. 
(b) Cross Platform Side Channel Attacks 
These attacks are also called network level SC attacks. Malicious processes P1 
(attacker) and P2 (victim) are placed in different OSs and on different hardware platforms. 
The network is the main source of communication between these two processes P1 and 
P2, therefore, these processes use network storage and timing channels to transfer the 
confidential data in such a way that violates the policy of the system security. SC attacks 
are mainly based on the entire network, the literature showed the study on these attacks 
in the non-virtualized environment since 1987 (Zander, Armitage et al. 2007, Irazoqui, 
Eisenbarth et al. 2015). These attacks can also be implemented in the cloud environment 
but its prevention solution is already available in the literature (Brickell, Graunke et al. 
2006, Osvik, Shamir et al. 2006). 
(c) Cross-VM Side Channel Attacks 
These are the OS level SC attacks. Malicious processes P1 (attacker) and P2 
(victim) are situated in distinct domains but the underlying hardware platform is same. 
Cross-VM SC attacks are introduced by the hypervisor managed multi-tenancy and VM 
Co-residency features (Ristenpart, Tromer et al. 2009, Suzaki, Iijima et al. 2011, Wu, Xu 
et al. 2012, Zhang, Juels et al. 2012). Confidential information (e.g., extraction of a 
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cryptographic key ) may be leaked by the SC attacks among VMs and competitive 
companies that are physically co-located, which will bring huge economic losses to the 
CC. Cross-VM cache-based SC attacks are further categorized into shared memory-, 
CPU-load-, and cache-based attacks. In SC attacks based on the shared memory SC 
attacks, different memory access intervals are used to extract the secret key of any 
cryptographic algorithm and sensitive information about the memory. In CPU-load based 
SC attacks, the physical characteristics of computation (e.g., physical resources) such as 
CPU execution time is used to extract the confidential information and the secret key of 
any cryptographic algorithm. While in cache-based SC attacks the different cache access 
latencies (e.g., cache miss and cache hit) are used to transmit and extract data covertly. 
Details of the cache-based SC attacks are given in the following section. In this thesis, 
our focus is on the cross-VM cache-based SC attacks which we will elaborate in detail in 
the upcoming section. 
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Figure 2.3: Types of Side Channel Attack in Hypervisors (XEN) 
2.1.3.2 Side Channel Attacks based on Implementation 
SC attacks can also be classified into parallel and sequential attacks, based on the 
implementation as given in Figure 2.4. These attacks are differentiated as to whether they 
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are conducted on parallel or sequential access to the cache memory of CPU. These types 
of attacks are the most known cache-based SC attacks in CC. The following section 
describes these two types of attacks in detail. 
(a) Sequential Side Channel Attacks 
In order to establish cache-based SC attacks, the victim and the attacker need to 
share some portion of cache memory. In present-day hardware, two different approaches 
are used to share caches between multiple cores. One approach is that cache is assigned 
to one CPU core or the cache is accessed by two processes sequentially while the other is 
for them to have parallel access or the CPU cache is shared between different CPU cores. 
Sequential access requires a process context switch to be on the same CPU core, whereas 
concurrent access can be achieved by having a shared cache between CPU distinct cores 
based on hardware restriction. The literature shows that there is a lot of research for both 
types of the channel (Wu, Xu et al. 2012). In both types the sequential access is typically 
seen as more portable, as the concurrent access is to a cache is only allowed by some 
systems. Sequential SC attacks work in a way that the receiver (attacker) will wait for a 
message to be read until the sender (victim) writes a message. Due to the ordering, there 
is a clear window in which the cache can be flushed for prevention purposes that are when 
the context switch occurs between the attacker and the victim. All other cache-based 
sequential SC attacks rely on this mechanism, making it a well-known example of a 
canonical SC attack. Moreover, all cache-based cross-VM SC attacks have been based on 
this fundamental method; an effective restriction of its principles could, therefore, prevent 
all current SC attacks in the cloud (Zhang, Juels et al. 2012). 
(b) Parallel Side Channel Attacks 
Parallel SC can be achieved by adapting sequential SC on a shared-cache system 
having Last Level Cache (LLC). In this approach, the probing (attacker) and target 
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(victim) processes are located on distinct cores but have concurrent access to the shared 
LLC. Although the access to a cache memory in both sequential and parallel attacks are 
the same, the parallel access method does not require to trigger between two VMs. This 
is because there is no clear gap in the Trigger and the Probe steps and both have occurred 
at the same time. Although similar to the sequential method, the process originates with 
the probing executing the “Probe” step, however, unlike sequential this method has no 
context switch so the target process is started after probe step. Once the cache is primed, 
like the sequential, the target VM can execute the “Trigger” step rather than the “Trigger" 
and “Probe" steps are executing concurrently. However, in comparison to a sequential SC 
attack, the parallel technique is not so reliable as an attack medium because the more 
noise in the system makes them unreliable, and also because while one VM reads a cache 
line, the other VM modifies another cache line.  
To date, the literature described that only a sequential SC attack can do a very serious 
destruction in the cloud (Zhang, Juels et al. 2012). Although a parallel channel attack is 
difficult to conduct, as it still holds the ability to be applied in such an attack and gain 
unauthorized access to the information about a VM. In addition, it is difficult to flush the 
cache in parallel access, because the VM might change the cache, rendering it useless and 
generating too much overhead. Parallel cache-based SC attack can be avoided by 
restricting the ability of co-resident VMs on the physical machine from evicting one 
another’s data from the cache memory. 
2.1.3.3 Side Channel Attacks based on the Way of Accessing the Module 
Anderson et al. (Anderson, Bond et al. 2006), categorized SC attacks into invasive, 
non-invasive and semi-invasive attacks based on whether these attacks have direct or 
indirect access to the device as shown in Figure 2.4. 
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(a) Invasive/ Hardware Side Channel Attacks 
In this section we discuss the physical attacks involving the interaction of 
attackers with the chip package and direct physical access to the components by 
depackaging the chip. The well-known example of this is the direct connection between 
a wire and a data bus to observe the transfer of data. In addition, these attacks involve the 
probing or modification of the chip once it is opened. Invasive attacks can be achieved 
by getting direct access through electrical to the internal parts of the main crypto 
processor. For instance, to capture signal of a bus line, the attackers place a micro probing 
needle that can open a hole to get direct access to the passivation layer of a microcontroller 
chip. These attacks are not limited to a smart card but can also be performed on 
Complementary metal–Oxide–Semiconductor (CMOS) components. However, these 
attacks are expensive, since they require the individual or physical access of the 
compromised devices. 
(b) Non-invasive/ Software Side Channel Attacks 
SC attacks, also known as passive non-invasive attacks, exploit the directly 
accessible interface of the cryptographic devices. However, these attacks do not leave 
behind any evidence because the cryptographic device is not permanently modified. 
These attacks involve playing with the clock signal and voltage, which exploit the 
physical characteristics of computation (e.g., the unintentional leakage) such as execution 
time and the power consumed to run a process. The device’s computation process can be 
observed or manipulated by local non-invasive attacks. For instance, the fluctuation in 
the current in a power analysis attack, consumed by the devices can be measured with the 
high accuracy, and by correlating the measurements obtained with the computations of 
the underline hardware the value of cryptographic keys can be extracted. These attacks 
are dangerous as the owner of the compromised device is often unaware that the secret 
key has been stolen. 
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Non-invasive attacks are further divided into power analysis and fault analysis SC 
attacks. Power analysis is further categorized into Simple Power Analysis (SPA), 
Differential Power Analysis (DPA), and Fault Analysis (FA) attacks. In SPA attacks, the 
attackers try to leak information and the encryption key by observing the power 
consumption of the device (Mangard 2002). While in a DPA (Kocher, Jaffe et al. 1999), 
instead of looking for a direct relation between the secret data and the power consumption, 
the attackers try to check the variance in power consumption over many iterations of the 
algorithm. The power consumption of a unit is generally used to observe the internal 
execution while an encryption operation is being performed. SPA and DPA are the non-
invasive SC attacks that allow the attackers to attack and harm the tamper-resistance 
device by analyzing their power consumption (Countermeasures). DPA is a most 
dangerous security threat for all the electronic devices which use cryptography for 
performing encryption. The countermeasure for SPA and DPA attacks include hardware, 
software, and protocol prevention solution that secure tamper-resistance electronic 
devices from SC attacks. However, FA attacks generate fault in a system and investigate 
the encryption algorithm to extract secret keys by using this faults (Aumüller, Bier et al. 
2002). Fault analysis attacks can be further categorized into conventional and differential 
fault analysis. A conventional FA attack (Li, Sakiyama et al. 2010) aims to retrieve secret 
data by analyzing the result of faulty encryptions. While in differential FA attacks (Biham 
and Shamir 1997), the attacker encrypts the same plaintext twice, once with and once 
without an induced error. The attacker then tries to identify the round in which the fault 
occurred by looking at the difference between the two obtained ciphertexts. 
(c)  Semi-invasive SC Attacks 
Compared with the non-invasive attacks, semi-invasive attacks are very difficult 
to implement as they involve the opening or depackaging of the chip. However, these 
attacks have implemented without the requirement of an expensive equipment in 
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comparison to invasive attacks. Furthermore, the implementation of these attacks requires 
only a short time. They can be achieved by depackaging the chip to get direct access to 
the chip surface but without harming the chip passivation layer or making any illegal 
electrical entry other than with the authorized interface. These attacks could be 
accomplished using UV light, X-rays, electromagnetic fields, laser, and another source of 
ionizing radiation. For example, the attacker can ionize a transistor by using a laser beam 
and thus changing the flip-flop’s state that holds the device’s protection state (Aciiçmez, 
Koç et al. 2007).  
 
Figure 2.4: Taxonomy of Side Channel Attacks 
Existing literature shows that these three attacks are local and can be easily prevented, 
however, remote attacks are more challenging to prevent since they are not dependent on 
the quality of the crypto processor hardware (Smith 2003). Having discussed the 
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vulnerability issues concerning CC, this current research focuses mainly on the defensive 
mechanism of cache-based SC attacks (cross-VM attacks) in CC. Our proposed HBP-
DCP solution is based on the cache-based time-driven SC attacks. The detailed 
classification of these attacks is given in Figure 2.4.  
2.2 Cross-VM Cache-based Side Channel Attacks 
SC attacks existed in the past in multilevel systems including database, OS, and 
networking (Zander, Armitage et al. 2007), however, the co-residency feature of the CC 
makes cross-VM cache-based SC attacks more effective in this paradigm (Ristenpart, 
Tromer et al. 2009). It was very difficult to gain physical access to the system in the past, 
but with shared resources, in the cloud, physical access can be easily accomplished 
(Chang and Ramachandran 2016). Cross-VM Cache attacks are purely software based, 
and they extract the full encryption key of the well-known cryptographic algorithms 
including RSA, AES without any direct or physical interaction with the cryptographic 
devices (Zhang, Juels et al. 2012). These attacks are deployed very easily and are efficient 
as they require a short time to break the well-secured systems. Moreover, these attacks 
use the spying process to collect information about the accessed cache line for extracting 
the cryptographic key from Linux encrypted partition. Irazoqui et al. (Irazoqui G 2014) 
conducted the Bernstein’s correlation attack in a virtual environment for the first time to 
show the implementation of cross-VM SC attacks on KVM, VMware, and Xen.  
Similarly, Irazoqui et al. (Irazoqui, Inci et al. 2014) established the Flush + Reload 
cache-based SC attack across VM executing on a VMware hypervisor. They used a 
memory deduplication technique known as transparent page sharing for launching the SC 
attack and recovered the AES key in a very short time from the AES implemented in 
OpenSSL 1.0.1. One of the main features of cache-based SC attacks is the memory 
deduplication, which has been explained in the earlier section of this thesis. To this extent, 
CPU Cache is seen as the attackers’ most targeted device in the cloud due to the device’s 
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high shared interaction between processes, cores, and VM. This interaction leads to 
crosstalk between processes and VM, thus leaking the most fine-grain information of 
computation (power, time) to attackers. Although the virtual memory mechanism secures 
the stored data in the cache memory from SC attacks by, the “metadata” have the most 
fine-grain information about the cache information and pattern of the memory access (i.e. 
the addresses of which are being accessed) is not fully protected. Several approaches for 
measurement that exploit crosstalk between processes have been identified. One approach 
is to measure the effect of the cache on the encryption algorithm (requiring accurate 
timings). Another approach analyzes the effect of the encryption algorithm on the cache 
status. Despite using the partitioning method, which includes sandboxing and memory 
protection, these attacks allow an unauthorized program (attacker) to attack the victim 
processes on the same physical device running in parallel. These methods provide the 
logical isolation but are unable to secure communication between processes that are 
physically located on the same domain. 
In comparison to hardware (physical) SC attacks, software cross-VM cache-based SC 
attacks have a more serious impact on the systems and clients or cloud users. Since almost 
all modern microprocessors contain cache, physical access to a system very easy in the 
cloud, making the software attacks much easier to accomplish, and are also effective on 
disparate platforms (Bernstein 2005, Percival 2005, Osvik, Shamir et al. 2006). 
Consequently, this makes cross-VM cache-based SC attacks as a new weapon for the 
adversaries and a much-discussed topic in the literature. These attacks can be achieved 
without exploiting bus and memory probing since it is not must for software cache-based 
SC attacks to gain physical access. The attacker can exploit the system by acting like a 
legitimate user performing a normal operation without the requirement to find the system 
flaws to perform unauthorized operations. The attacker and the victim are two processes 
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that do not have the same address space, therefore this always makes the attacker able to 
leak confidential information about the victim’s activity. 
 The cross-VM cache-based SC attacks are also called remote attacks involving 
faraway observation of the normal input and output data of the device. Timing 
observation, cryptanalysis, analysis of the protocol, and SC attacks on the programming 
interfaces of applications are examples of remote timing attacks. The cross-VM cache 
based SC attacks are further categorized into time-, access-, and trace-driven attacks, 
which are explained in detail in the following section. Timing analysis attacks conducted 
on shared caches memory have been widely studied in the cryptanalysis of cryptographic 
algorithm, e.g. (Bonneau and Mironov 2006, Acıiçmez, Schindler et al. 2007, Intel 2007, 
Brumley and Hakala 2009, Tromer, Osvik et al. 2010, ARM 2012) in a non-virtualized 
environment. In this research work, we elaborate the cross-VM cache-based SC attacks 
in detail. To the best of our knowledge, no prior works have conducted a survey on cross-
VM cache-based SC attacks and countermeasure. Therefore, the main contribution of this 
chapter is to thoroughly study the literature on cross-VM cache-based SC attacks and 
proposed countermeasure to these attacks. 
2.3 Causes of the Cross-VM Cache-based Side Channel Attacks 
Cross-VM attacks are conducted between the two VMs (victim and Attacker) in a 
virtualized environment. In this section, the main causes in the memory management 
system are described that allow the information leakage in virtualized environment. 
Although sandboxing provides logical isolation across guest VMs, this isolation is 
considered to be imperfect and the attacks exploit the memory deduplication and huge 
pages to leak the secret information across VM boundaries. Since the cache is the most 
interactive device between VM, it often becomes the targeted device for SC attacks in the 
modern computers. Therefore, the source of information leakage by using cache in X86 
computer is shown in the Figure 2.5. 
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Figure 2.5: Sources of Information Leakage on Shared Hardware 
2.3.1 Last Level Cache Memory 
The cache memory is located between RAM and CPU cores to remove the delay added 
by the accessing of the data. The main objective of the cache memory is to decrease the 
required time for accessing data from the main memory. Modern CPU have more than 
one cache memory to improve the computation performance by improving the efficiency 
of cache access. A unit of a cache memory is called line, which consists of a fixed number 
of bytes. There are a fixed number of cache lines in each multiple cache sets and these 
cache lines in a cache set is called an associative. The cache is divided into L1, L2, and 
L3 level. The associative of L1 and L2 cache memory are 8-way associative while the L3 
cache memory is a 12-way associative (Handy 1998).  
Cache is classified into inclusive and exclusive on the basis of the design approach. In 
the inclusive design approach, the data is stored in the L1 cache and is also duplicated in 
the L2 and L3 cache at the same time. While in the exclusive design, the data is never 
shared between all the cache levels. In modern Intel processors including Core I5 and 
Core I7, the L3 or LLC is shared between all CPU cores. The salient characteristic of the 
LLC is that it is by design an inclusive cache memory. Therefore, the data stored in the 
L1 and L2 caches is also copied in the LLC. Consequently, in the case of a cache miss in 
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the L1 cache, the data will be checked in L2 in order to decrease the cache miss rate. 
Furthermore, if the data is flushed or evicted from the LLC, it will automatically be erased 
from all the other levels of the processor’s cache.  
Although shared cache has some advantages such as increased utilization of cache 
space, decreased cache miss rate, faster inter-core communication through shared LLC 
(L3 and L2), and the elimination of undesired replication of cache lines to reduce 
aggregate cache footprint. However, the major disadvantage of shared LLC is the 
uncontrolled contention can occur by allowing CPU-cores to access the shared LLC on a 
freely basis. Consequently, a scenario can occur where one core can easily access and 
evict the useful content of LLC (L3and L2) belonging to another core result a high LLC 
miss rate. This cache miss rate degrades the overall performance of the application and 
system. Similarly, one core can easily extract the useful data of another core can cause 
SC attacks.  
The cache is divided into cache lines having fixed size of l bytes. A cache line contains 
the information that can be fetched or written at the time of cache access. When the CPU 
accessed the data stored in the memory for the first time, it first queries the cache memory 
for data, if it is in the cache then the required time for fetching the data will be low. This 
is because the memory line that contains the regained data is loaded into the cache 
memory. If the same data is retrieved again from the identical memory line, then for the 
same data access the access time will be minimized and this is called a cache hit. 
However, if the needed data is not available in the cache then the CPU will fetch the data 
from the main memory and the required time for fetching the data will be high and this is 
called cache miss. The CPU fetches the data from the main memory when the cache miss 
occurs and stores a copy in the cache. Therefore, encryption time for a cryptographic 
algorithm directly depends on the position of the accessed table, which in turn depends 
on the internal confidential state of the cipher. The secret key of the encryption algorithm 
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can be extracted by exploiting this timing information. In the case of unavailability of 
cache lines, the data that is not recently being accessed are removed to create a space for 
the input lines to cache. Therefore, the eviction of cache lines from the cache memory is 
based on the not recently accessed cache line policy. 
TLB (Translation-Lookaside Buffer) is the fastest hardware cache of virtual to 
physical address translation is also called address translation cache. Upon each virtual to 
physical translation, the hardware first checks the TLB cache whether the virtual memory 
reference is already present in the TLB or not. If present in the TLB then the translation 
is performed very quickly without consulting with the page table. TLB improve the 
performance of the system by making virtual to physical translation possible. The 
hardware can handle the TLB misses entirely by using page table base register that exactly 
tell the location of the page table in memory. On the TLB miss the hardware check the 
exact page table and extract the translation and update the translation in the TLB. 
Cache hit rate= number of hits/ total number of access 
When the TLB cache accesses the memory for the first time this misses always occur, 
however, spatial locality improve the TLB performance. The elements of the array are 
tightly couple so always TLB miss occurs only for accessing the first element of the array. 
The idea behind hardware is to take advantage of locality. The functionality and 
performance of TLB cache are always dependent on the spatial and temporal locality 
features of cache. According to temporal locality the data or instruction that are recently 
been accessed will likely be accessed again in the future (e.g., loop variables). In contrast, 
with spatial locality, the data and the information in the nearby location of the already 
accessed will be likely accessed in the future. Consequently, when the data is retrieved 
from main memory by the processor, the copy of that data with nearby memory data will 
be put in the cache memory to minimize the future access delay of data. The spatial 
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locality facilitates the CPU by storing the entire bigger block of data along with the data 
in nearby locations. The execution performance can be improved by storing the entire 
block of data because the data that is located nearby the originally retrieved values are 
likely to be retrieved again. With address space identifier (ASID), the TLB is able to hold 
and differentiate translation from the different process without any confusion during 
context switching.  
How do the attackers work? To exploit the timing information, the attacker chooses a 
cache sized memory buffer and set the cache to a known state before the victim processes 
an execution. The Attacker accesses all the lines in the buffer, loading the cache with its 
data. When the victim executes, the victim replaces some memory in the cache. The 
attacker then measures the time to access the buffer cache (Liu, Yarom et al. 2015). 
Access to the cache line is faster than to evict lines. CPU caches are the most targeted 
hardware devices by adversaries due to the high-rate interactions between processes, 
shared among VMs or Cores, and have the most fine-grain information about the 
computing processes. In the past, SC attacks are applied on L1 and L2 caches, and in 
virtualized environment L2 cache in Core 2 duo system is the most targeted device for 
cache-based SC attacks (Figure 2.6). Most of the attacker are still using L2 cache for 
launching cache-based SC attacks (Godfrey and Zulkernine 2014).  
However, in modern PC including Core i5 and Core i7, the LLC or L3 is the most 
targeted device for SC attacks. This is because every core has their own L1 and L2 cache 
but the L3 cache is shared between every core in modern architecture as shown in Figure 
2.7. Consequently, the attackers always target LLC (L3) for SC attacks. Flush and Reload 
attacks exploit the cache behavior and can be mostly implemented by using LLC. Figure 
2.6 shows the architecture of Core i5 processor in which the L2 cache is always shared 
between cores and VMs. Every cores have their own L1 data cache and instruction cache. 
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Figure 2.6: Virtual Machine CORE 2 Duo Memory Allocation Hierarchy 
In contrast to Core i5, Core i7 process have their L1 and L2 cache but L3 cache is 
always shared between cores and VMs as shown in Figure 2.7. The access time for 
accessing information from main memory or from L1 or L2 cache closer to main memory 
is more than from accessing it from L3 cache closer to the core. Cache-based SC attacks 
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Figure 2.7: Virtual Machine CORE i7 Memory Allocation Hierarchy 
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exploit this cache access timing difference. There is a need for a prevention mechanism 
that hides this timing difference from the attacker and which does not need any changes 
in the software or hardware by the client (Mishra, Pilli et al. 2017). 
2.3.2 Memory Deduplication 
One of the major causes of SC attacks is content aware sharing or memory 
deduplication. By using content aware sharing, the same pages are recognized and loaded 
by the disk location (Miłós, Murray et al. 2009). By merging the identical pages and 
making a single copy of the redundant data, many VMs are able to run on the host system 
(e.g., Hypervisor) (Xiao, Xu et al. 2013). This technique improves the memory efficiency 
by reducing the space and bandwidth requirements for data storage of multiple clients. 
However, deduplication has a great impact on the security of the system and it opens the 
door for cache-based SC attacks. The memory deduplication leaks sensitive information 
due to the deficiency in the Intel x86 processor and the Flush + Reload attack exploits 
this deficiency to monitor memory lines. The recent statistics (Russell 2010) showed that 
deduplication is the most impactful storage technology and in the near future, 75% of all 
backups will apply this. The memory deduplication mechanism, which first appeared in 
the Linux kernel version 2.6.32, is KSM (Kernel Same-page Merging) (Suzaki, Iijima et 
al. 2011). KSM is a memory saving feature and has also been suggested for virtualization 
such as Satori (Miłós, Murray et al. 2009). However, this approach is a big security threat 
for cryptographic algorithms in virtualized environment (Gullasch, Bangerter et al. 2011). 
The memory deduplication feature is enabled by default in some hypervisor namely 
VMware ESXI and Virtual Box. However, recognizing it as a major threat to security, 
Amazon never enabled this memory deduplication feature on their compute cloud server 
EC2. 
The memory deduplication can be exploited by one of the low noise cache-based SC 
attacks called flush reload attack. All the current LLC attacks (e.g., flush + reload attack 
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on L3) require deduplication. In these attacks, the target of the two processes is to access 
the same physical memory location. This means no identical contents are stored in the 
physical memory since the memory deduplication feature has eliminated the redundant 
data from the memory allowing the cross-sharing of data between processes. However, 
this mechanism creates a security vulnerability in CC. The system must protect data 
shared between two non-cooperating processes. Due to the additional copy operation, the 
access time to the normal page and de-duplicated page is different. Therefore, in 
virtualized environment, the attackers can easily get the memory access information from 
victim VM because the victim and attacker VM are collocated on the same physical 
machine (Suzaki, Iijima et al. 2011, Suzaki, Iijima et al. 2011). For instance, the attacker 
can easily detect whether the de-duplicated page exists in the collocated VM or not by 
requesting the same page from the memory. Although the adversary cannot modify or 
corrupt the data in the cache, parallel access rights and cross sharing can be exploited to 
extract secrets from the process executed in VM. 
2.3.3 Big Data Deduplication 
In this era, as the volume of the data is increasing on daily basis, everyone is thinking 
about for online storage to move and store data on the cloud side. Since this data is stored 
in a huge amount, it is therefore needed to remove the redundant data for improving the 
performance. In order to eliminate the repeated data, data deduplication mechanism is 
used. Data deduplication is one of the data compression mechanism use for big data which 
eliminate redundant copies of the data stored in multiple places in the storage of big data. 
Although this mechanism is used to improve the utilization of big data storage and also 
minimize the number of packets or bytes to be sent (Yu and Guo 2016). However, this is 
because of data deduplication that big data storage is vulnerable to SC attacks. Big data 
deduplication is one of the major cause of SC attacks. The overall cost can be reduced by 
providing the same services to multiple clients and this can be achieved by deduplication 
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mechanism. Since data is generated from different resources in a big data environment, 
everyone needs to think about the security of big data in CC. Similarly, the data is shared 
between different VM in the virtualized environment. If you think about to store a huge 
amount of data (big data) on the cloud side and to share your data with another VM then 
you have to care about the security and cost as well. The security of the big data storage 
is a major issue in CC which demotivates the cloud user and they are not further trusting 
to move their data to cloud side. The big data has different characteristics and is not 
equivalent to normal data, thereby security requirement for big data is different.  
Data duplication can be categorized into various types including granularity, location, 
and ownership on the basis of distinct criteria. Based on data granularity, the 
deduplication is further divided into a file- and bloc-level deduplication. In file-level 
deduplication, the big data is reduced by removing the redundant file. While in the block-
level, the redundant block of data is removed in the non-similar file (Stanek, Sorniotti et 
al. 2014). According to location, the deduplication is divided into the client- and server-
side deduplication. The deduplication of redundant data performed on the client side is 
called client-side deduplication otherwise target-based (server) deduplication. In the 
target or server-based mechanism, the server does all the deduplication while the source 
or client is completely unaware of the deduplication. The server-side deduplication 
mechanism improves the overall storage but does not have improvement in the 
bandwidth. While the deduplication on the client side improves both data storage and 
bandwidth making the system more vulnerable to SC attacks. By using deduplication the 
SC attackers can easily determine the big data storage. To store big data on the server side 
is more secure as compared the big data storage on the client side. Based on the data 
ownership, the deduplication mechanism is further classified into single-user and cross-
user deduplication. In a cross-user deduplication mechanism, the data interchange 
between two users. The storage and bandwidth can be improved by using cross-user 
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deduplication. Although cross-user deduplication is more effective in CC, however, it 
gives a chance to the attacker to leak the confidential information (Harnik, Pinkas et al. 
2010). In (Wang, Cao et al. 2016), the author proposed the attribute-based encryption 
which secures the big data storage from the SC attacks and is able to provide security to 
the big data. 
2.3.4 Huge Pages 
Although cloud service providers and the virtualization company have disabled the 
memory deduplication feature for the mitigation of cache-based SC attacks, another 
security risk for the virtualized and non-virtualized environment in the form of huge pages 
has come into existence. Huge pages are another root cause that attackers use for 
launching SC attacks. The attackers gain the knowledge about the physical addresses of 
the memory by using large size pages. The attacker takes the opportunity of the translation 
of the virtual to physical addresses. All the processes have no direct accessed to the 
physical address instead they are using the virtual addresses. The memory is divided into 
continuous fix block called memory pages. The virtual memory is used to load these 
memories when they are not present in the main memory. When some pages needed by a 
process is not retrieved from the main memory then page fault occur and the required 
pages are loaded from other storage. Therefore, before access to memory, a translation 
stage between virtual to physical address is needed. Modern computer architectures 
consist of Translation Lookaside Buffer (TLB) for the purpose to avoid the latency of 
virtual to physical address translation.  
The TLB behaves like a small cache is first observed before memory management 
unit. If the memory is divided by increasing the size of the page into fewer pages then 
this can be used to avoid TLB misses (Weisberg and Wiseman 2009, performance Feb 
2016). The TLB misses will be reduced than 4KB pages because the translation between 
virtual and physical addresses have significantly been reduced. Due to this reason, state-
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of-the-art processors use the huge size pages of 1MB. The usage of huge pages is very 
effective in virtualized environment where different VM use the same hardware resources 
on the same physical machine. The huge pages by default are enabled in all VMM or 
hypervisor including KVM, VMware, and XEN. Therefore, unlike Yarom’s Flush + 
Reload (Yarom and Falkner 2014) that only works when the deduplication is enabled, 
many other attacks can be launched by exploiting huge pages to extract the secret 
information in virtualized and non-virtualized environment (Irazoqui, Eisenbarth et al. 
2015). Liu et al. (Liu, Yarom et al. 2015) conducted SC attacks on the L3 cache by 
exploiting huge memory pages. They extracted the cryptographic key from the ElGamal 
encryption algorithm. Picking up from Liu et al (2015), Inci et al.(Inci, Gulmezoglu et al. 
2015) conducted prime + probe attacks in the cloud environment. They used the huge 
pages to extract the information about co-location and also the cryptographic key of 
ElGamal algorithm.  
2.4 Types of Cross-VM Cache-based Side Channel Attacks 
Cross-VM cache-based attacks are categorized into time-, trace-, and access-driven. 
The detail of each category is given in the following section. 
2.4.1 Time driven Side Channel Attacks 
In cryptography, an attack in which the attacker observes the execution time of the 
cryptographic algorithm and use this information to compromise a cryptosystem is called 
time-driven attacks. In addition, the attackers try to extract the cryptographic key by 
learning the system’s sensitive information and by analyzing the computation’s time of 
processes. It is an extremely powerful in CC because of the memory deduplication and 
logical isolation. In CC, the sandboxing provides only the logical isolation, which is not 
equal to the physical isolation. Therefore, the attacker in one VM can easily measure the 
computation time of any encryption algorithm by accessing the cache to determine the 
encryption key in use on the victim VM on the underlying hardware. The two co-resident 
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VM can easily access each other’s execution process and cache if the Transparent Page 
Sharing between the two VMs is enabled. The victim and the attacker VM could be on 
the same physical machine and could be remote. The attacks associated with the class of 
time-driven attacks are explained in (Osvik, Shamir et al. 2006, Tromer, Osvik et al. 2010) 
and the detailed example is given in Table 2.2.  
In these attacks, the timing difference can be exploited by associating the cache to a 
prior state known to a victim cryptographic operation. In addition, the following two 
methods are used to extract information from the victim’s operation. The first method is 
based on the time measurement which it takes for the victim to execute the cryptographic 
operation. As this time is related to the cache’s state, when the victim executes the 
operation, the attacker can evaluate the accessed cache lines by the victim and extract the 
secret information (Bernstein 2005, Acıiçmez, Schindler et al. 2007). In the second 
method, the attacker’s time for accessing the data after the victim’s operation is measured 
(Aciiçmez 2007, Brumley and Hakala 2009, Acıiçmez, Brumley et al. 2010). The changes 
in this time are dependent on the changes in the cache state before and after the victim 
operation. In the literature, this problem has gained a lot of attention. Time-driven attacks 
are further categorized into active and passive attacks. In a passive time-driven attack, the 
total computation time of the victim’s process is measured by the attacker, in contrast, the 
attacker observes the state of the cache in active time-driven attacks. 
The main challenges in the measurements of timings in the time-driven attacks are the 
increased level of noise (such as network latency and increased access time) and 
unpredictability of correlation of timings. Many cryptographic algorithms lack a proper 
defensive mechanism for cache based timing attacks. Therefore, the timing attacks can 
easily be implemented on any cryptosystem. For instance, libgcrypt (used in GNUTLS 
and GPG) and Cryptlib are not secure from the timing attacks. A defensive mechanism 
against the timing attacks is present in the OpenSSL 0.9.7 as an option. However, this 
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option is not enabled in common applications such as the Apache SSL module and mod 
SSL and therefore they are vulnerable to time-driven attacks. The following examples 
show that cryptosystems are vulnerable to time-driven SC attacks. 
Tsunoo et al. (Liu, Ge et al. 2016) implemented the initial practical results for cache-
based time-driven attacks and the authors were able to break the Data Encryption 
Standard (DES) in 90% of their attempts. They found that the internal table lookup 
collision in the cryptographic algorithms is the main cause for time-driven attacks. 
Various attacks associated with the class of timing attacks on AES were explained in the 
subsequent papers (Bernstein 2005, Osvik, Shamir et al. 2006, Acıiçmez, Schindler et al. 
2007, Tromer, Osvik et al. 2010). In some of them, the first or the last round of AES 
algorithm is required. These attacks execute the overall execution time of encryption 
algorithms. The detail of these attacks is given in Table 2. Osvik et al. (Osvik, Shamir et 
al. 2006) introduced the time-driven attack on the second round of AES algorithm for 
analyzing the timings information. Similarly, Weiß et al. (Weiß, Heinz et al. 2012) 
described the most relevant class of time-driven SC attack. In this work, they 
implemented a time-driven SC attack against an embedded uniprocessor in virtualized 
environment. In cache collision attack against AES (Bonneau and Mironov 2006), the 
authors conducted cache-based timing attacks in which they extracted the secret key by 
exploiting the cache collision due to the internal state of the table lookup operation in 
AES. 
2.4.2 Trace–Driven Side Channel Attacks 
In these attacks, the attacker’s process has the ability to capture a profile of the cache 
activity during the execution of the cryptographic algorithms. To launch this attack, the 
attackers need to access the profile in which they observe and extract the profile of the 
cache activity from other profile content. These attacks (Bertoni, Zaccaria et al. 2005, 
Lauradoux 2005) are related to the class of trace-driven attacks. The result of this attack 
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produces a cache hit if the victim accesses the cache and cache miss for every access to 
memory. Therefore, it is very easy to trace the S-box accesses for encryption algorithm 
including AES and DES during the execution time. As opposed to a time-driven attack, 
Osvik et al. (Osvik, Shamir et al. 2006) in his research conducted the two trace-driven 
attacks including Prime + Probe and Evict + Time and their impact on AES algorithm. 
They further investigated that both techniques can be applied during the attack 
implementation to recover the encryption key of any cryptosystem. 
In an Evict + Time attack, the cache is evicted before the encryption and then the cache 
access is investigated in term of a cache hit and cache miss. While in the Prime + Probe 
procedure, the cache is filled prior to encryption and after it has checked which cache line 
has or has not been accessed. The information can be further used to extract the encryption 
key. By using these attacks some features of the device are continuously monitored 
throughout the cryptographic operation, for example, a processor leaks information by 
analyzing electromagnetic radiation (e.g., (Gandolfi, Mourtel et al. 2001, Quisquater and 
Samyde 2001) and by the power consumption of the device (e.g., (Kocher, Jaffe et al. 
1999)). These attacks became powerful by the ability to continuously monitor the 
processor computation but the limitation is in physical proximity of the device to the 
timing and power measurements, an idea which was first introduced by Kocher in the 
year of 1999 (Kocher, Jaffe et al. 1999). Here we described the continuation of these 
attacks by measuring the cache access latency. 
2.4.3 Access-Driven Side Channel Attacks 
The most powerful attack is called an access-driven, in which the attacker tries to 
investigate which cache line has been observed during the execution of cryptographic 
algorithms. These different memory accesses are the main threat to cryptographic 
software since the variations in the computation time provide information about the secret 
key. These attacks evaluate the cache memory working with a fine-grain information, 
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rather than analyzing the overall computation time of the executable program. In these 
attacks, the attacker and the victim’s programs are executed side by side on the same host 
machine. The attacker executes a program on the same physical system that is executing 
the cryptosystem and observes the operation of the shared architectural component to 
extract confidential information about instruction and data cache.  
The usage of a shared architectural components such as the instruction cache 
(Aciiçmez 2007, Acıiçmez, Brumley et al. 2010), data cache (Percival 2005, Tromer, 
Osvik et al. 2010) floating-point multiplier (Aciicmez and Seifert 2007), or branch 
prediction cache (Aciiçmez, Koç et al. 2007) is monitored by the attacker’s program to 
extract secret information about the cryptographic key. To implement this attack, the 
researchers (Ristenpart, Tromer et al. 2009, Gullasch, Bangerter et al. 2011, Zhang, Juels 
et al. 2012, Yarom and Falkner 2014) exploit a shared hardware cache between both VMs 
and filled the cache with their own data. The target victim VM changed the cache by 
overwriting some of its data, including information about the secret key. When they 
rewrite their information in the cache, the attacker is able to detect the private encryption 
key. The most effective and common method for implementing an access-driven SC 
attack as conducted by Osvik et al. (Osvik, Shamir et al. 2006) is to Prime the cache and 
then Probe, hence it is called the prime + probe protocol. Similarly, Neve et al, (Neve and 
Seifert 2006) introduced access-driven SC attacks in which they target the last round of 
AES. They showed in their research that the whole key can be extracted with a limited 
set of encryption in a very short time. In addition, in (Neve and Seifert 2006, Gullasch, 
Bangerter et al. 2011), the authors illustrated that these attacks are successful in a single 
core, non-virtualized environment by attackers involved in game OS process scheduling. 
Traditionally, unlawful access into a non-virtualized environment is very difficult, 
however in virtualized environment, the co-residency of guest VMs make it possible to 
gain access quite easily.  
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In a virtualized environment, Ris-tenpart et al (Ristenpart, Tromer et al. 2009) 
implemented the first access-driven attack on modern Symmetric Multi-Processing 
(SMP) and multi-core architectures. Their attack is able to provide information about the 
cache utilization of guest VM, however, is unable to extract the cryptographic secrets. In 
line with that, Percival, et al (Percival 2005) conducted an access-driven attack on the 
data cache. In their attack, the shared architectural component is monitored to extract data 
from the data cache during the execution of the RSA cryptosystem. Similarly, in (Owens 
and Wang 2011), the authors implemented an access-driven attack to exploit the memory 
deduplication in the victim VMware ESXI hypervisor for fingerprinting the OS. Zhang 
et al. (Zhang, Juels et al. 2012) described the cross-VM SC attacks in a virtualized SMP 
by extracting a cryptographic key from the VM. They perform the successful sequential 
SC attacks by using the CPU cache and do serious damage to virtualized environment by 
extracting the cryptographic secret from unwary hosts.  
In the existing study, Gullasch et al. (Gullasch, Bangerter et al. 2011) implemented a 
Flush + Reload SC attack that accessed specific memory lines in the AES memory by 
utilizing cache behavior. The authors used the processor’s clflush instruction to expel the 
observed memory lines and using this information, they extract the secret key in less than 
100 encryptions. While this attack accesses specific memory lines, it generates a false 
alarm by frequently interrupting the victim process. These authors (Acıiçmez, Brumley 
et al. 2010, Gullasch, Bangerter et al. 2011) introduced the access-driven attacks called 
asynchronous, meaning that in the trigger step, the attackers do not require the precise 
time information of victim operations. The CPU with Simultaneous Multi-Threading 
(SMT) feature or the OS process schedulers is more vulnerable to these attacks; SMP 
settings are not vulnerable to these attacks. The class of asynchronous access-driven 
attack is further extended by Zhang et al. (Zhang, Juels et al. 2012) to VMs running on 
virtualized SMP systems. Furthermore, by using this attack they have extracted the most 
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fine-grain data from a victim VM across VMs in a virtualized environment. More 
specifically, by using cache-based timing attacks an ElGamal decryption is recovered 
from the victim VM. The authors used a hidden Markov model to reduce the errors and 
cope with noise (e.g., network latency). The significance of this work is that the authors 
have extracted the fine grain data across VMs for the first time, unlike Ristenpart et al. 
(Ristenpart, Tromer et al. 2009) who managed to achieve the usage of CPU and recovered 
keystroke patterns by co-location of VM. Table 2.2 describes the attack based on 
execution environment and architecture. The execution environment categorizes the 
attacks whether they are conducted in the virtualized or non-virtualized environment. 
According to the architecture, Table 2.2 shows whether the attacks have conducted on a 
single core or multi-core. In addition, it also describes the target of attacks (e.g., Attacks 
on AES, RSA, and ElGamal or any other encryption algorithm).
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Table 2.2: Side channel Attack in Virtualized and Non-Virtualized Environment 
 
Type of Attacks Ref Title Description Name of 
Attacks 
Method Target Of 
Attacks  
Execution 
Environment 
Architecture 
Acces-Driven (Neve and 
Seifert 2006) 
Advances on access-driven 
cache attacks on AES 
To scrutinize the cache behavior with 
a finer granularity, rather than 
evaluating the overall execution time. 
Side Channel  Prime + Probe AES Non-Virtualized Single-Core 
(Ristenpart, 
Tromer et al. 
2009) 
Hey, you, get off of my 
cloud: exploring 
information leakage in 
third-party compute clouds 
To detect the co-residency of virtual 
machine and then leak the 
information (such as aggregate cache-
usage) 
Side Channel  Prime + Probe Leak 
information 
about cache 
pattern 
Virtualized Multi-Core 
(Acıiçmez, 
Brumley et al. 
2010) 
New result on intrusion 
cache attacks 
To monitor the instruction cache for 
leaking the timing information of 
cache 
Side Channel Prime + Probe DSA, 
Information 
leakage 
Non-Virtualized Multi-Core 
(Gullasch, 
Bangerter et 
al. 2011) 
Cache games–bringing 
access-based cache attacks 
on AES to practice 
To extract the confidential key with a 
less than 100 encryption by using 
timing difference of cache access 
Side Channel  Flush+Reload AES Non-Virtualized Single-Core 
(Owens and 
Wang 2011) 
Non-interactive OS Finger 
printing through memory 
de-duplication technique in 
virtual machines. 
To conduct access-driven attack to 
exploit the memory deduplication in 
the victim VMware ESXI hypervisor 
for fingerprinting the OS 
Side Channel Prime + Probe Information 
leakage 
Virtualized Multi-Core 
 
(Zhang, Juels 
et al. 2012) 
Cross-VM Side Channels 
and Their Use to Extract 
Private Keys 
To extract ElGamal decryption key 
by using cache timing attack 
Side Channel  Prime + Probe ElGamal Virtualized Multi-Core 
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 (Suzaki, 
Iijima et al. 
2011) 
Wait a minute! A fast, 
Cross-VM attack on AES 
To extract the AES key by exploiting 
page deduplication feature in 
VMware ESXI  
Side Channel  Flush+ Reload AES Virtualized Multi-Core 
Trace-Driven (Gandolfi, 
Mourtel et al. 
2001) 
Electromagnetic Analysis: 
Concrete Results 
To conduct attack on three different 
CMOS chips to extract cryptographic 
key 
Side Channel N/A RSA, DES Non-Virtualized 
(Smart Cards) 
Single-core 
 (Quisquater 
and Samyde 
2001) 
Electromagnetic analysis 
(ema): Measures and 
counter-measures for smart 
cards 
To establish simple and differential 
electromagnetic attack on the 
implementation of RSA, DES, 
cryptographic token and SSL 
accelerator 
Side Channel N/A DES, RSA Non-Virtualized 
(Smart Cards) 
Single-Core 
 (Bertoni, 
Zaccaria et al. 
2005) 
AES power attack based 
on induced cache miss and 
countermeasure 
To leak information by using a power 
side channel of MIPS microprocessor 
Side Channel Flush+Reload AES Non-Virtualized Multi-Core 
 (Aciiçmez 
2007) 
Yet another micro 
architectural attack: 
Exploiting I-cache 
To discover that during execution of 
RSA encryption the main cause for 
leakage information is instruction 
cache likewise the data cache 
Side Channel Prime + Probe RSA Non-Virtualized Single-Core 
 (Aciiçmez, 
Koç et al. 
2007) 
On the Power of simple 
branch prediction analysis. 
To extract information by analyzing 
the branch prediction cache 
Side Channel Prime + Probe Extract key Non-Virtualized Single-Core 
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 (Yarom and 
Falkner 2014) 
Flush+ reload: a high 
resolution, low noise, L3 
cache side-channel attack 
To extract the private encryption keys 
of RSA from a victim program across 
cores and across VM hosted by 
VMware and KVM 
Side Channel Flush+Reload RSA Virtualized Multi-Core 
Time-Driven 
 
(Bernstein 
2005) 
Cache-timing attacks on 
AES 
To attack the AES algorithm and 
extract the cryptographic key  
Side Channel Prime + Probe AES Non-Virtualized Single-Core 
(Percival 
2005) 
Cache missing for fun and 
profit 
To describe a cache-based SC attack 
on RSA on processors having 
simultaneous multithreading. 
Side Channel  Prime + Probe RSA Non-Virtualized Multi-Core 
(Brumley and 
Boneh 2005) 
Remote timing attacks are 
practical 
To launch a cache-based timing 
attack to extract confidential keys 
from a library used in web server and 
SSL applications such as OpenSSL-
based  
Side Channel Prime + Probe RSA Non-Virtualized Single-Core 
(Wang and 
Lee 2006) 
Covert and Side Channels 
due to Processor 
Architecture 
To identify two new attacks namely 
Simultaneous Multithreading and 
speculation 
Covert and 
Side Channel 
Prime + Probe RSA Non-Virtualized Single-Core  
(Osvik, 
Shamir et al. 
2006) 
Cache attacks and 
countermeasures: the case 
of AES 
To describe time-drive side channel 
attacks which neither require the 
plaintext or cipher text  
Side Channel Evict + Time AES Non-Virtualized Multi-Core 
(Bonneau and 
Mironov 
2006) 
Cache-collision timing 
attacks against AES,  
To extract cryptographic key by 
using cache-based timing attack 
Side Channel Evict + Time AES Non-Virtualized Multi-Core 
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 (Acıiçmez, 
Schindler et 
al. 2007) 
Cache based remote timing 
attack on the AES 
To establish cache-based timing 
attack to measure the cache timing 
for extracting secret key by using 
statistically infer information 
Side Channel Prime + Probe AES Non-Virtualized Single-Core 
 (Weiß, Heinz 
et al. 2012) 
A cache timing attack on 
AES in virtualization 
environments 
To launch a cache-based time-driven 
attack against an embedded ARM 
processor inside L4Re virtual 
machine 
Side Channel Prime + Probe AES Virtualized Single-Core 
 (Irazoqui G 
2014) 
Fine grain Cross-VM 
Attacks on Xen and 
VMware are possible! 
To conduct the Bernstein’s 
correlation attack in a virtual 
environment for the first time to show 
the implementation of cross-VM SC 
attacks on KVM, VMware, and Xen. 
Side Channel Prime + Probe AES Virtualized Multi-Core 
 (Irazoqui, 
Eisenbarth et 
al. 2015) 
S $ A: A Shared Cache 
Attack That Works across 
Cores and Defies VM 
Sandboxing--and Its 
Application to AES 
To conduct time-driven cache-based 
attacks targeting L3 cache by using 
huge pages 
Side channel Prime + Probe 
 
AES Virtualized Multi-Core 
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2.5 Prevention of Cross-VM Cache-based Side Channel Attacks 
Although hypervisor enforces logical isolation to the cloud resources through a 
mechanism called sandboxing, however as compared to physical isolation this logical 
isolation has some security implications. For instance, we know that co-locating VMs on 
the same platform are not physically isolated and can easily leak sensitive information of 
each other’s which give a great opportunity to the attackers to do security interference. 
Many researchers have shown the applicability of SC attacks to extract this confidential 
information and have also demonstrated the mitigation of these security interferences in 
this section. SC attacks use the fundamental characteristics of sensitive computation (e.g., 
power consumption, execution time, and the electromagnetic field sharing of a processor 
core with an attacker) to leak this confidential information. Computations unintentionally 
leak confidential data through either hyper threading or time division.  
The main idea of SC attacks is that most cryptographic algorithms have memory access 
pattern that are data dependent, which can be easily observed by cache miss and hit rate. 
Most of the existing prevention mechanisms are adhoc and are unable to prevent SC 
attacks because they are designed to prevent only specific attacks. No general prevention 
mechanism has been proposed in the past which could prevent all types of attacks as well 
as cache-based SC attacks (Singh and Chatterjee 2017). The proposed approaches for the 
prevention mechanisms for the mitigation of cache-based SC are categorized into three 
types. The first approach is to come up with new cache designs (e.g. (Wang and Lee 2006, 
Wang and Lee 2007, Zhang, Juels et al. 2011, Irazoqui, Inci et al. 2014, Zhou, Reiter et 
al. 2016)). In the second approach, Aviram et al. (Kong, Aciiçmez et al. 2009) described 
that cache-based SC attacks in CC can be mitigated by forcing VM execution to be 
deterministic, however, further research is still needed for this approach. The third 
approach is to construct cryptographic algorithm in such a way that it can block the cache-
based access timing attacks (e.g., (Domnitser, Jaleel et al. 2012), (Intel 2007)). The 
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existing countermeasure for SC attacks has several limitations including high overhead, 
the requirement to change the hardware and software, application-specific, or 
inappropriate to mitigate the SC attacks (Page 2003). 
Similarly, the operation and implementation of Flush + Reload is associated with the 
combination of four factors (Yarom and Falkner 2014) including the flow of data between 
sensitive information and memory access patterns, memory deduplication between victim 
and attacker VM, the analysis and the measurement of high-resolution interval, and the 
unrestricted use of clflush instruction. Preventing any of these can mitigate SC attack. 
Techniques such as new cache designs, disallow cache sharing between VM, partitioning 
the cache among tenants, and forced determinism could potentially mitigate the SC 
attacks. However, these techniques will not be widely adapted in the future because they 
require hardware changes (Coppens, Verbauwhede et al. 2009). One technique proposed 
by Zhang et al. (Zhang, Juels et al. 2011) that enable its guest VMs to detect the exclusive 
usage of the physical machine. In addition, it verifies the success or failure of the cache 
isolation policies implemented by the service provider. In addition to the data cache, other 
architectural SC includes the instruction cache (Acıiçmez, Brumley et al. 2010), the 
shared functional units (Wang and Lee 2006, Aciicmez and Seifert 2007), and the branch 
target cache (Aciiçmez, Koç et al. 2007, Zhang and Reiter 2013), all of which have been 
exploited in the cryptosystem. The countermeasures for these attacks are divided into 
hardware-based and software-based. Table 2.3 shows that existing solution for SC attacks 
requires to changing either hardware or software consequently affect the overall 
performance in term of load testing and cache utilization. 
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Table 2.3: Required Modification in the Existing Solutions of Cache-based Side 
Channel Attacks  
Implemented Solution Types Source Hardware Performance degradation 
Obscure Cache-Data Correlation Y N N 
Delay Timing Information Y N N 
Normalize Cache State N N Y 
Custom Hardware N Y N 
Disable Cache N N Y 
Cache Warming N N Y 
Cache Partitioning N N Y 
Cache Flushing N N Y 
     Y for need to change, N mean does not need to change 
2.5.1 Existing Countermeasures 
The existing countermeasures for cache-based SC attacks are divided into hardware-
based and software-based countermeasure which are explained in the following section 
in detail. 
2.5.1.1 Hardware-based Countermeasure 
The literature shows that cache-based SC attacks are mostly prevented by a hardware-
based solution that mainly focuses on altering the replacement policies of cache (Kim, 
Chandra et al. 2004, Percival 2005). Although some of these solutions are effective, the 
existing processors are unable to employ this because they need a special support of 
hardware. For instance, Osvik et al. (Osvik, Shamir et al. 2006) proposed hardware-based 
solutions to disable the cache or to utilize an individual cache for concurrent threads. Few 
of the new proposed solutions include eviction strategies which minimize the eviction of 
data of one thread used by another one (Percival 2005). In (Page 2003), the partitioned 
cache initially designed for multimedia applications is exploited to block cache-based SC 
attacks. The Instruction Set Architecture (ISA) is altered by adding new instructions to 
make the cache a prominent part of the existing architecture that can define a partition, 
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cache line size, as well as other parameters. However, the authors also claimed that the 
costs of the cache design and its computation can be high. As compared to software-based 
solution, a hardware based solution cannot provide an efficient countermeasure and takes 
more time to develop to block these attacks. As a result, this problem can be solved by 
using an efficient countermeasure such as software-based solution.  
Over the last decade, when the attention in the literature was given to SC attacks (Inci, 
Gulmezoglu et al. 2015) many proposals for the mitigation of SC attacks (Page 2003, 
Osvik, Shamir et al. 2006) were put forward. These proposed prevention mechanisms 
were typically categorized into eight types as shown in Table 3. Various methods to 
implement these prevention mechanisms, such as changing the usage of the cache to 
cryptosystem and altering the hardware channel. In addition, the hardware-based solution 
proposed (Kong, Aciiçmez et al. 2009, Domnitser, Jaleel et al. 2012), included coming 
up with new designs for a shared cache. However, these existing prevention mechanisms 
would require either modifying the source code, altering the cryptographic algorithm, 
changing the hardware (e.g., changing cache design), or creating high computation cost 
in term of high overhead. Designing new caches will take longer time and during this 
time the SC attacks do a lot of damage. Therefore, there is a need for software-based 
prevention mechanisms for the quick mitigation of SC attacks. 
2.5.1.2 Software-based Solutions 
Most of the existing prevention mechanisms for cache-based SC attacks are software-
based and are associated to a specific cryptosystem. The basic phenomenon of this 
prevention mechanism is to edit the software in a new method that the SC attacks cannot 
be established. Such as, to prevent SC attacks on AES, many types of mechanisms have 
been proposed, such as 1) The AES tables must be loaded into the cache prior to executing 
an encryption so that all accesses to AES create cache hit and hence have constant 
encryption time, 2) During the AES execution, only mathematical operations should be 
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used instead of table lookups. For instance, Brickell et al. (Brickell, Graunke et al. 2006) 
proposed a software solution, which mitigates the SC attacks by changing the 
implementation of cryptographic algorithms including RSA and AES. Similarly, the 
researchers in (Coppens, Verbauwhede et al. 2009, Aviram, Hu et al. 2010, Shi, Song et 
al. 2011, Zhang and Reiter 2013, Godfrey and Zulkernine 2014) proposed software-based 
countermeasure for the quick mitigation of SC attacks. Over the last decade, hardware-
based solutions have been used for the mitigation of SC attacks, however, recent security 
activities motivate the implementation of software-based prevention mechanisms by 
improving the software isolation properties.
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Table 2.4: Countermeasures for Cross VM Cache-based Side Channel Attacks 
 
Ref Title Description Attack Types Implementation 
Type 
Used Method Limitation 
(Aumüller, 
Bier et al. 
2002) 
STEALTHMEM: System-
Level Protection Against 
Cache-Based Side 
Channel Attacks in the 
Cloud 
To propose system level design in which 
hypervisor or OS give an individual 
access to a particular sectioned portion of 
the cache to each VM. 
Trace-driven 
Time-driven 
Software-based - Locking page 
- Page partitioning 
Require user interaction 
for client side 
modification which does 
not comply to the cloud 
model 
(Page 2005) Partitioned Cache 
Architecture as a Side-
Channel Defense 
Mechanism 
To propose a cache partitioning method 
against SC attacks that use data cache 
and access to SBOX through this cache  
Access-driven 
 
Hardware-based - Partitioning Cache - High overhead 
- Require hardware 
modification 
(Brickell, 
Graunke et al. 
2006) 
Software mitigations to 
hedge AES against cache-
based software side channel 
vulnerabilities 
To secure encryption algorithms (RSA 
and AES), they proposed new 
implementation of AES and RSA 
Access-driven Software-based - Compact S-Box table 
- Frequently 
randomized Table 
- Pre-loading of 
relevant cache line 
 
- Performance 
degradation 
- Require software 
modification 
(Osvik, 
Shamir et al. 
2006) 
Cache attacks and 
countermeasures: The case 
of AES 
To describe an active timing SC attack 
and then prevent this attack by disabling 
the cache or use separate cache for 
simultaneous thread 
Access-driven  Hardware-based - Disabling cache - Need hardware change 
(Wang and 
Lee 2006) 
Covert and Side Channel 
due to processor architecture 
To propose new cache design for 
mitigation of attacks 
 NA Hardware-based - Selective cache 
partitioning 
- Random permutation 
cache 
- Require hardware 
change 
- High Overhead 
- Application specific 
(Wang and 
Lee 2007) 
New cache designs for 
thwarting software cache-
based side channel attacks. 
To propose hardware based mitigation 
technique by designing new cache or by 
dividing the existing cache to hide cache 
access pattern 
Time-driven  Hardware-based - Locking cache line 
- Cache partitioning 
- Require hardware 
modification 
- Performance Degradation 
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(Intel 2007) Faster and timing-attack 
resistant AES-GCM 
To construct a constant time 
cryptographic AES implementation that 
mitigates cache-based timing attacks 
Time-driven Software-based - AES implementation - Require software changes 
- Runtime time overhead 
(Kong, 
Aciiçmez et 
al. 2009) 
Determinating timing 
channels in compute clouds 
To mitigate timing side channels in 
virtualized environment by forcing the 
execution of VM to be deterministic 
Time-driven Software-based - deterministic 
execution 
Need fine grain timing 
information 
(Zhang, Juels 
et al. 2011) 
Non deterministic caches: a 
simple and effective defense 
against side channel attacks 
To introduce the cache decay approach 
which controls cache and randomly 
select the interval of the cache to create 
non-deterministic behavior of the cache. 
Access-driven Hardware-based - Cache decay 
approach 
- Require hardware 
modification 
- High overhead 
(Shi, Song et 
al. 2011) 
Limiting cache-based side-
channel in multi-tenant 
cloud using dynamic page 
coloring. 
To partitioned the cache and reserved a 
small portion of the cache for each VM 
and core by using page coloring 
technique 
Access-driven Hardware-based - Partitioning of cache 
- Page coloring 
Require the software 
changes 
 
(Domnitser, 
Jaleel et al. 
2012) 
A fast and cache-timing 
resistant implementation of 
the AES 
To construct a new implementation of 
cryptographic algorithm that resists side-
channel attacks 
Access-driven Software-based - Lookup-based 
Implementation 
- Runtime overhead 
- Less data memory 
- Application and Attacks 
specific  
 
(Kong, 
Aciicmez et 
al. 2013) 
 
Architecting against 
software cache-based side-
channel attacks  
To propose a prevention mechanism that 
hides the cache access by different cores 
Access-driven Hardware-
Software 
integrated 
- Preloading 
- Informing Load 
- Software 
Permutation scheme 
Require Code changes 
Performance degradation 
(Irazoqui, Inci 
et al. 2014) 
Deconstructing New Cache 
Designs for Thwarting 
Software Cache 
Based Side Channel Attacks 
To propose new cache design namely 
Random permutation cache and Partition 
lock cache 
Time-driven Hardware-based - Cache partitioning - Unable to prevent the 
attack which built either 
on cache collision or 
cache sharing 
- Need hardware 
modification 
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(Godfrey and 
Zulkernine 
2014) 
Preventing Cache-Based 
Side-Channel Attacks in a 
Cloud Environment 
To implement a server side solution 
which complies Cloud model and does 
not need any changes in the software or 
underlying hardware 
Access-driven Hypervisor-
based 
- Cache flushing 
- Static Cache 
partitioning 
- High Overhead 
- Misuse Cache Utilization 
(Crane, 
Homescu et al. 
2015) 
Thwarting Cache Side-
Channel Attacks Through 
Dynamic Software Diversity 
To propose a solution which use 
dynamic software diversification to 
change the observable execution features 
while preserving semantic of program 
and just changing the replica at the 
machine level instruction 
Access-driven 
Time-driven 
Software-based - Diversifying 
Transformation 
- Inserting random 
memory load 
Require the changes in 
cryptographic algorithms 
(Zhou, Reiter 
et al. 2016) 
A Software Approach to 
Defeating Side Channels in 
Last-Level Cache 
To proposed CacheBar approach which 
automatically detects the concurrent 
access to shared pages and prevents them 
from evicting memory contents 
Access-driven Software-based - Copy on access for 
physical pages 
- Cache ability 
management 
Running Overhead 
(Liu, Ge et al. 
2016) 
CATalyst: Defeating Last-
Level Cache Side Channel 
Attacks in Cloud Computing 
To propose a solution that protects the 
square-and-multiply algorithm in GnuPG 
1.4.13 by dividing the cache into secure 
and non-secure partition 
Access-driven Hardware-based Cache partitioning Dependent on intel cache 
specific design 
 63 
2.5.2 Proposed Countermeasures 
In the following sections, we discuss several prevention mechanisms that prevent the 
exploitability of the shared level cache and SC attacks. 
2.5.2.1 Disable Huge Size Pages 
The main cause of SC attacks is the utilization of huge pages due to which attacks take 
benefit of the additional memory address. Thus the attack by using huge pages can be 
conducted in both virtualized and non-virtualized environment since in Linux and in the 
CC, huge pages are enabled in advance in the hypervisor. In particular, Irazoqui et al. 
(Irazoqui, Eisenbarth et al. 2015) established SC attacks by using huge pages. These 
attacks can be prevented by not allowing the guest VM to use huge size pages. The VMM 
or hypervisor is responsible for making decisions about huge size pages, based on precise 
parameters such as the size or memory space resources that are needed by the 
programming code. 
2.5.2.2 Cache Partition Using Cache Coloring 
Cache coloring is a software-based approach which is used for mapping memory pages 
to cache lines and for the purpose of a cache hit optimization. The author in (Taylor, 
Davies et al. 1990) introduced this as an OS performance optimization technique to 
improve the performance between the physical and virtual memory. This technique is 
designed to ensure that accesses to contiguous pages in virtual memory make the best use 
of the processor cache. For instance, two instructions or two VMs that are consecutive in 
the memory can evict one another data in the cache. Cache coloring solves this problem 
by mapping the two consecutive memory addresses into non-consecutive locations of the 
cache. Furthermore, the author used the cache coloring approach for the prevention of 
cache-based SC attacks (Shi, Song et al. 2011) by dividing the cache into the various 
portion. The partition of cache for each individual VMs is always implemented using 
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cache coloring approach which is used in the earlier research for the cache performance 
improvement (Jin, Chen et al. 2009). There is two type of cache partition mechanism 
namely static and dynamic cache partition. Static partition degrades the overall 
performance of the system by decreasing the usable portion of the cache for each 
individual VMs. In contrast dynamic partition improve the usable part of cache for each 
VMs by diving the cache on the fly according to VMs requirement. Moreover, this thesis 
conducted the dynamic cache partition approach for the prevention of cache-based SC 
attacks as well as improve the cache usage for the various VMs. 
2.5.2.3 Private LLC Cache Slices 
The SC attacks can be prevented by making the cache slices per private VM, same as 
to the prevention mechanism presented in (Wang and Lee 2007). Author’s means that two 
co-located VMs are unable to use the identical cache slice at the same period of time or a 
guest VM is not allowed to use it when it is being used by another co-located VM. 
Therefore, the attacker cannot reach the victim‘s cache slice and may not able to decide 
on the usage of memory lines by the attacker. However, this prevention mechanism 
requires a change in the cache structure and a reduction in the length of the cache slices 
for a VM. The creation of multiple Guest VMs on the multiple cache slices can also be 
restricted. 
2.5.2.4 Controlling Clflush Instruction 
In X86 architecture the deficiency of authorization check for the clflush instruction is 
the major cause for the SC attacks (Yarom and Falkner 2014). These attacks can be 
mitigated by controlling or limiting the power of the clflush instruction. Clflush 
instruction is used to enforce the memory coherence in the devices that do not support 
memory coherence (Intel 2007). In addition, it also improves the efficiency of the 
 65 
program by controlling the usage of cache memory and flushing the lines from the cache 
that is not in use during the program execution. 
2.5.2.5 Preventing Page Sharing 
The Flush + Reload SC attacks can be mitigated by preventing the sharing of memory 
between the victim and the attacker programs. However, this prevention mechanism will 
degrade the overall performance as well as affect the functionality of the system by 
opposing the increased page sharing trend in the OS and the hypervisor. The complete 
prevention of memory sharing would increase the demand of memory for the OS and the 
hypervisor and therefore it is not a good solution. However, this solution can be adapted 
to prevent the sharing of the personal credential by changing the program loader code. 
Furthermore, there is another possible solution for preventing a Flush + Reload attack is 
to disable deduplication, which is disabled by default in the XEN hypervisor only (Suzaki, 
Iijima et al. 2011, Suzaki, Iijima et al. 2011). 
2.5.2.6 Prefetching Cache Memory 
The prefetching of lookup tables or T tables of any encryption algorithm into the cache 
before execution of the attacker program blocks the SC attacks. The attacker will never 
analyze the difference in the memory access time because all the data will be loaded into 
the cache prior to execution of attacker program. However, the prefetching of 4kb size T 
tables requires more memory and more time. Consequently, it would increase the AES 
encryption time and overall performance of the system. The assembly version of AES in 
OpenSSL used the prefetching technique to stop cache memory information leakage 
because of T table’s access. 
2.5.2.7 Flushing Cache Memory 
Flushing a cache increases the execution time on a modern processor, therefore, a 
cache must be flushed only when it is needed. It has been disregarded as a prevention 
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mechanism for traditional cache-based SC due to the generation of large amounts of 
overhead (Osvik, Shamir et al. 2006). Flushing the T tables after the execution of the 
encryption algorithm (e.g., AES) from the cache memory produces the same result as 
cache prefetching. The attackers check the access time difference by locating the T tables 
in the memory. The generated overhead from cache flushing is based on two main 
elements: the proportion of flushes to context switches and the context switching ratio in 
the system. These two factors in combination generate the major source of overhead that 
reduces the system performance. Additional context switches are needed for the increased 
flushes and more overhead is generated when more flushes are needed. Cache flushing 
for mitigating the cache-based SC attack in a non-virtualized environment is more 
expensive (Osvik, Shamir et al. 2006) because in the non-virtualized environment, the 
high rate cache flushing and overhead are required on the process-level. However, in 
virtualized environment, the prevention of SC attacks on process-level is not required, 
but the prevention of SC attacks across VM-level is required. By comparison, in the cloud 
system, the context switch rate between VMs is comparatively much lesser than the rate 
between programs in a regular OS because very few VMs are created when compared to 
processes or programs.  
2.5.2.8 Hardware Masking of Addresses 
This prevention mechanism is conducted on the hardware level, which applies a mask 
to the offset field. During the usage of huge pages, this mask to the offset field is applied 
on the basis of some of the non-set addressing bits in the physical address. Since the offset 
field is completely hidden from the users and they have no longer control over the offset 
field. Thereby, the user is unable to lead the particular set, which he desires to target in 
the LLC memory and is unable to decide whether the victim has used that particular set 
or not (Irazoqui, Eisenbarth et al. 2015). The detail description of countermeasures is 
given in Figure 2.8. 
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Common 
Countermeasures
Disable Huge Pages
Side Channel Attacks
Private LLC Cache 
Slices
Controlling Clflush 
Instruction
Application Specific 
Algorithm Masking
Address Translation using 
Shadow Page Table
Disabling Cache Sharing
Hiding the Timing
Preventing Page 
Sharing
Prefetching Cache 
Memory
Flushing Cache 
Memory
Hardware Masking of 
Address
Cache Partioning
Alternative Lookup 
Table
Dynamic Software 
Diversity
Data Independent 
Memory Access Pattern
 
Figure 2.8: Overview of Countermeasure for Side Channel Attacks 
2.5.2.9 Address Translation using Shadow Page Table  
In many architectures including X86, the CPU uses the shadow page table for address 
translation. In the case of virtualized environment, the VMMs use the shadow page tables 
for a virtual to virtual memory translation. For example, the shadow page tables are not 
only responsible for the translation from VM’s virtual memory to the hypervisor (e.g., 
XEN and VMware) virtual memory but are also responsible for applying a mask based 
on the non-cache-addressing bits. Therefore, the guest user is unaware of the masking 
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value applied by the guest VM, and he is unable to control the set that the LLC (L3) that 
contain his data. 
2.5.2.10 Dynamic Software Diversity 
Dynamic software diversity approach is a protection mechanism against both online 
and offline cache based SC attacks. The countermeasure for the attacks which rely on the 
static properties of computation includes diversification of the program representation. 
On the other hand, SC attacks rely on the dynamic properties of computation including 
memory access timings, time of execution, and the power consumption. Consequently, 
for the prevention of SC attacks the diversification will randomize the program’s 
execution instead of representation. 
2.6 Research Challenges 
Through the detailed study of literature, we analyzed and found that there are some 
research challenges related to prevention mechanisms. These research challenges are 
listed in the following subsection. 
2.6.1 Efficient Cache Utilization 
Since the cache-based SC attacks are implemented using the shared L3 cache. The two 
VMs using the same cache can evict and also extract each other confidential data. There 
are prevention mechanisms which divide the shared L3 cache into a partition to restrict 
the individual VMs to a specific part of the cache. However, this degrades the cache usage 
for each VMs which affect the overall performance of the system. There must be a 
mechanism which could divide the cache into a partitions in such a way which does not 
reduce the cache utilization of individual VM and without affecting the performance of 
the system. 
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2.6.2 Server Side Solution Transparent to Guest OS and Client Software 
The literature showed that the attention has been given to SC attacks in the non-
virtualized environment since the 70s. Many prevention mechanisms including software-
based and hardware-based have been proposed to mitigate such attacks (Page 2003, 
Osvik, Shamir et al. 2006, Tromer, Osvik et al. 2010). These include modification of the 
hardware functionality (e.g., cache), to disable the hardware channel, modifying the 
encryption algorithms (e.g., AES and RSA), or breaking the correlation between 
hardware and program’s execution by altering the victim. Unfortunately, implementing 
any of these defensive mechanisms would either require the cloud users to change their 
software intended to be executed in the cloud (Aumüller, Bier et al. 2002, Shi, Song et al. 
2011), or to customize all the underlying hardware needed to be used in the cloud (e.g., 
cache) (Page 2003). Both of these solutions contradict the relationship between the cloud 
model and their users, as they would either restrict the client to change their software or 
needed the hardware changes, consequently restrict the client to use the cloud. In the 
virtualized environment, the hardware and software based solution are inappropriate 
where VM is dynamically added and removed, so the security requirement is also 
changing. Thereby a server-based prevention solution is required in virtualized 
environment which is transparent to the clients and the underlying hardware and does not 
need the changing of client software or hardware and always comply to the user relation 
with the cloud. 
2.6.3 Predicting Cache Contention 
If several applications or VMs are accessing an identical part of the cache in parallel 
as it is in the case of SMT or Chip Multi-Processing (CMP) and if there is not enough 
cache associativity. Then the two executing applications or VMs displace each other data 
in order to fill with their own data as well as to extract confidential information. In this 
cache, the cache contention occurs when the VMs request for the displaced data has to be 
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re-fetched. There must be a cache contention co-aware scheduling where various VMs 
running in parallel on the shared cache is to be aware of co-aware scheduling. Cache 
contention co-aware scheduling can reduce the drawback initiated by cache contention 
by an appropriate mapping of VMs to various CPU Cores and a proper scheduling of 
VMs. 
2.6.4 Determining Optimal Cache Partition Policy at run time with low Overhead 
When two or more VMs running on the same physical system, they shared the LLC 
(L2 or L3) even both are on the different cores. There are existing mechanisms including 
cache partition, assign per VM cache, assign part of cache to secure algorithm, which 
divides the cache for individual VM and restrict each VMs cache utilization. However, 
these cache partitions degrade the cache usage for an individual user and consequently 
degrade the overall performance of the system. Therefore there must be a mechanism 
which monitors and determine the required cache of each VM and optimally partitions 
the cache accordingly.  
2.6.5 Improving the Xen Credit Scheduler 
Some attackers perform the attacks based on the core-private-cache (e.g., L1 and L2) 
by exploiting the Xen credit scheduler to extract the fine-grained information of the same 
cores for two different VMs. There must be a mechanism to improve the functionality of 
Xen scheduler to restrict the L1 (data & instruction cache), L2, and L3 cache usage in 
order to not interfere with each other data. 
2.6.6 Hiding Memory Access Pattern 
The cryptographic algorithms have data-dependent memory access pattern, which can 
be easily extracted by the attackers by observing the associated hit and miss rate of cache 
memory. During encryption and decryption cache attacks depend on certain statistics to 
leak the confidential information in the form of cryptographic key. The information 
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leakage is due to the low-level detail provided by the CPU namely the structure of the 
cache memory, specifically forms a shared LLC which all the VMs compete for and thus 
is affected by each VM. For instance, the attacker VM takes benefit from this shared 
resources. Although virtual memory mechanism protects each VM data is cache, 
however, the metadata about cache content and the memory access pattern is not fully 
protected and is available to all running VMs. Therefore, there must be a mechanism in 
the OS kernel which hides the memory access pattern of that physical system on which 
different VM is running. 
2.6.7 Cache-Aware Scheduler for Optimum Cache Partition 
The scheduler must be cache-aware, that scheduler has the ability to monitor the cache 
utilization of individual VM and decides the partition accordingly. Since various VMs 
shared the local cache section, there is a change for cache interference to happen between 
VMs. In this case, there must be a global coordination amongst schedulers on each core 
for using cache in a proper manner. The likelihood of cache contention as a result of static 
and dynamic cache partition can be reduced by proper scheduling of VMs and by sharing 
the information on page color usage. 
2.6.8 Soft Isolation as a Solution 
In hard isolation, the hardware is dedicated to every VM, however it degrades the 
performance and efficiency in term of reducing cache usage. In contrast, soft isolation 
such as scheduler based prevention mechanism (Varadarajan, Ristenpart et al. 2014) 
improve the performance and reduce the risk of sharing through better scheduling. 
Although hard solution is more effective, however it cannot be applied in the existing real 
processor because it is based on cache replacement policies (Kim, Chandra et al. 2004, 
Qureshi and Patt 2006). In contrast, soft solution is not based on the hardware replacement 
policies and it used the page coloring technique to change the source code of the Xen 
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scheduler or OS scheduler and can be very deployed without any additional hardware cost 
(Tam, Azimi et al. 2007, Shi, Song et al. 2011). 
2.7 Discussion 
In the virtualized environment, the hardware and software based solution are 
inappropriate where VM is dynamically added and removed, so the security requirement 
is also changing. Thereby a hypervisor-based prevention solution is required in 
virtualized environment which does not need the changing of client software or 
underlying hardware and always comply to the user relation with the cloud. Our research 
work in this thesis addresses the software attacks and does not consider the physical 
attacks such as bus probing and the analysis of power. In addition, our focus is on software 
solutions instead of the hardware solutions. In (Godfrey and Zulkernine 2014) the author 
referred to the cloud relation with the user and underlying hardware as the cloud model. 
According to the cloud model the prevention mechanism, which does not need hardware 
or software changes is implemented for the prevention of SC attacks. In order to 
implement any defensive mechanism, the two key points are highlighted that have 
become commonplace in CC. Since the users’ is completely unaware of the cloud 
environment, they may not have the permission to change their canonical software they 
intend to run on the cloud. Secondly, a CC can be easily maintained and expanded, 
because it is built from canonical hardware. In order to maintain the practicality of the 
CC, these two key factors must be maintained.  
One solution to SC attacks is the modification of the encryption algorithms (AES, 
RSA, and ElGamal). The solution is based on writing constant time AES algorithm 
because the variable timing AES has created an opportunity for attackers to launch an 
attack. However, to write constant time AES encryption algorithm is very difficult 
because constant time AES is unacceptable for many application. Kim et al. (Aumüller, 
Bier et al. 2002) have implemented a prevention mechanism for active time-driven and 
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trace-driven cache-based SC attacks in the cloud environment. Hyperthreading, 
preemptive scheduling, and multi-core OSs are the leakage channel which forms the basis 
for these time-driven and trace-driven attacks. In preemptive scheduling, the attackers 
VM and victim VM may use a single CPU core and its cache. In hyperthreading, multiple 
hardware threads execute on a single CPU core. While in multi-core the attackers and 
victim may be executing in parallel on a separate CPU core with a shared L3 cache. This 
framework is compatible with the existing server hardware and tenant software and it will 
not affect the system performance. In their prevention solution, they have given an 
individual access to some part of the cache known as stealth page to prevent cache-based 
SC attacks. However, in order to access these stealth pages by using software application, 
their prevention mechanism requires to changing the software being run in the guest VM. 
Since the modification of client software violates the cloud model and describes the 
requirement for a transparent prevention mechanism to the client. The state of the art 
literature showed very little work describing the severity of other side channels including 
power consumption, electromagnetic radiation in the cloud as compared to cache-based 
SC attacks. To this extent, the most interactive device is the CPU cache, thereby, is the 
commonly targeted channel to exploit for the successful SC attacks in the cloud. This is 
because it generates one of the highest and reliable communication speeds. Thereby, this 
chapter describes the prevention mechanisms for cache-based SC attacks as opposed to 
any other channel (Zhang, Juels et al. 2012).  
Misiu et al., proposed a preventive mechanism for SC attacks without changing or 
affecting cloud model. In addition, if a prevention mechanism can be compiled without 
change or effect the existing hardware and software then it can be easily adapted to the 
existing cloud system without any interference to the cloud functionality. For this, the 
author used the Xen source code for the prevention of SC attacks without change the 
client side or hardware. Wang et al., (Wang and Lee 2006) proposed the hardware-based 
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mitigation methods which reduce the cache accesses by designing new caches, or by 
caches partitioning with dynamic or other efficient methods. However, this prevention 
mechanism requires changing the underlying hardware and software. Mitigation of SC 
attacks is very necessary at a hardware level since these channels of hardware level are 
not affected by the strong mechanism of software isolation. The attackers steal the 
information from the victim through shared functional unit that is dynamically allocated 
to each of processes in every cycle. In this sharing process, one process can interfere with 
another leading process through a side channel. In their paper, two methods are proposed 
one is Selective Partitioning and the other is novel Random Permutation Cache 
(RPCache). Selective partitioning by hardware (or software) can prevent the simultaneous 
multithreading/functional unit covert channel problem. The RP cache solution is 
implemented by using distinct memory location to cache mappings between a process 
that need isolation from each other and is used to mitigate software cache-based SC 
attacks. It can also find which cache location is used by another process. The main 
advantage is low-performance degradation. While the disadvantage is extra overhead 
when two cache sets are swapped. 
Weiß et al. (Weiß, Heinz et al. 2012) conducted a cache timing attack on AES for the 
first time in an L4Re VM running on an ARM processor inside a Fiasco.OC microkernel. 
The attack is implemented using Bernstein’s correlation attack and the target of this attack 
is many popular AES encryption algorithms including the one in OpenSSL. The 
extraction of the most fine-grain information from inside a VM is the significance of this 
work (AES vs. ElGamal keys in (Zhang, Juels et al. 2012) ). The cipher text determines 
the entry of the loaded table by a byte of the cipher state. Hence, information about the 
confidential key of AES can be extracted by accessing the cache directly that during 
execution which table data have been inserted into cache like trace-driven attacks. The 
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corresponding information can also be extracted by monitoring the behavior of timing 
during various AES executions over time, like time-driven cache-based SC attacks. 
 Yarom et al. (Yarom and Falkner 2014) demonstrate a trace-driven flush + reload 
attack which accesses specific memory lines to evicts the data from the LLC and extract 
the encryption key of the RSA algorithm. Furthermore, he noted that this attack could be 
applied in CC. Similarly, Tiri et al. (Liu, Yarom et al. 2015) proposed an analytical model 
which forecasts the symmetric key of ciphertext against timing attacks based on the 
lookup table and length of cache lines. The access-driven cache attacks need the attacker 
to monitor that which lines of cache have been monitored (like trace-driven attacks), but 
similar to timing-driven SC attacks it does not need detailed information about the cache 
that how and in what order the cache was accessed for data. Therefore, these classes of 
attacks can be varied with each other based on the attacker's access capabilities. The 
software-based countermeasure is needed for the mitigation of these types of attacks. 
Because hardware based solution takes time and degrades the overall performance. The 
hypervisor-based software solution for these type of attacks is cache flushing and cache 
warming, however, it degrades the overall performance of the system in term of CPU 
speed and load (Godfrey and Zulkernine 2014). 
In (Godfrey and Zulkernine 2014), the author proposed a purely software-based server-
side defense for cache-based SC attacks in the cloud. To make it fully deployable on the 
cloud model, the author implemented the solution in such a way that it does not require 
the software used to run CC or hardware changes for the prevention of SC cache-based 
attacks between co-resident VM. The prevention mechanism for SC attacks should be 
invisible and secure from cloud provider as well as from client and only visible to the 
cloud developer. Wang (Wang and Lee 2007) mitigate SC attacks by redesigning or 
partitioning the cache. The author in (Wang and Lee 2007) identified two main solutions 
namely Selective Partitioning such as Partition-Locked cache (PLcache) to hide the 
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access pattern of the cache by locking cache lines and the other is novel Random 
Permutation cache (RPcache) to complicate patterns of the cache by randomizing cache 
mappings. One of the solutions is to minimize the interference between cache lines by 
partitioning the cache. The other class of solution is to allow sharing by randomizing the 
interference between cache lines so that no useful confidential information can be 
extracted. The RPcache solution is implemented by using distinct memory location to 
cache mappings between the processes that need isolation from each other and is used to 
mitigate software cache-based SC attacks. It can also find which cache location is used 
by another process. These hardware-based solutions, however, is unable to provide 
practical defensive mechanism until CPU designer and cloud provider purchase and 
integrate them into CPUs and cloud providers purchase them. The main advantage is low-
performance degradation. While the disadvantage is extra overhead when two cache sets 
are swapped. 
2.8 Conclusion 
CC is a shared open environment, which has its own characteristics and features such 
as on-demand services and multi-tenancy. Specifically, it introduces multi-tenancy to 
facilitate the users to share computing physical resources provisioned over the Internet 
on-demand scaling. While multi-tenancy has many benefits, this paradigm introduces a 
new concept known as clients’ co-residence and VM’s physical co-residency. This co-
residency arise security vulnerabilities to CC and enables a new form of sensitive 
information leakage including SC attacks. Although there are many benefits to adopting 
CC, however, security is the most significant barrier to adoption. In order to gain the trust 
of clients, cloud provider must consider the security in CC. VM managers (VMMs) 
namely XEN and VMware for modern virtualization systems enforce logical isolation 
between VM by using sandboxing mechanism. Since this logical isolation is not 
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equivalent to physical isolation, the attackers can easily circumvent this logical isolation 
by using SC attacks. 
In this thesis, different hardware and software, specifically CPU cache-based SC 
attacks and their countermeasure have been discussed. CPU cache is one of the most 
prone hardware devices targeted by adversaries due to its high rate of interactions and 
sharing between processes. In addition, several methods have been described by which 
the attacker can observe the memory pattern of the victim process. e.g., one that executes 
encryption algorithm with an unknown private key. These methods are categorized into 
various type based on cache state. In one method, the affect the cache state is observed 
and then measure and analyses the consequence on the encryption algorithm running time, 
and in second methods the state of the cache is investigated after or during encryption. 
The second method is found to be noise-resistant and particularly effective. For 10 years 
it is a known problem in a virtualization environment. The most past attacks applied on 
the L1 cache which exploits the hyper threading or scheduler weaknesses. However, the 
existing LLC attacks (L2 or L3) such as the prime probe, flush reload, and LLC attacks 
require memory deduplication and usage of huge pages. Some attacks do not have 
restrictions such as hyper-threading and memory sharing. There is a need for prevention 
mechanisms which is hypervisor-based and does not need any software by the client or 
the changing of the underlying hardware. The hypervisor-based software solution for 
these type of SC attacks is cache flushing and cache warming, however, it degrades the 
overall performance of the system in term of CPU speed and load.
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CHAPTER 3: PROBLEM ANALYSIS 
In this chapter, we aim to analyze the existence of the cross-VM cache-based SC 
attacks and the performance of the existing prevention mechanism to mitigate these 
attacks in the cloud environment. Although cache-based SC attacks and the prevention 
mechanism for these attacks in multiprocessing systems namely in networks, in OS, and 
in database systems have already been studied by the researcher for many years. However, 
in CC this is a new topic for research. As we already discussed in detail in Chapter 2 when 
two or more VMs run on a multiple cores system. One VM would be able to disturb the 
cache access of another VM and can extract secret information, even if every VM is 
running on a dedicated core. This situation has created a security risk in the form of cache-
based SC attacks in the cloud environment. Therefore, in this thesis, cache-based SC 
attacks and the preventive countermeasures for these attacks in CC have been discussed. 
The main objective of this chapter is to analyze the aforementioned research problems 
discussed in Section 2.6 to establish the problem. The measurement parameter to analyze 
and establish the problem is the implementation of the cache based SC attacks in the cloud 
environment and to analyze the overhead of the existing prevention mechanism for cross-
VM cache-based SC attacks in term of CPU’s load and speed and cache usage. The 
problem analysis for this thesis consists two parts. 
The first part of the problem analysis is to implement the cache-based SC attacks in 
the cloud and a non-cloud environment. This analysis is accomplished on the basis of 
Prime + Probe and Flush + Reload method to check the existence of information leakage 
through shared devices. We carried out the software based SC attacks, in which victim 
program play the role of sender and the attacker program as a receiver. The attacker places 
some code in the cache during the execution of victim program. The attackers observe 
the difference in the cache access time and execution time of encryption algorithms 
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through software side channel to leak some confidential information to extract the full 
encryption key or part of the encryption key. 
The second part of the problem analysis is to formulate the overhead of the existing 
prevention mechanism for cross-VM cache-based SC attacks. The initial findings are 
verified through apache, cachebench, and cachegrind benchmarking experiments on a real 
cloud environment. The results from two hypervisors including unmodified 
(default/unsecure) and static partitioned unveil the performance degradation in terms of 
bearable load, cache utilization and memory access time due to static cache partition as a 
prevention mechanism. The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 
3.1, we present the experimental methodology for launching the SC attacks and for the 
performance analysis of the prevention mechanism. In Section 3.2, we provide the 
detailed investigation of the SC attacks and implement SC attacks by using flush + reload 
and prime + probe techniques. In Section 3.3, static cache partition as a solution to SC 
attacks is presented. Section 3.4 describe the performance evaluation of the static 
partitioned based prevention mechanism by using various benchmarking experiment and 
the chapter is concluded in Section 3.5. 
3.1 Experimental Methodology 
In this section, we report the details of the experimental setup for this study. In order 
to evaluate the prevention mechanism for SC attack, we implemented the cache-based SC 
attack in native OS, XEN, and VMware hypervisor. Because for the analysis of 
prevention mechanism, it is needed to implement the attack first. For this, we utilize the 
customized version of XEN hypervisor on Ubuntu and creates two VMs. We changed the 
XEN source code according to our requirement and used different benchmarks. The main 
focus of our work is to prevent the cache-based cross-VM SC attacks and to evaluate the 
computational overhead of prevention mechanism in term of CPU load and CPU speed. 
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Table 3.1: Experimental Environment in Problem Analysis 
Items Detail 
CPU Processor Intel Core i5-3450 CPU @ 3.10GHz, 4 cores, Hyper Threading disabled 
L1 Data-cache 32KB, 8 way associative, line size 64  
L1 Instruction-cache 32KB, 8 way associative, line size 64 
L2 Cache 256KB, 8 way associative, line size 64 
L3 Cache 6144KB, 12 way associative, line size 64 
Memory 11915MB DDR3 @1333MHz 
VMM Xen Hypervisor with static cache partition 
Virtual Machines HVM guest, 1GB memory, 1 dedicated core for individual VM 
Guest OS Ubuntu 12.04.5 
3.2 How cache based side channel attack works 
As described in Section 2.4, the root causes of the cache-based cross-VM SC attacks 
are the memory sharing and cache interference and specifically multitenancy and co-
residency in virtualized environment. PTP (Prime + Trigger + Probe) and Flush + Reload 
are the two methods widely used for conducting SC attacks and the main causes for these 
attacks are cache interference e.g., memory deduplication and usage of the huge pages. 
Flush + Reload attacks are conducted by sharing some physical memory pages between 
the attacker and victim (Zhang, Juels et al. 2012, Yarom and Falkner 2014). The PTP 
technique does not require the sharing of memory pages between the attacker and the 
victim. Instead, the PTP attacks are conducted by sharing the same CPU cache set 
between the attacker and the victim (Irazoqui, Eisenbarth et al. 2015). PTP is mostly used 
to launch time-driven attacks by using the whole cache set while access-driven attacks 
are mostly conducted by using the Flush + Reload method (Tromer, Osvik et al. 2010), 
which uses a specific single cache line. In the access-driven channel, the value sent by 
the sender is written, and then the receiver reads and stores that value. While in timing 
channels signaling information of the sender is observed and decoded by the receiver by 
modulating the use of resources over time.  
These two methods are proven to be conducted on the systems when the memory 
deduplication feature is enabled by the VMM to share some pages between the attacker 
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and the victim processes (Yarom and Falkner 2014). Due to the sharing pages capability, 
the attacker can know about the eviction of a particular memory line from all levels of the 
cache. The spy observes the memory access timings to leak the secret information. The 
Flush + Reload technique is a variation of Gullasch’s attack (Gullasch, Bangerter et al. 
2011) which can be adapted for use in the multi-core and in virtualized environments. 
Gullasch et al. (Gullasch, Bangerter et al. 2011) also conducted attacks on specific 
memory lines. However, the victim process is frequently interrupted by the attacker and 
as a result, it generates much false-positive. Similarly, Yarom et al. (Yarom and Falkner 
2014) conducted the Flush + Reload attack to extract the secret key of RSA across 
different cores in virtualized environment. Later on, Irazoqui et al. (Suzaki, Iijima et al. 
2011) conducted the Yarom’s attack on cross-VM hosted by VMware in virtualized 
environment to extract the cryptographic key of AES algorithm. In our thesis, we used 
the Prime + Probe method to implement the Gorka’s attack. The basic algorithm which is 
used for both prime + probe and flush + reload techniques in order to implement cache-
based SC attack is as follows: 
Table 3.2: Algorithm for Implementing Cache based Side Channel Attacks  
Sender queries Receiver queries 
(Wait for receiver to perform some 
queries) 
for i := 0 to N −1 do 
{Put Cache (i) into the cached state} 
Access memory maps to Cache (i); 
end for 
for i := 0 to N −1 do 
if DSend (i) = 1 then 
{Put Cache (i) into the flushed state} 
Access memory maps to Cache (i); 
end if 
end for 
(Wait for sender to prepare the cache) 
(Wait for receiver to read the cache) for i := 0 to N −1 do 
Timed access memory maps to Cache (i); 
{Detect the state of Cache (i) by latency} 
if AccessTime > Threshold then 
DRecv (i) := 1; {Cache (i) is flushed} 
else 
DRecv (i) := 0; {Cache(i) is cached} 
end if 
end for 
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3.2.1 Implementation of Cross-VM Cache-based SC Attack by using Flush + 
Reload technique 
In order to conduct cache-based SC attacks, Flush + Reload technique is used. This 
technique consists the three phases.  
Step 0: attacker will flush the cache (Flush) 
Step1: Target victim access cache line and do some operation  
Step 3: attacker measures the delay by reloading memory lines 
During the first phase, the observed memory line is flushed from all the levels of cache 
including L1, L2, and L3. In the second phase, the attacker will wait until the target victim 
access to the memory line and do some operation before the third phase. During the third 
phase, the spy measures the delay in the memory access timings by reloading the memory 
lines. If the victim accesses the memory line during the wait phase, the cache hit occurs 
and the reload time will be short because the monitored line will be available in the cache 
memory. While a cache miss occurs when the victim is unable to access the cache 
memory lines, the reload time will be high because the lines will be required to access 
from the main memory. The flush reloads attack is always conducted on the LLC.  
These attacks have become more powerful and dangerous due to two properties: First, 
unlike the prior attacks which access some specific cache set, the attackers try to access 
specific memory lines. Consequently, the Flush + Reload does not require any further 
processing for detection and does not generate a false alarm. Flush reload attacks are only 
conducted on the X86 architecture and are unable to be conducted on the ARM 
architecture, although the ARM architecture has instruction for the eviction of cache lines. 
However, it does not allow an unprivileged user process to use the eviction intrusion to 
selectively evict the information from the cache memory (ARM 2012).  
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3.2.1.1 Flush + Reload Attack Scenario 
We have implemented Gorka flush + reload attack in the VMware ESXI 5.5.0. We 
used two VMs one for an attacker and the other for a victim, both are communicating 
through local IP connection. Where we have executed the attacker in one VM and victim 
program on another VM and on different cores. For the purpose of this attack, the authors 
in (Ristenpart, Tromer et al. 2009) have been solved the co-location problem which 
ensures that two VMs (attacker and victim) are running on the same physical machine. 
The VMM such as XEN and VMware provide memory overcommitment feature, 
however, Irazoqui et al. (Irazoqui G 2014) exploited this feature especially focusing on 
memory deduplication in their attack which Suzaki et al. (Suzaki, Iijima et al. 2011) have 
implemented in their research. The hypervisor (VMM) has the ability to search regularly 
for the same pages and merge the identical pages and make a single copy of the redundant 
data. Once the VMM execute this, this scenario enables the cache-based SC attack 
because both the attacker and victim will access the same physical memory. The 
implementation of this attack is such that target program is executed in VMware ESXI 
5.5.0 running Ubuntu 12.04.5 64 bits, kernel version 3.11 for encryption using C 
implementation of the AES OpenSSL 1.0.1f. We have conducted all experiments on a 
machine having features an Intel i5-3450M four core clocked at 3.10GHz. Core i5 has 
three level caches including L1, L2, and L3 but in this attack, the L3 cache is used because 
this LLC is always shared between programs. The attacker and victim share this L3 cache 
for launching SC attack. The attack steps are as follow:  
(a) Flushing step 
In this step, the attacker flush the desired memory from the L3 cache by using 
the clflush command hence make sure that if needed next time they have to be accessed 
and retrieved from the main memory. It is important to note that clflush command not 
flush the desired memory lines from the L3 cache of the corresponding cores but it also 
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flushes from L1 and L2 of the of all the different cores in the same physical machine. 
Because if it only flushed the cache of the corresponding, the attack would only work if 
the victim and attacker’s program were co-locating on the same core.  
(b) Target accessing step 
 In this step, the attacker waits for the victim to run a fragment of code, which 
might use the cache memory lines that have been flushed by the attacker in the first step. 
(c) Reloading step 
 The attacker reloads the previously flushed memory lines in this step and takes 
all the measurements such as measure the reload time it takes for these flushed lines. On 
the basis of these reloading time, the attacker knows whether the memory lines accessed 
by the victim or not in case if accessed by victim the corresponding memory line would 
be present in the cache (cache hit) otherwise will not be present in the cache if not 
accessed by the victim (cache miss). The attacker takes the advantage of this timing 
difference between a cache hit and a cache miss and can easily detect the encryption key 
by analyzing the victim activity. 
(d) Discussion 
The victim is an encryption server receive encryption quires through socket 
connection and in response sends back the ciphertext. The attacker sends the encryption 
queries to the victim. In this attack, a package of 16 bytes (the plaintext) sends to the 
encryption server unlike Bernstein's attack (Bernstein 2004), where the server receives 
packages of 40 bytes (the plaintext). The attacker does not know about the confidential 
encryption key used by the encryption server. The victim program receives the encryption 
queries sent by the attacker program. All the measurement such as the required time for 
the reload step is performed on the attacker side. In this attack, only a single line is 
required to monitor. The flushing step is always occurs before encryption and reloading 
can be done after encryption, i.e. the attacker will not interfere with the attack process.  
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In this attack, the attacker first discovers the offset of the T tables’ addresses with respect 
to the beginning of the library. After gaining this information, the attacker is able to refer 
to any memory line that the value of T table holds, even the ASLR (Address Space Layout 
Randomization) is activated. Then, it sends encryption queries to the encryption server 
and receives the interrelated ciphertext. After each encryption, the attacker checks the 
value of the chosen T table by Flush + Reload technique whether its value have been 
accessed or not. 
We assume that the attacker monitors the memory line corresponding to the T table 
first position, where T is the lookup table is applied to the i-th byte of the targeted AES 
state before the last round. It is further assumed that n T table can adjust in the memory 
lines, for instance, for this attack the memory lines will hold the first n T table position. 
If any value of the T table entries is equal to si in the memory lines (i.e. Si Ɛ {0,…., n} if 
the first n T table entries in the memory line) then the accesses memory line will be 
present in the cache with a high probability shows that these memory lines been accessed 
by the encryption server. However, si with a change value means that accessed memory 
lines are not loaded in this step. The probability that encryption process did not access the 
specific T table memory lines is given as: 
Pr [no access to T ((i))] = (1 −
𝑡
256
)
𝑙
 (3.1) 
 
Here l represents the number of accesses to the particular T table. Since each 
encryption uses 40 access to each of the T table, therefore l=40 for OpenSSL 1.0.1 AES-
128. The probability that the cache line is not accessed is Pr (no access to T(i)) = 28%. 
Therefore, we can easily distinguish about the accessing of memory lines whether it is 
accessed or not. In order to distinguish whether the line is accessed or not is to measure 
the reload time for the targeted memory lines. If the reload time is high it shows that the 
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memory lines are accessed and the low reload time shows that the memory line is not 
accessed.  
The key recovery step is then executed after all the measurement performed which 
takes less than half a minute. The result is shown in Figure 3.1. The vertical access refers 
to the correct bytes of key and the horizontal access refers to the number of encryption 
needed to recover the key. Due to the noise ratio in the virtualized environment we need 
different number of encryption for the attack in the Linux and for the cross-VM attacks. 
We need 100 thousand encryption for the correct bytes of key in Linux and 400 thousand 
encryption for recovering the correct bytes of key in cross-VM attack scenario. 
 
Figure 3.1: Number of the Key Bytes of AES Key Correctly Guessed vs Number of 
Needed Encryption 
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Similarly, the prime + probe method is used in order to conduct cache-based SC 
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Step 3: attacker probes data to determine if the set was accessed or not  
In the PRIME step, the attacker filled the CPU cache with his own data; in the IDLE 
step the attacker waits for some random interval for the victim to perform some operation; 
then finally in the PROBE step, the execution is resumed and the cache is refilled to 
measure the delay between the cache access and memory access time. In addition, during 
the first phase, the cache memory is divided into accessed and un-accessed categories. In 
the prime phase, it generates cache hit and cache miss based on the accessed and not 
accessed. Then finally, the probing instance has more values, which indicates how much 
time is needed to access the cache line with a primed cache. Then the delay in the memory 
access timings are observed to extract the secret information. This memory access timings 
are considered to be an easier way to exploit the cryptosystem and functionality of the 
system and is more difficult to control. The purpose of Ristenpart’s PTP attack was to 
check if a cache-based SC attack could be established between the two co-located VM on 
the same physical machine. This attack requires that the attacker VM and target VM must 
be placed on the same physical machine. This SC was conducted such that the probing 
instance or first VM could collect a message that the target instance or second VM 
encodes in its usage of the cache. 
3.2.3 Experimental Setup 
We have implemented the cache-based SC attack by using prime + probe method. In 
native setup we have installed the attacker and the victim programs on the same core 
within same OS. For the cross-VM attack setup, the attacker and the victim programs 
have been installed on different guest VM which has different cores and different OS but 
both are sharing the same hardware. 
3.2.3.1 Attack1 Setup: Attack in Native Operating System and in Single VM 
In the native OS, the PTP technique is implemented in such a way that the attacker and 
the victim programs are executing on the same core. Since VM is a guest operating 
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system, the execution of cache-based SC attack using PTP technique would be same as 
SC attack in native OS. In both environment the attacker and victim programs will be 
executed on the same core. In the PTP technique, the probing instance (attacker) first 
divides the cache lines into the touched and the untouched category. Cache lines in the 
touch category have been accessed by the target and in the untouched category have not 
been accessed by the target. After categorization step, the probing instance primes the 
monitored cache by filling his own data. Now in the victim accessing stage, the attacker 
waits for the victim to perform some operation causing the eviction of some cache lines 
that were primed by the attacker in the first stage. Now in the probing stage, the attacker 
access the prime data again. When the attacker reloads the data from the set that has been 
used by the victim causing a higher probe time because some of the primed cache lines 
have been evicted. However, if the victim program did not use any set of the cache lines 
in the primed set, causing a low probe time because all the primed cache lines will still 
reside in the cache. The probing instance has a series of values which represent the access 
latency for cache lines.  
The latency difference for cache lines in the touched category compared to the 
untouched category shows that the victim instance was trying to communicate. Later on 
Wu et al. (Wu, Xu et al. 2012) refined the PTP technique, where they conducted a high-
speed channel by communicating a “1” or a “0” . The generation of these “1” and “0” 
depends on the variation of timing category whether it is positive or negative (assuming 
the variation is above a specific threshold value). In addition, their attack has the ability 
to transfer bit-streams of over 190kb/s. So far, this SC attack is the most reliable and 
robust cache-based SC attack in a virtualized environment. This technique is mostly used 
for sequential cache-based SC attacks, making it a good example of a canonical attack. 
Since all the cache-based SC attacks in the cloud rely on this basic PTP technique, a 
successful prevention of its principle could prevent all the present cache-based SC attacks. 
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Therefore, in our research, we have implemented and analyzed Wu et al. attack for our 
problem analysis (Wu, Xu et al. 2012). 
3.2.3.2 Attack2 Setup: Cross-VM Attacks 
We have also implemented Gorka et al. attack in which they used the PTP technique 
for the extraction of cryptographic key targeting the AES algorithm running in victim 
VM. Unlike Gorka flush + reload attack this attack is not rely on the deduplication, 
instead, it uses the huge pages for conducting the SC attack by using PTP method. This 
method can be used to extract information from any encryption algorithm (i.e. ELGamal, 
RSA) but Gorka’s target is the AES algorithm. AES is also stored in a cache and the 
attacker can leak the detail of AES to extract the cryptographic key. Unlike normal 
information leakage, the leakage from AES algorithm is very dangerous. Because the 
attackers can detect the complete key and by using that key they can easily detect the 
confidential information. AES in most famous cryptographic libraries including 
OpenSSL, PolarSSL, and Libgcrypt are vulnerable to Gorka attack when runing in the 
most popular hypervisor such as Xen and VMware used by popular cloud service 
providers (CSP) namely Amazon and Rackspace. The attack on AES has existed in the 
literature for many years, however, in virtualized environment, this attack has been 
introduced in 2009.  
The implementation of this attack is executed in Ubuntu 12.04.5 64 bits, kernel version 
3.11. We have executed target process using the C-implementation of AES in OpenSSL 
1.0.1f for encryption. This is used when OpenSSL is configured with no-asm and no-hw 
option. We want to remark that this is not the default option in the installation of OpenSSL 
in most of the products. We have conducted all experiments on a machine having features 
an Intel i5-3450M four core clocked at 3.10GHz. The cache hierarchy of Core i5 has 
three-level: It is important to note that L1 and L2 cache are private to each core while L3 
(LLC) is divided into slices and shared among all cores. When attacker and victim are in 
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the same core they use the L1 cache. When both attacker and victim are in the different 
core they use the shared L3 cache. The L1 cache line size is 64 bytes and is 8-way 
associative, with 215 bytes of size. The size of the L2 cache line is 64 bytes and a total 
size of 218 bytes cache and is 8-way associative. The L3 cache is 12-way associative with 
a 64 bytes cache line size and a total size of 222 bytes. The L2 cache in combined with 
the memory deduplication feature performed by the VMM allows the attacker to learn 
about cache accesses by the victim program. The attack scenario is such that one VM 
receiving the encryption queries with a secret key. The attacker VM is co-located with 
the victim encryption server but on different cores.  
The communication between the attacker and victim is carried out through local IP and 
by using this connection the attacker start the spy process and sends the plaintext to the 
encryption server. The attacker start measuring the usage of L3 cache on the reception of 
cipher text. There are four main steps in the Gorka attack on AES in Xen Hypervisor: in 
the first step the attacker gain the knowledge about the LLC (L2 or L3), cache slice 
number, and the cache lines that fills one of the sets in L3 cache. In the second step, 
attacker tries to know about the set which T table occupies, because these T table needs 
to be accessed again for recovering the secret key. In the third step the attacker perform 
the prime, reprimes, and request encryption steps on the desired set to check whether the 
cache lines have been accessed or not. Finally in the last step, the attacker recover the 
cryptographic key used by the server by utilizing the measurements taken in step 3. 
3.2.4 Experimental Results 
In this section, we show the proof of the existence of SC attacks in virtualized 
environment by conducting the experiment and analyzing the results. We perform the SC 
attack and analyze the results in native OS, and in XEN hypervisor.  
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3.2.4.1 Result in Native Operating System 
This is the basic setup in which we have executed the attack. We have executed two 
program in the native OS in the same core. This experiment is based on the number of 
encryption needed to recover the correct bytes of key. The Figure shows that due to low 
noise in a native operating the number of encryption for recovering the correct key is very 
low as compared to the virtualized environment. To distinguish L3 cache access from 
main memory is more susceptible to noise as compared to differentiate between L1 cache 
access and main memory access. Therefore, while L3 cache is mostly used for SC attacks, 
its make the SC attack more challenging. Figure 3.2 shows the result. 
3.2.4.2 Result of Attacks in Single VM and in Cross-VM 
In this scenario we executed the attack in virtualized environment in which two VMs: 
one is the attacker and the other is a victim are communicating through local IP. Due to 
the noise ratio in virtualized environment more encryptions are needed to recover the 
correct bytes of the key as shown in Figure 3-2. We have implemented Gorka attack and 
analyze the different results in our thesis. It is important to note that attacker has the 
administrator privileges in the cross-VM attacks due to the sharing resources in 
virtualized environment. In the first stage, the spy process recognizes the L3 cache access 
pattern in our Intel i5-3450M system and by using this method we can detect the division 
of L3 cache into a slice. The spy process makes us able to know about the cache division 
into two slices and that the selection method of the slice is based on the parity of the first 
non-set addressing bit (i.e., a 17th bit). Thereby, for filling set in the odd slice we need 16 
odd lines and to fill a set in the even slice we need 16 even lines. In the second stage, the 
spy process recognizes the set in the LLC (L2 or L3) that each T table cache lines of the 
hold.  
In order to recognize the set, each possible set is monitored according to the obtained 
offset from the shared library of the Linux feature. The set reserving of T table cache line 
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is used in the encryption process around 90% of times while the set will remain unused 
around 10% of the time where 500 random encryptions in a cross-VM scenario in Xen 
hypervisor were observed. It is to be noted that monitoring time for an unused set is more 
stable which is in the range of 200-300 cycles as compared to the monitoring time of a 
set used by T-tables which is 90% around of the time. The last step is to execute Gorka 
attack to recover the AES key used by encryption server. Valid ciphertexts are to be 
considered for the step of key recovery that are below the average time. The 
measurements are taken in the customized Xen hypervisor-based when the corresponding 
last line of T table is monitored and the key is 0xe1 in this case.  
The attack was analyzed in native, single-VM, and in cross VM-scenario requiring 
275.000 and 650.000 encryption respectively to recover 16 bytes key. It is shown in the 
Figure 3.2 that in the single-VM and cross-VM environment more number of encryption 
is needed as compared to the non-noisier environment such as native OS scenario.  
 
Figure 3.2: Number of Recovered Key Bytes Correctly Guessed vs Number of 
Requested Encryption for Native OS, Single-VM, and Cross-VM in XEN 
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For example, the encryption key consists of 16 bytes. In the native setup, it is clear 
from the Figure that 150.000 encryption is needed to recover the 16 bytes key. While in 
the single-VM scenario 250.000 encryption is needed to recover the 16 bytes key. This is 
because of noise that in the cross-VM scenario 650.000 encryption is needed to recover 
the whole key as compared to another scenario in which low encryption is needed to 
recover the whole bytes of the key.  
Table 3.4 describes the correctly recovered key in number of bytes in both single VM 
and cross-VM. Single VM means that attack is conducted in single in which the attacker 
and victim programs are in the same VM. In cross-VM scenario, both the attacker and the 
victim programs are in different VM and in different cores. Table 3.2 shows that the 
required number of requested encryption for correctly recovered the whole bytes of key 
in single VM is less than as compared to cross-VM. Because in cross VM the external 
noise effect the results. We believe that due to noise SC attacks require a high number of 
encryption in the cloud environment as compared to non-cloud environment. Table 3.2 
shows the result of cache-based SC attacks in native, single VM, and in a cross-VM 
scenario in XEN and VMware. 
Table 3.3: Comparison of Correctly Recovered Key in Single and Cross-VM 
In Single Virtual Machine (Single-Core) In Cross-Virtual Machine(Multi-Core)  
Number of requested 
encryption 
Number of correctly 
recovered key bytes 
Number of requested 
encryption 
Number of correctly 
recovered key bytes 
10,000 1 30,000 2 
90,000 6 60,000 2 
130,000 10 100,000 4 
150,000 10 200,000 8 
200,000 13 260,000 9 
250,000 13 300,000 11 
260,000 14 350,000 12 
265,000 14 450,000 13 
270,000 15 500,000 15 
275,000 16 650,000 16 
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 Similarly, Table 3.5 describes the comparison of cache-based SC attacks in both Xen 
and VMware. This table shows the result of the SC attacks in both Xen and VMware 
implemented by flush + reload and prime + probe methods. The need number of requested 
encryption for correctly recovering the number of key bytes are different in each scenario.  
Table 3.4: Comparison of Cache-based Side Channel Attacks in XEN and VMware 
Name of Attack Scenario Platform Technique No of 
Encryption 
Flush + Reload Native OS i5-3450 L3 Cache Flush + Reload 250 
 Cross-VM i5-3450 L3 Cache Flush + Reload 450 
Prime + Probe Native OS i5-3450 L3 Cache  150 
 Single-VM i5-3450 L3 Cache (Gorka attack) 275 
 Cross-VM i5-3450 L3 Cache prime + probing 650 
 
3.3 Prevention Mechanism 
As we discussed in Chapter 2 in detail, the prevention mechanism is divided into two 
types: Software-based and hardware-based. The hardware based prevention mechanism 
need to change the underline hardware while for the software-based the client need to 
change their software which violates the CC concepts. There are several existing 
prevention mechanisms for cache-based SC attacks. These mechanisms may also prevent 
cross-VM cache-based SC attacks. For instance, one prevention method is to rewrite the 
software (AES) in a way that does not allow the known attacks to occur (Brickell, 
Graunke et al. 2006). Similarly, there is another prevention mechanism that needs the 
non-standard hardware to refine the processor architecture for the prevention of cache-
based SC attacks (Wang and Lee 2008). Some research work proposed the disability of 
cache sharing for mitigating cache-based SC attacks (Oswald, Mangard et al. 2005). The 
author in (Shi, Song et al. 2011) used the cache partition by using dynamic page coloring 
technique. However, this approach requires the client to change their software which is 
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against the cloud rule. To use the cloud resources we need to follow the cloud rules and 
according to cloud rule, we are unable to change the canonical software and hardware. In 
addition, if a prevention mechanism can be compiled without change or effect the existing 
hardware and software then it can be easily adapted to the existing cloud system without 
any interference to the cloud functionality.  
For instance, Misiu et al. (Godfrey and Zulkernine 2014), proposed a hypervisor 
preventive mechanism for SC attacks without changing or affecting cloud model. We 
evaluated this hypervisor-based solution using the Gorka’s cross-VM cache-based SC 
attack. In order to evaluate the performance of hypervisor-based solution, the Gorka’s 
attack was given an ideal condition to execute in. Specifically, for attack, the attacker VM 
(probing instance) and the victim VM (target instance) and dom 0 VMs are running on a 
hypervisor and all the three VM were pinned to different CPU cores. This is the ideal 
configuration for launching cross-VM attacks and any variation in this configuration 
would make difficult the success of the SC attack. The author in (Godfrey and Zulkernine 
2014) used static cache partitioning approach for the prevention of SC attacks without 
changing the client side or hardware. However, this hypervisor-based solution degraded 
the overall performance of XEN hypervisor by reducing cache usage, because if the cache 
size is 4MB and we divide it into 4 parts and make static partition of 1MB. For example, 
if there are 4 active VMs. Two of them are using the cache and the other 2 are not using 
the cache, however, each time hypervisor boot they will make the static partition 
according to the active VM. The cache will be wasted and the performance will be 
degraded. Because if one VM needed the more cache memory than the assigned one and 
the other needed less memory than the assigned one. Then the assigned memory to each 
VMs cannot be assigned other VM on the needed basis.  
The authors in (Shi, Song et al. 2011) have tried to partition the cache dynamically. In 
their proposed approach, they are given a small portion of the cache to the secure 
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encryption algorithms (AES, DES) to maintain the efficiency. However, their solution is 
unable to secure the VMs from the leakage attacks. Secondly, their solution needs the 
client’s software to change and to be informed about their partition approach to take 
advantage of the partition. Our hypervisor-based solution by contrast partition the cache 
dynamically and it does not need to change the client’s software, mean the software and 
hardware do not need to change. The reason for hypervisor-based solution using dynamic 
cache partition comes from the fact that we are dynamically partitioning the cache on the 
hypervisor side to make the clients unaware of the solution. In addition, client’s software 
does not need any changes for using this solution. Our solution will be compatible with 
the existing software and hardware and will not degrade the system performance, which 
will fulfill the CC criteria. Our solution applies preventive mechanism rather than a 
reactive mechanism. Since according to our solution, two VMs cannot access the same 
cache lines, therefore there is no chance to create side channel between two VMs. We 
utilized a set of benchmark and Phoronix test suite for the evaluation.  
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3.3.1 Cache Partitioning as a Prevention Mechanism 
When multiple VMs run on multi-cores system, because of shared L3 cache one VM 
can extract the information of another VM by disturbing the cache access, even every VM 
is running on a dedicated core. Therefore fair partition of cache and cache-sharing is not 
only considered in a multi-programming system but also is a hot topic for virtualized 
environment. Cache partitioning mechanism is based on page coloring technique. Page 
coloring is a software-based approach for memory mapping to leads that how memory 
pages mapped to the specific cache set or cache lines (Soares, Tam et al. 2008, Zhang, 
Dwarkadas et al. 2009). Furthermore, the memory management module is controlled by 
page coloring approaches to ensure that a group of memory pages having the same color 
will be mapped to particular cache lines. The figure shows the mapping of memory pages 
to cache lines during memory management process. Page coloring technique is divided 
into static and dynamic types (Tam, Azimi et al. 2007, Jin, Chen et al. 2009). Static page 
coloring is the intuitive approach for the prevention of cache-based SC attacks (Jin, Chen 
et al. 2009) which provides a strong degree of isolation between VMs. However, this 
approach limits the number of VMs and degrade the overall performance in term of 
reducing cache usage for individual VM. Although static partition of the cache can reduce 
the eviction rate of cache data, consequently prevent the cache-based SC attacks. 
However, it reduces the memory usage or the size of the usable part of cache for 
individual VM. As a cache is divided into a static portion, it became smaller and many 
VMs compete for the same portion usage of cache making that portion the more efficient. 
These conflicting factors degrade the overall performance of this static partition based 
prevention mechanism. The static partition using page coloring technique is shown in the 
following Figure 3.4. 
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Figure 3.4: Static Cache Partition Using Page Coloring 
Since the performance of many applications depends on the cache size and utilization, 
however, in virtualized environment, this approach proportionally limited the access to a 
cache set that a VM can use to effect the overall performance. In addition, depending on 
the cache total size and set associativity, the page coloring system is able to provide a 
very limited number of colors that impose a restriction on the number of running VM on 
a cache during VM provisioning. Since the cache color for a system is calculated as: 
Number of Colors =  (
𝐶𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑤𝑎𝑦 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 × Page Size 
)  (3.2) 
 Moreover, since the partition is static it cannot be changed at runtime. It means that 
the partition cannot be scaled up or down after booting the hypervisor correspond with 
the number of running VMs. Therefore, the efficiency of static partition solution depends 
on correctly balancing the number of VMs correspond to a number of partitions. If the 
number of VMs are not correctly balancing correspond to the number of partition then 
this little mismatch can lead to a significant overhead and can degrade the overall 
performance very badly. For instance, if the shared cache (L3) is divided into four 
partitions statically during boot time and the number of created VMs are eight then this 
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mismatch can lead to significance overhead in term of cache usage. Similarly, if the 
number of partition is four and the number of created VM is one then other parts of cache 
will be wasted and also has a bad impact on the speed because the cache size will be 
reduced. Since the size of cache partition is static and it cannot be just changed unless the 
system is rebooted.  
To address this limitation, the author in (Shi, Song et al. 2011) proposed dynamic 
cache partition approach. To maintain the efficiency, they have assigned a small portion 
of the cache to the encryption algorithms. In their solution, they partitioned the cache 
based on the page coloring technique and assigned a secure color to the encryption 
algorithms e.g., AES and DES. It means that when two or more VMs would be using 
cache, the hypervisor will not partition the cache. However, the hypervisor would be 
partitioned the cache based on the execution of any encryption algorithm. Although this 
prevention mechanism maintains the cache efficiency, it requires the client to change their 
software e.g., encryption Algorithms, which does not comply with the cloud model. 
Moreover, it gives a small portion of the to the encryption algorithm cache by using a 
page coloring technique, mean it just secure the clients and programs which use the 
encryption algorithm. For instance, if one VM wants to leak information from another 
VM, then their solution is unable to prevent the information leakage across VMs. 
Therefore, there is a need for server-based prevention mechanism which is transparent to 
guest VM and the underlying hardware.  
Moreover, this prevention mechanism prevents the extraction of the cryptographic key 
as well as the normal information leakage. This prevention mechanism follows the cloud 
rule as we discussed in Chapter 2 as a cloud model that does not need to change the client 
software or the underlying hardware. Our solution does not need to reboot the system 
every time for partitioning the cache on the provisioning of new VM. Additionally, if the 
cache is divided dynamically according to the requirement of each VMs, and the 
Cross-VM 
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individual VM does not have to worry about that other VM will evict its data. 
Consequently, this improves the overall performance by increasing the cache hit and 
cache miss rate and also the cache usage for each VM. This solution is more preventive 
rather than reactive. There are two types of prevention mechanism: Intrusion response 
system (IRS) and Intrusion prevention system (IPS). Since we cannot wait for a cache 
channel might be forming we completely prevent the channel to form or occur, therefore 
our solution is IPS e.g., Proactive response rather than IRS e.g., Reactive response.We 
utilized the standard workload such as apache benchmark and Cache bench benchmark 
from the open sourced Phoronix test suite for the evaluation of the amount of overhead 
generated by the static-based partitioned hypervisor. These benchmarks are used because 
these are open source. 
3.3.2 Phoronix Test Suite 
We utilized the apache and cachebench benchmark from the Phoronix test suite to 
evaluate our proposed dynamic cache partitioned solution. The Phoronix test is 
commonly used for the evaluation for the performance measurement of various system 
attributes and subsystems. These attributes include cache usage, CPU load testing, cache 
access rate and how the Xen hypervisor is able to handle the high load distributed among 
different VMs. However, among the available tests, we focused on standard workload 
namely Apache benchmark and the Cachebench benchmark to evaluate the various 
performance attributes most significant in the virtualized environment. Apache was 
chosen because it is the most widely used software for load testing and typically find in 
the Cloud. Our solution is also related to virtualizing environment therefore, we chose 
this benchmark and Cachebench was chosen because it shows the cache usage in more 
detailed form. 
3.4 Evaluation Parameters 
The following test we performed by using the above mentioned benchmark. 
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 Load testing with varying numbers of VMS and partitions 
 Cache Utilization with varying numbers of VMs and partitions 
 Memory access rate with varying numbers of VM and partitions 
3.4.1 Load Testing with varying numbers of VMs and Partitions 
The Apache benchmark is a standard benchmarking tool based on HTTP webserver 
(Foundation. 2013). We utilized apache benchmark from the open sourced Phoronix Test 
Suite for the evaluation of the partitioned hypervisor. This benchmark is chosen because 
this typical software is found very easy to use and frequently available in the cloud. Table 
3.4 shows the performance of the static partition in term of load testing that the modified 
hypervisor based on the static partition can tolerate how much load in term of request per 
second. As shown in the table that with increasing number of VMs and partitions the 
bearable load in term of number of request per second is decreasing. 
Table 3.5 : Load Testing with Varying Number of VMs and Partitions 
 Number of Requests per Second  
Number of 
Partitions 
With 1 VM With 2VM With 4VM With 8 VM With 16 VM 
Default (1) 3200 3500 3200 1500 700 
Partition (2) 3200 3200 3100 1500 700 
Partition (4) 2800 3100 3100 1500 600 
Partition (8) 2600 2900 2800 1400 600 
Partition (16) 2200 2100 2000 1100 400 
We’re assuming that if there are four cores in the system then we will have 4 VM. 
Dom 0 will divide the cache partition according to cache associative. If the cache is 24way 
and VM is 4. Then 24/4=6. Each VM will get 6 partitions. We concluded from the various 
experiments that if we will partition the cache into 16 at boot time then the overall 
performance of the system will be degraded even one VM is executing on the partitioned 
(16 parts) cache. 
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Figure 3.5: Load Testing in Static Partitioned Hypervisor with Varying Number of 
VMs and Partitions 
In Figure 3.5, the result of the conducting experiment in static partitioned hypervisor 
is shown. We analyzed from this load experiments that as the number of partitions 
increases the request per second is decreased which show the bearable load of a system 
or load that a system can tolerate. The problem with the static partition during boot time 
is: once we create the static partitions at boot time we cannot change the partitions until 
we boot the system. For instance, once we divide the cache into 16 partitions and during 
this time one VM is running then one VM will be executing on one part of the cache and 
the remaining 15 partitions will be idle during execution of VM. Because we cannot 
change the 16 partitions into single partition according to the executing single VM. 
Moreover, we cannot change the partition into one partition with respect to the creation 
or execution of one VM. We have concluded from the experiments that the ideal 
distribution with minimum overhead would be an equal amount of VMs and amount of 
partitions for each set of partitions. Although static partition prevents overhead from 
cross-VM cache evictions, however, it would be very difficult to detect the number of 
VMs and number of partitions at boot time. 
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3.4.2 Cache Utilization with varying numbers of VMs and Partitions 
We conducted this experiments by using cachebench benchmark. Cache utilization is 
investigated for static portioned hypervisor to check the amount of data accessed in bytes 
by each one. Cachebench includes various benchmark, however, we used the Cache 
Read/Modify/Write to evaluate the different level of cache in term of accessed data. We 
analyzed by conducting this experiment that in the static cache partition the amount of 
cache bandwidth would be decreases with increasing number of VMs and number of 
partitions. Consequently, static cache partition generates much more overhead as the 
number of VMs and partitions increases. Table 3.7 shows the result of a statistically 
partitioned hypervisor. 
Table 3.6: Cache Utilization with Varying Number of VMs and Partitions 
 Cache Bandwidth of Read/Modify/Write (MB per Second) 
Number of Partition 1VM 2VMs 4 VMs 8 VMs 16 VMs 
Default (1) 17923 17128 15289 13567 13889 
Partition (2) 15628 14035 13878 11228 12556 
Partition (4) 14289 13582 12728 10988 10454 
Partition (8) 10989 9366 8800 8487 8000 
Partition (16) 4896 4098 3789 3567 3089 
 
Figure 3.6 shows a gradual decrease in the cache utilization for each VM as the number 
of VMs and partitions increases. For 1 VM the cache bandwidth is more as compared to 
the 16 VMs and partitions. It means when the number of VMs and partition is increases 
the performance will be degraded because the cache bandwidth in term of cache 
read/write/modify bandwidth will be decreased. Similarly, if the number of partition is 
increased then the cache bandwidth for each VM will decrease even if one VM is running. 
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Figure 3.6: Cache Utilization with Varying Number of VMs and Partitions 
3.4.3 Memory Access Rate with varying numbers of VMs and Partitions 
The average memory access time is a valuable parameter to evaluate the performance 
of a memory hierarchy configuration. When a processor demand to execute an item from 
the main memory, it sends a load request to the cache memory. If the item resides in the 
cache it will generate a cache hit and in the case of absence, it will generate a cache miss. 
These cache miss and hit rate are used to calculate the memory access rate. We have 
calculated the total cache references, cache miss, and cache hit rate by using a cachegrind 
benchmark for the purpose to determine cache access rate. Then by using these values, 
we have calculated the memory access rate by our own designed program in the static 
cache partitioned-based hypervisor. Figure 3.7 shows the access latency for varying 
number of partitions with increasing number of VMs. We have observed from the analysis 
that the performance for 2-way and 4-way partitions are same as the default hypervisor. 
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Figure 3.7: Cache Access Rate in Static partitioned based Hypervisor 
However, when we increase the number of partition and number of VMs, there is a 
gradual decrease in the cache access time. When there is many numbers of VMs and 
partitions then there are chances for eviction of each other data that’s why the memory 
access rate would be increased as the data will not be present in the cache memory and 
will be coming from the main memory. Since the program is running on the partitioned 
hypervisor, therefore, the performance will be degraded. If our design program for the 
calculation of cache access rate is run in the default/unmodified hypervisor then it will 
generate more cache hit as compared to the program which is running in the static 
partitioned based hypervisor. Because in the partitioned hypervisor case, our design 
program gets a portion of the entire cache. This proves that the overall performance will 
be degraded with the static cache partition. 
3.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, the implementation of SC attacks by using two methods in the different 
hypervisors is presented. Then the prevention mechanism for SC attacks has been 
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discussed in detail. According to the studied literature, one intuitive defense to mitigate 
cache-based SC attacks is the static partition of the cache is to divide the cache into 
statistical partition according to the different scheme of color assignment and strictly 
assign distinct page color to different VMs, so they access different parts of cache. We 
conducted the real-time experiment for the prevention of SC attacks based on the static 
partition solution and analyzed the load, cache utilization, and memory access time of this 
existing solution. Consequently, we analyzed that there are some bearable differences in 
the load, and memory access time between unmodified and modified (based on static 
cache partition) hypervisor as we know security is always comes with some overhead. 
However, there is a very large difference in the cache utilization of modified and 
unmodified hypervisor.  
Although the static cache partition is simple and provides isolation, it potentially 
decreases the cache set for utilization. Consequently, the number of cache sets in typical 
processor cores is very limited which could reduce the number of executable VMs in a 
shared cache when using a static partition of cache. Consider, for instance, a system 
having 4 cores with 64-page color and 16 MB of memory for individual color. Therefore, 
this system support 64 VMs with one color each and every VM limited to footprint not 
more than 16MB. Moreover, cache utilization is low when all cores and all VMs are 
active. It was observed that once the static partition is created during the boot time, it 
cannot be changed after creation of more VMs until we boot the system and change some 
changes. In addition, existing page coloring mechanisms either is unable to adaptively 
adjust cache partitions efficiently or they unable to identify phase transition of 
application. To mitigate this problem, we extend page coloring with dynamic cache 
partitioning capability by adding recoloring mechanism. In this dynamic partition 
mechanisms, every VMs get their partition upon the creation without booting the system. 
There are some other approaches to prevent cache-based SC attacks, however, they all 
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require the changes in the client software and in the underlying hardware. The prevention 
mechanism for SC attacks can be improved in term of cache utilization and performance 
improvement.  
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CHAPTER 4: HYPERVISOR-BASED PREVENTION MECHANISM USING 
DYNAMIC CACHE PARTITIONING: HBP-DCP 
This chapter aims to present the details of our Hypervisor-based Prevention 
Mechanism using Dynamic Cache Partitioning (HBP-DCP) for the prevention of cross-
VM cache-based SC attacks. We describe the building blocks and components of the 
proposed prevention mechanism and describe their functionality. The HBP-DCP is 
comprised of three main components, namely, admission control, cache usage monitor, 
and cache partitioner (Color-Aware Page Migrator). The admission control interprets and 
analyzes the user requests and takes a decision based on the availability, capability, and 
price of VM. The cache usage monitor analyzes and measures the number and utilized 
cache of executing VMs. The cache partitioner then divides/partition the cache according 
to executing VMs. The required amount of cache varies from VM to VM and the number 
of VMs also varies, therefore, it is difficult to fulfill the demand of the each VM for the 
different requested amount of cache in a static partition. Our approach divides the cache 
according to the executing number of VMs and facilitates the VMs requested amount of 
cache on the fly and also can prevent the cache-based SC attacks across VMs. 
In the following sections, details of the HBP-DCP are provided. In Section 4.1, the 
overview of the system requirements for HBP-DCP. Section 4.2 presents the VM 
creation/provisioning in detail. Section 4.3 describes the various component of the 
proposed prevention mechanism, such as admission control, cache usage monitor, and 
cache partitioner in detail. In section 4.4 the significance of the proposed prevention 
mechanism is provided. Section 4.5 describes the data designing followed by concluding 
remarks in 4.6 for this section. 
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4.1 Hypervisor-based Prevention mechanism using Dynamic Cache 
Partitioning 
In this subsection, we present the overview of our HBP-DCP mechanism that is 
capable of preventing cross-VM cache-based SC attacks. As already discussed in section 
2.1.2, the basic idea behind cache-based SC attacks is the shared resources in CC as VMs 
resides on the same physical devices and can easily extract each other data by using shared 
L3 cache. Since it is clear from the name that hypervisor-based prevention has three main 
phases. The first phase is that Xen hypervisor will check the VM request. This usually 
includes whether the request is generated from the new VM or from existing VM. The 
second phase is to check the cache usage that how many VMs already exist in the cache 
and how much cache is assigned to those VM. The third phase is to reconfigure the cache 
and re-divide the cache according to the requirement of the current running VMs. This 
approach is to rewrite the software (Source code of Xen Hypervisor) in a way that no 
known and unknown cache-based SC attacks between VMs can succeed. This solution is 
more preventive than reactive. There are two types of prevention mechanism: Intrusion 
response system (IRS) and Intrusion prevention system (IPS). Since we cannot wait for a 
cache channel might be forming we completely prevent the channel from being forming 
or occurring, therefore our solution is IPS (e.g., Proactive response) rather than IRS (e.g., 
Reactive response). 
4.1.1 Features of the Proposed HBP-DCP Prevention Mechanism 
The aim of the HBP-DCP is to mitigate cross-VM cache-based SC attacks. The 
proposed prevention mechanism has the following features that distinguish it from the 
existing prevention mechanism: 
 Generalizable: The fundamental cause of any type (e.g., Trace-driven, Time-
driven, and access-driven) of cache-based SC attacks in the virtualized 
environment is the cache memory. Since the cache is the most interactive devices 
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between VMs and it is always been targeted for SC attacks. As our proposed 
prevention mechanism is based on the cache memory partition, therefore, it can 
mitigate any type of cross-VM SC attacks which is based on the cache memory. 
 Comply with Cloud Model: The existing solution does not comply with the cloud 
model as they need the client to change their software or the underlying 
hardware. As discussed in Section 2.1.1.2, our prevention mechanism 
confirming to the cloud model because it can be directly implemented into the 
hypervisor. Furthermore, it is transparent to the cloud model because it does not 
need any modification in the underlying hardware and in the client software. 
 Portability: Hypervisor can be installed almost on every type of computing 
infrastructure. Since our prevention mechanism is hypervisor based means we 
have implemented by using the source code of an open source hypervisor. 
Therefore our prevention mechanism can be ported to any type of the supported 
software (hypervisor) and computing infrastructure. 
 Applicable to Commodity Operating System: To implement the cache partition 
at the VMM (hypervisor) level is very beneficial. Since all the monitoring and 
partitioning activity will be done on the hypervisor level. Therefore it is 
applicable to Commodity OS the source code of which is unavailable such as a 
window OS. Most of the previous work is done for the multi-programming 
workload. However, our work enables the cache partitioning across and within 
the OSs, as it is implemented in the hypervisor and therefore improve the whole 
system optimization by providing more flexibility.  
 Saving Cache Utilization: Hypervisor-based prevention mechanism is based on 
the dynamic partition of the cache. Therefore the overall performance can be 
improved by increasing the cache utilization for individual VM because VM is 
only giving as much more cache memory as they are requested. Unlike static 
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partition, the dynamic system avoids having to reboot the system every time on 
the VM provisioning so increase the overall performance of the system. 
 Preventive rather than Reactive: Our solution is more preventive rather than 
reactive. Since we cannot examine when SC attacks might occur, we simply 
ensure that the two VMs would not be able to access the same cache lines for the 
purpose to create SC attack. Preventive mean early prevention before occurring 
of the attacks while reactive mean prevents attacks after occurring. Because once 
the attack occurs, it will harm the system even in a minute, therefore, early 
prevention of attack is more beneficial than post prevention. 
4.2 System Architecture 
We devise HBP-DCP mechanism for the mitigation of cross-VM cache-based SC 
attacks. This prevention mechanism is based on the open source code of Xen hypervisor. 
Since the source code of the Xen hypervisor is open source and freely available. 
Therefore, we chose Xen hypervisor for the creation of VM and for the implementation 
of our solution. Furthermore, our solution is also hypervisor-based and will be added to 
the existing source code of Xen. However, this prevention mechanism can be applied in 
other hypervisors namely VMware ESXI because it is general approach and is based on 
the cache partitioning. This prevention mechanism is enabled by admission control and 
VM provisioning rather than SC channel attacks. Therefore, we need to explain these 
terms in our thesis according to the requirement of our HBP-DCP prevention mechanism. 
Furthermore, for this thesis, first of all, we have implemented the attack on the shared 
LLC (L3) cache, the detail of which is given in Chapter 3 in detail. Since we need to 
check the cross-VM cache-based attack. Therefore, VM provisioning is must to create 
two VMs on the Xen hypervisor. Since both the implementation of attack and solution 
are based on the shared LL cache, therefore, LLC (L3) must be in the system. The salient 
characteristic of the LLC is that it is by design an inclusive cache memory. Therefore, the 
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data stored in the L1 and L2 caches is also copied in the LLC. Consequently, in the case 
of a cache miss in an L1 cache, the data will be checked in L2 in order to decrease the 
cache miss rate. Furthermore, if the data is flushed or evicted from the LLC, it will 
automatically be erased from all the other levels of the processor’s cache.  
Although shared cache has some advantages such as increased utilization of cache 
space, decreased cache miss rate, faster inter-core communication through shared LLC 
(L3 and L2), and the elimination of undesired replication of cache lines to reduce 
aggregate cache footprint. However, the major disadvantage of shared LLC is the 
uncontrolled contention can occur by allowing CPU-cores to access the shared LLC on a 
free basis. Moreover, HBP-DCP is always activated when the user sends a request to 
admission control for VM creation and when the VM provisioning phase will be activated 
by assigning VM to the specified client. The system requirements for the implementation 
of our prevention mechanism includes Xen hypervisor and Intel Core i7 with shared LLC 
(L3). We choose Core i7 having 4 cores because in this modern architecture each core 
has a dedicated L1 (instruction and data cache) and L2 cache but the L3 cache is shared 
amongst all cores. Therefore, the state of the art cache-based SC attacks target L3 cache.  
Our proposed HBP-DCP prevention mechanism consists the following four 
components, namely; (a) Admission Control module has been used as a general 
mechanism to enforce the fair usage policy of resources on server, (b) After verification 
and availability of resources, once the admission control grants the request, then after this 
stage the global scheduler will assign the physical id of the underlying hardware to VM 
on which new VM will be created, (c) Cache Usage Monitor has the ability to check the 
status and utilization of cache of the underlying physical device and the executing VMS 
on the fly, (d) and Cache Partitioner (Color-aware Page Migrator) repartitions the cache 
dynamically according to the requested VM. The high level components of the proposed 
prevention mechanism is depicted in Figure 4.1. 
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Figure 4.1: Proposed Hypervisor-based Prevention Mechanism Using Dynamic 
Cache Partitioning 
Since our proposed prevention mechanism is based on the VM provisioning (When 
VMs create and demand cache) and page coloring (assign the separate part of cache to 
VM) technique. Admission control and global scheduler are based on the VM 
provisioning, because these components are always activated with VM provisioning. 
Therefore, we need to describe VM provisioning and page coloring terms according to 
the requirement of our proposed prevention mechanism in the following section. 
Moreover, we describe the Xen paging mechanism. 
4.2.1 Virtual Machine Provisioning 
VM provisioning is a management process for a system that creates new VMs on the 
physical host server and computing resources are allocated to support these VMs. These 
computing resources consist the entire cores or CPU cycles, Input/output cycles, storage 
and memory spaces. Xen enables users to instantiate the guest operating systems (VM) 
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on the fly to execute whatever they desire and require. Furthermore, admission control is 
performed/activated based on the provisioning or creation of new VM as shown in Figure 
4.2. Each VM have to pay in some fashion for the resources it requires. We use this same 
basic approach to building Xen, which multiplexes physical resources at the granularity 
of an entire OS and is able to provide performance isolation between them. The task of 
building the initial guest OS structures for a new domain is mostly delegated to Domain0 
which uses its privileged control interfaces to access the new domain’s memory and 
inform Xen of initial register state. VMs sees the allocated space whether the thick or thin 
allocation is provided by Xen hypervisor. In thick allocation, the whole virtual disc is 
provided to VMs while in thin approach only the required part of the virtual disk is 
provided to VMs. VMs sees all the time the allocated virtual disk space but only used the 
amount of capacity required to hold the current files. These virtual disks are allocated to 
each VMs on the fly on the physical disk according to the requested user need. 
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Figure 4.2: Process of VM Provisioning 
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4.2.2 Page Coloring 
Our proposed prevention mechanism using dynamic cache partition is based on the 
page coloring technique. Page coloring is a classical software based page allocation 
technique that directs how pages are mapped to the cache memory lines. It is the basis for 
the fine grain division of LLC namely L2 and L3 for the purpose of a cache hit 
optimization. Despite, the primary use of the cache coloring as an optimization approach, 
the particular mapping of the memory addresses to cache lines can be exploited for the 
security of the system by mimicking VMs isolation across LLC (L2 or L3). In addition, 
the memory management module is controlled by the page coloring systems to ensure 
that the group of pages having the same color is assigned to the same cache lines to 
enforce the security of the system.  
In modern OS, the OS access physical memory and L3 cache by physical address. In 
limited cache associative, there should be overlapped on bit field between physical page 
number and L3 cache set number. Furthermore, there are some overlapped bit between 
the set number of cache associative and the page number of machines which are directly 
controlled by the cache coloring. These bits can be used to group the memory pages into 
distinct color. For instance, the size of the physical page is 4KB and to represent page 
offset there must be 12 bit. The remaining bits are assigned to the physical page number. 
The size of the L2 cache is 512KB, 61-way associative, and the size of a cache line is 
64B. So the physical page number has 3 lower bits that are overlapped with the higher 3 
bits of cache set number. This overlapped part is called page color. 
Similarly, in Figure 4.3, the physical page number has 4 bits that are overlapped with 
the higher 4 bits of the cache. These 4 overlapped bits show the cache partition into 16 
colors. Furthermore, 5 overlapped bit partition the cache into 32 part and for 3 overlapped 
bits the cache will be divided into 8 partitions. This number can be varied according to 
cache’s associativity, the size of the cache and cache line. In addition, the OS has full 
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control on these overlapped bits. OS decide how and which virtual page to be mapped 
into which physical page. The hardware by itself fixes the mapping of the physical page 
into a cache, which is the most important requirement for page coloring technique. OS 
can use its control of virtual to physical mapping to control indirectly the mapping of 
physical pages to cache lines. Distinct color could be mapped into distinct cache sets. The 
steps for the color assignment are as follow:  
 Each set has own color 
 The same color has to be assigned the pages mapped on the same set 
 A VM own one or more color 
 Hypervisor assigns to VMs only pages of their own color 
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Figure 4.3: Mapping between the Physical Address and Cache Lines (Overlapped 
Bits are Used for Page Coloring) 
4.2.3 Paging Mechanism in Xen Hypervisor 
As we discussed in the previous section that our proposed prevention mechanism uses 
page coloring for the allocation of pages in Xen hypervisor. Therefore, in our thesis, we 
need to discuss the Xen paging mechanism. In a traditional non-virtualized environment, 
the OS is responsible for the assignment of physical memory to the running process inside 
its own virtual address space. During the memory access, the virtual address of process 
must be translated by the memory management unit to traverse the corresponding process 
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page table set up by the OS. However, in the hypervisor (e.g., virtualized environment) 
one more indirection of memory translation from guest to host is performed. Xen 
hypervisor supports para–virtualization and full-virtualization. The performance of para-
virtualization is better as compared to full virtualization, but it need change in the guest 
OS source code. Therefore, for our prevention mechanism using dynamic cache partition, 
we focused on full virtualization. Under full virtualization mode, Xen is responsible for 
the translation of three address space namely machines-, guests-, and linear address-
space. The machine address-space is called the real machine address-space; while the 
guest’s view of the real machine address space is the guest address space is also known 
as pseudo-physical address space, and linear address space is provided by processor’s 
MMU is a flat contiguous address space. 
 As shown in Figure 4.4, there are three memory namely virtual memory, physical 
memory, and machine memory. Virtual memory is mapped by application inside the guest 
OS. While in physical memory the host presents physical pages to VMS and actual pages 
allocated by the host in machine memory. Furthermore, when executing on the 
hypervisor, the guest OS translates the guest virtual address to the physical address of 
guest OS, and the hypervisor (VMM) maintain a mapping from the guest physical address 
to machine physical address. Furthermore, this real memory address is used for accessing 
the memory. The machine, the guest, and the linear address spaces are manipulated in a 
unit knows as page frames. Particularly, the frame number of the machine physical 
address space is called Machine Frame Number (MFN) while guest’s pseudo Physical 
Frame number is known as PFN.  
Furthermore, hypervisor detects the same pages in the memory of each guest VM and 
maps these identical pages to the same physical memory. Hypervisor allocates frame 
numbers and mapped a unique PFN of guest OS (VM) to a specific MFN (Barham, 
Dragovic et al. 2003). The Xen hypervisor used the two hardware page table namely guest 
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physical to machine physical translation (P2M) in order to translate the guest physical 
address to machine physical address and machine physical to guest physical translation 
(M2P) in order to translate the machine to guest physical address. In addition, Xen 
hypervisor used the shadow page table for the guest virtual address to host physical 
address. P2M and M2P are the arrays of frames numbers indexed by either by machine 
or physical frames, particularly P2M table for the mapping of PFN to MFN while the 
M2P table is for the MFN to PFN mapping.  
In full virtualization mode, the guest OS considers itself as a real machine. Therefore, 
in page tables the frame numbers that they used to be MFN, which are in fact PFN. The 
PFN entries filled in the page table cannot be accessed directly without translation to 
corresponding MFN before the page table be committed to MMU. Xen handles this 
problem by using a mechanism called Shadow Page Table. OS creates and maintains 
shadow page table for the original page table in each VM for its virtual address spaces 
without modification. But MMU hardware does not use these shadow page tables, these 
tables just for the direct virtual to physical mapping. It uses the TLB for the translation of 
virtual pages of a guest to machine page of a physical system. These tables are loaded 
into the hypervisor (VMM) on context switching. VMM keeps its tables consistency with 
the OS in such a way that it’s VM consistent with the OS VP. VMM maps page table 
of OS as read-only. When OS tries to write to the page table then traps to VMM. VMM 
applies write to shadow page table and OS page table and returns. This process is called 
memory tracing. Original page table used by MMU will be locked on the creation of 
shadow page table for further changes, the effect of every write to original page will be 
captured and propagated to shadow page. A shadow page pool will be created by Xen for 
every guest OS, then Xen is responsible for allocating a free page from the shadow page 
pool to every guest OS which tries to access these pages as page table, or recycles a 
shadow page to make it a target page shadow based on less frequently used and on no 
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availability of free page. Since it is common for page tables to reference each other, 
Thereby Xen is responsible to organizes all shadow pages with both page level as keys 
and PFN into a hash table. 
Modern computer architecture has the hardware support for the memory virtualization 
techniques. For instance, Extended Page Table (ETP) feature is enabled in Intel CPU by 
Intel VT (Virtualization Technology) (Technology. 2016), the hardware MMU first walk 
through the shadow page table used by the guest OS for each memory access by each VM 
to translate from guest virtual address to guest physical address. Then access a separate 
page table namely ETP setup by the hypervisor for the translation of guest physical 
address to machine physical address. Thus, the conceptual P2M and M2P tables we have 
mentioned above just map to the EPT table in the case of Intel architecture. 
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Figure 4.4: Paging Mechanism in Hypervisor 
4.3 Components of the Proposed HBP-PDC Prevention Mechanism 
The following section describes the components of the proposed prevention 
mechanism which is admission control, Xen scheduler, cache usage monitor, and cache 
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partitioner. Although our prevention mechanism is mainly based on two components 
namely cache usage monitor and color-aware page migrator. Cache usage monitor is 
responsible for assigning initial page colors to the new creating VM and for monitoring 
VM cache usage metrics. While the responsibility of color-aware page migrator is to 
allocate page frames of a specific color. However, if the admission control accepts the 
request for the new VM creation then the global scheduler will be activated and the main 
components of our HBP-DCP will be activated based on the admission control and global 
scheduler approval for new VM. Therefore, there is a need to explain these components. 
4.3.1 Server Side Admission Control 
The responsibility of admission control module is to enforce the fair utilization of 
server resources. It uses various strategies to decide which user requests to be accepted in 
order to minimize the performance impact, avoiding the overloading of resources and 
penalties of service level agreement that decrease cloud provider’s profit (Wu, Garg et al. 
2012). Admission control regulates the number of active cloud users based on the 
utilization of the system or the policy manually defined by the system administrator. In 
order to share the resources among various devices, a request from clients will be 
processed and queued according to any scheduling policy namely round robin and FIFO 
defined by the system administrator or selected on the fly based on the system load and 
other metrics.  
Furthermore, whenever the clients send a request for VM, the admission control will 
communicate with the VMM (hypervisor) whether the VM can be created or not. 
Thereafter, the admission control phase verifies the software platform availability and 
analyses if the new request can be accepted then it will decide whether to queue it up in 
an already initiated VM or by initiating a new VM. Hence, if both conditions are satisfied 
then the request is transferred and the id of the physical CPU will be assigned to the 
requested VM. Hence, firstly, the admission control checks if the new request can be 
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queued up by waiting for all accepted requests on any initiated VM. If this request cannot 
wait in any initiated VM, then the admission control checks if it can be accepted by 
initiating a new VM provided by the cloud provider. Once the request is granted by the 
admission control then the global scheduler is responsible for the creation and scheduling 
of VMs on the specific hypervisor of the underlying physical device from which user 
request is generated for the VMs creation.  
4.3.2 Global Scheduler vs Xen Scheduler  
The scheduling and admission control are interlinked for VMs creation and resources 
allocation to users. The global scheduler is responsible for delivering or rejecting services 
to every user according to their request based on the admission control decision (Wu, 
Garg et al. 2012). Once the admission control grants the request, then after this stage, the 
global scheduler will assign the physical id of the underlying hardware to different VMs 
on which the user send a request to the admission control for the creation of new VM. 
The whole process of our proposed prevention mechanism is inter-related with the 
creation of VMs. The Xen scheduler will check the cache memory after the creation of 
new VM. 
Xen scheduler is the local scheduler on the individual physical machine. Xen being a 
virtualization hypervisor closely models the OS on which it is run. Therefore, the 
scheduling of VM in the hypervisor is same as the process or thread scheduling in OS. 
Just like the process in OS has multiple threads that can be processed on different cores, 
the VMs have multiple virtual CPUs (VCPUs) that can be run on different physical CPUs 
(PCPUs). Xen scheduler balances the load of one or more virtual CPU across physical 
CPU. The basic difference between the OS and hypervisor is that the number of VCPUs 
is static as compared to the process in OS because VMs and VCPUs are created and 
deleted on a rare basis. In contrast, the process or thread are created and deleted on a 
continuous basis. Since Xen scheduler controls the cache memory according to the new 
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requested VMs. Therefore, we change the existing code of Xen scheduler by adding code 
for monitoring the cache utilization and cache partition module. 
4.3.3 Cache Usage Monitor 
During the physical system booting all cache memory is allocated to the Dom0 by 
default. When the other guest VMs e.g., Dom U are executed, then they share the same 
memory which is allocated to Dom0. The responsibility of cache usage monitor (CUM) 
is to measure the cache for running VMs upon the creation of new VM and to make a 
decision about the partition adjustment. Moreover, the responsibility of CUM upon the 
new VM creation is to monitor the cache utilization, to assign the initial page colors to 
VM, and to readjust the color assignment according to the requirement of VMs. The 
CUM, reserve a memory pool for the page coloring during runtime, and partition this 
memory according to the underlying cache infrastructure into different colors. The 
memory pool is used in order to serve all page request. The free pages having the same 
color inside the memory pool are linked together to form multiple list. The CUM divide 
the cache into N portion of contiguous pages on a physical system having M processing 
cores. Each cache section is then assigned to a particular CPU core, this specific core will 
be considered a local core for a color if the color belongs to this core. All the core other 
than local core will be considered as remote cores. When new VM is created then the 
CPM will search the core having light weight and allocate the whole cache portion of the 
core to this VM. Consequently, in a system, if the total number of page color is C then 
the color assigned to every VM will be C/M. This means that the cache will be fully 
utilized by N co-running VMs. 
One intuitive defense to mitigate cache-based SC attacks is the static partition scheme 
is to divide the cache into statistical partition according to the different schemes of color 
assignment and strictly assign distinct page color to different VMs, so they access 
different parts of cache. Although the static cache partition is simple and provides 
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isolation, it potentially decreases the cache utilization and consequently limits the number 
of VMs. To mitigate this problem, we extend page coloring with dynamic cache 
repartitioning capability by adding recoloring mechanism. In this scheme, we first assign 
a default-sized partition and then gradually increase the size thorough re-partition (e.g., 
re-coloring). We devised an algorithm for cache usage monitor which is presented as 
follows. 
Algorithm 1 Cache Usage Monitor 
1: Input: Current VM, Cache Miss Rate 
2: if New VM creation = True then 
3: Cache Usage Monitor: Pass the cache miss rate of the current VM to cache 
usage monitor function 
4: Function Cache_Usage_Monitor (Cache miss rate) 
5: Assignment = Assignment of (current VM) 
6: if cache miss rate > High-Threshold then 
7:      if IsNotShared (Number of VMs do not sharing the same color) = False 
then 
8:        IsShared True 
9:        Return 
10:      End if 
11:       New = Assign_Color (c) 
12:      Assignment += new 
13:      IsNotShared  False 
14: End if 
15: End if 
16: End Function 
17: Function Assign_Color (number) 
18:     New  ϕ 
19:     While number > 0 do 
20:        If need-cache() then 
21:         new += pick_remote () 
22:       else  
23:         new + = pick_local() 
24:         end if 
25:         number  number -1 
26:       end While 
27:       return new 
28:   End Function 
Thus the different parts of the cache will be assigned to different VMs to improve the 
security of the system without impacting the overall performance of the system. Because 
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every VM can access different cache on a dynamic basis according to their requirements. 
The system will be secure from the SC attacks because no VM can access the partition 
assigned to another VM. The purpose of differentiating the VMs sharing the same color 
to the VMs not sharing the same color is useful for restricting two VMs to not interfere 
with each other data by assigning the new color which is not already shared to the new 
created VM. There are two approaches coloring and recoloring. In the cache usage 
monitor algorithm, the function Assign-Color is triggered to assign a specific color to a 
new created VM, whenever it run outs of memory with its pre-existing color. Here c is 
the configurable number of color. Moreover, in cache usage monitor algorithm, the 
number of VMs using the same color as the definition of IsShared and refer the other one 
IsNotShared when the VMs do not share the same cache. While the recoloring function 
in color-page allocator has explained in the following section is invoked when a cache 
demand exceeds its current assignment. This is determined by observing the ratio of the 
cache miss rate to the total number of cache accesses by hardware performance counter 
in modern processor over a period of time. Cache usage monitoring is responsible for 
assigning an initial color to VM. We set up high-threshold and low-threshold as a global 
variable for the cache miss rate when the system starts. VMs with the cache miss rate 
greater than the high-threshold are the one required more space on the cache. While VM 
with cache miss rate lower than the low-threshold is the ones willing to provide empty 
space on cache for re-partitioning.  
Function cache_usage_monitor in algorithm 1 is used to activate recoloring. It takes 
the cache miss rate of the existing VMs upon the time of new VM creation. The 
need_cache() function returns true if current VM has already been using the entire section 
of the local cache. The number of VMs sharing the same color (IsShared) act as a signal 
to indicate that a VM needs more page colors. Conversely, the number of VMs do not 
share the same color (IsNotShared) is used to indicate when more page colors are 
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available. Functions pick_remote select a color in a section of remote cache belonging to 
the existing VM. Similarly, pick_local choose a color in a local cache section, owned by 
the current VM. Cache usage monitor considers both the number of cache references and 
cache miss rate. If the cache reference for a VM is small then the cache miss rate for that 
specific VM will be considered as zero. 
4.3.4 Color-Aware Page Migrator 
Color-aware page migrator is responsible for allocating page frame of specific color. 
Upon receiving an allocation request from VM, the color-aware page migrator 
communicate with the CUM to determine the colors already assigned to the requesting 
VM. The color-aware page migrator then gets one of these colors in a round robin manner 
and returns a page from the memory pool with that specific color. For instance, when a 
new VM request for a page, the Xen hypervisor (VMM) allocate pages according to P2M 
table created by CUM in term of page coloring. Therefore, the requested data for 
individual VM will be placed in separate cache lines, this improves the security because 
one VM cannot access or evict the data of another VM. In our prevention mechanism, a 
memory pool is used to handle all the request from various VMs. Inside the memory pool, 
free pages having the same colors are linked together to make multiple lists. The per-VM 
color assignment is done in the cache usage monitor in order to reduce the complexity of 
our prevention mechanism.  
Once the admission control approves the request for new VM creation then upon the 
receiving request of allocation for new VM, the color-aware page migrator (CPM) 
communicate with the CUM to find the color already assigned to the created VMs. The 
CPM then select one of these colors in a round robin manner and return a page of that 
specific color to the requesting VM from the memory pool. If the memory pool does not 
consist that requesting color then the page migrator assigned another color to the VM. If 
the requesting color is not available then the page allocator of Xen hypervisor populate 
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the memory pool and organize the free pages in a machine using a buddy system, similar 
to the Linux memory management mechanism. To implement our prevention mechanism 
we have added our color-aware page migrator in addition to buddy system for memory 
management. Using these color bits, the Xen hypervisor can make the color-aware page 
migrator to control the mapping between physical pages and cache memory and can 
assign a specific color page to the requesting VM. 
4.4 HBP-DCP Prevention Mechanism Algorithm 
Section 4.3 explains the basic building blocks of the proposed prevention mechanism. 
In this section, we will present our proposed algorithm which starts from the interaction 
between the components of the proposed prevention mechanism. The existing prevention 
algorithm change the cache configuration at boot time based on the new VM creation. 
Our proposed prevention mechanism is different from the static page coloring method in 
that it allows cache usage of adjusting VMs on the fly. We achieve the dynamic cache 
partition between VMs by changing the physical location of a VM’s logical page through 
a set of hypercalls in the Xen source code. The dynamic cache partition algorithm is based 
on the cache coloring approach which has already implemented in the OS for page 
allocation (Tam, Azimi et al. 2007). However, the basic steps in generic dynamic cache 
allocation can be summarized in the following steps: 
1. Wait for new VM request. 
2. Admission control approves the request for new VM creation and send 
hypercalls to hypervisor. 
3. The cache usage monitor component in hypervisor is responsible to get the 
current partition of cache and the number of currently executing VMs. 
4. Reconfigure existing VMs by shrinking its cache size through page recoloring. 
5. Register a new cache partition for new VM with Xen hypervisor. 
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6. Create the requested VM with the new cache partition on dynamic basis and 
assign a color page to the VM which represent a unique cache line. 
7. Consequently, it prevents the cache-based SC attacks to occur because every 
VMs get individual unique partition in the cache and is unable to access and evict 
each other data. 
Based on these generic steps and the components of our proposed solution, we present 
our proposed cache usage monitor and dynamic cache partitioning algorithms to serve the 
end users as algorithm 1 and algorithm 2 for the prevention of cross-VM cache-based SC 
attacks. 
Figure 4.5 shows the flow of our HBP-DCP prevention mechanism. As shown in the 
figure when the user request for VM creation then the responsibility of the admission 
control in combining with the global scheduler is to assign the physical id on a physical  
Algorithm 2 Dynamic Cache Partitioning Algorithm 
1: Input: L3 cache detail, VM-ID 
2: Include Xen memory header file 
3: While(1) 
4: Input (src_mfn, dst_color) 
5: Allocate a free machine page from the cache usage monitor 
6: New free machine page  dst_mfn 
7: Store (src_mfn in SPT) 
8: Remove all write permission in SPT where each entry pointing to src_mfn 
9: Enable  dirty page 
10: If guest tries to access and modify src_mfn  
11: then mark page as  dirty page 
12: Before starting the above steps lock the SPT or activate shadow lock  
13: if (Copy src_mfn to dst_mfn) 
14: for each copy 
15: check whether the content is changed during the copying process 
16: if (unchanged) then 
17: Update P2M and M2P mapping 
18: End While 
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machine to that created VM. Once the admission control assign the physical id then the 
global scheduler send the hypercall to the Xen scheduler. Now VM is created, the 
responsibility of cache usage monitor in our HBP-DCP mechanism is to monitor the 
existing running VMs and their cache utilization. Now the responsibility of color-aware 
page migrator to repartition the entire cache according to the new created VM. For 
instance, if currently one VM is running then the entire cache is assigned to that VM. 
Now if 2 more VMs are created and the demand of each VM for cache is different. Then 
HBP-DCP mechanism monitor the entire cache and repartition the entire cache according 
to the demand of 3 created VMs.  
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Figure 4.5: Flow of the Prevention Mechanism Using Dynamic Cache Partitioning 
4.5 Data Design 
In this section, we present the features of our performance evaluation system namely 
performance evaluation parameters and methods. We introduce and describe our 
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performance evaluation parameters. These parameters are selected to evaluate and 
efficiently analyzes the lightweight characteristics of our proposed prevention 
mechanism. In addition, we describe the methods to evaluate and validate the 
performance of the proposed prevention mechanism. 
4.5.1 Performance Evaluation Metrics 
In this section, we describe the evaluating process of our proposed prevention 
mechanism. It describes the criteria by which we evaluate the effectiveness of our solution 
and the environment for conducting our experiment. We also describe the parameters or 
metrics by which we evaluate our proposed prevention mechanism and compare to the 
existing state-of-the-art prevention mechanism. These parameters are used to determine 
under what conditions our proposed HBP-DCP prevention mechanism for cross-VM 
cache-based SC attacks can be practically implemented into a commercial cloud 
environment. Table 4.1 shows the evaluation parameters with the measurement unit. 
Table 4.1: Metric for Performance Evaluation of the proposed Prevention 
Mechanism 
Evaluation 
Metrics 
Description Unit 
Load Testing To evaluate the performance of a system in term 
of generated overhead from normal (low) to 
peak (high) load to find peak for the system 
Seconds 
Cache Usage To calculate cache usage by measuring 
performance of the memory hierarchy more 
specifically the level (L1, L2, and L3) of cache 
MB/Sec 
Memory Access 
Rate 
To calculate the time required to access data 
from memory 
Nanoseconds 
(a) Load Testing 
We measure the performance of our proposed prevention mechanism under the 
normal and peak condition and consider the load testing which is mostly used method for 
performance testing. The load testing of any system can be better expressed by the 
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maximum amount of work a system can handle without performance degradation. These 
load testing can be done by many methods, however, we used Apache benchmark 
explained in next chapter which is open source and easily benchmarks for the cloud. 
(b) Cache Usage 
We measure the performance of the memory hierarchy (e.g., cache usage) of the 
system after deploying our prevention mechanism, specifically our focus is to 
parameterize and evaluate the performance of cache level (e.g., L1, L2, and L3) present 
on and off the processor. The performance of the system means that how much raw 
bandwidth in megabyte per second after the dynamic partition of cache. 
(c) Memory Access Rate 
Memory access time is calculated during translation of guest virtual pages to 
machine physical page. This is the total time, the computer takes to read data from a 
storage device such as computer memory, physical memory, and cache or another 
mechanism. The unit of measurement for memory access rate is commonly nanoseconds 
or milliseconds. If the memory access time for any instruction is low then it is considered 
to be a better access time as compared to high access time. For instance, if the memory 
access time is 10ns for reading 100MB then it is considered faster than the 50ns for 
accessing the same data. 
4.5.2 Data Collection Tool 
Although there are different methods and tool for generating and analyzing a load of a 
system and also the data can be gathered by using different approaches. However, in order 
to analyze the load of a system, we used Apache benchmark. In which we check that a 
system can handle how many numbers of requests per second in a modified and 
unmodified hypervisor. Similarly, there are a number of programs and benchmark for 
extracting the cache usage, however, cachebench was expected to give more detailed 
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cache usage. Auto-generating of load testing and cache usage is beneficial in order to 
avoid man-made mistakes and improving data integrity, accuracy and data reliability at 
the stages of analyses and synthesis. The memory access rate and boot time are collected 
by using our customized designed program. The program calculates and analyzes data 
gathered by measuring the number of cycles required to access a set of memory addresses. 
4.5.3 Performance Evaluation Method 
The performance of this prevention mechanism is evaluated using benchmarking 
experiments on the modified (static and dynamic partitioned) and unmodified Xen 
hypervisor and on different numbers of VMs. The data are collected for analysis by using 
many synthetic workloads. The statistical model is used to validate the results of our 
benchmarking experiments. We developed the statistical model using the independent 
replication model to train the regression model. The split-sample approach is used to 
validate the identified statistical model. The validated model are used to generate the load 
testing, cache usage, and memory access rate. Data analysis and synthesis testify the 
proposed prevention mechanism performance. 
4.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we presented our proposed HBP-DCP prevention mechanism. The 
basic objective of the HBP-DCP mechanism to prevent the cross-VM cache-based SC 
attacks. HBP-DCP consists of cache usage monitor and color aware page migrator that 
monitor the cache after VM creation and assign a specific part of cache to each VM. These 
VMs will not interfere with each other data nor evict each other data. Moreover, HBP-
DCP mechanism partitions the entire cache dynamically according to VM creation. If we 
partition the entire cache statically during boot time, then this will degrade the cache 
usage and consequently the overall performance of the system. For instance, if there is 
one VM in the running state but the cache is already partitioned into 4 equal parts during 
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boot time. Then this running VM will get the one small part of the entire cache while the 
other three parts will be idle or wasted. As a result, the cache utilization will be degraded 
and will affect the overall performance of the system. To solve this problem prevention 
mechanism based on dynamic cache partition is proposed in our solution (HBP-DCP) 
which will decide to partition and assign the cache to different VMs according to their 
requirement on a dynamic basis.
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CHAPTER 5: EVALUATION 
In this chapter, we describe the performance evaluation approaches to evaluate the 
proposed our modified dynamic partitioned hypervisor based on HBP-DCP mechanism 
for cross-VM cache-based SC attacks based on dynamic cache partitioning. For this 
purpose, we analyze the performance difference between unmodified (default/insecure), 
static partitioned and our modified (dynamic partitioned/secure) hypervisors by 
considering three performance metrics, namely load testing, cache utilization, and cache 
access rate. The main motive of this chapter is to discuss and analyzes the data collection 
methods, experimental setup, evaluation parameters, and to analyze the performance of 
the proposed algorithms. To evaluate the proposed prevention mechanism and its 
lightweight features, we utilized standardized synthetic benchmarking experiments 
namely Apache benchmark and cachebench benchmark from the Phoronix test suite and 
also cachegrind benchmark. In addition, we also used customized program to measure the 
average number of cycles needed to access a set of memory addresses or the average 
memory access time. The evaluation process also describes that how the results were 
conducted and how many observation is performed in order to evaluate the proposed 
prevention mechanism. Moreover, the data collection method for the proposed HBP-DCP 
prevention mechanism is also described. 
The evaluation results are validated through statistical modeling. We have used 
independent replication method in order to build our statistical model and validate the 
proposed prevention mechanism using split-sample approach. In another set of 
experiments, we build a separate test-bed for the comparison of our proposed prevention 
mechanism using dynamic cache partition to the static cache partition to describe the 
lightweight features of our mechanism. Finally, we demonstrate the statistical data 
analysis methods used to analyze and synthesis the results. The rest of this chapter is 
organized as follow: Section 5.1 presented the process of evaluation at a high level. 
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Section 5.1.1 described the experimental method along with the data collection and data 
generation method. The benchmarks and their input data are listed in Section 5.2. In 
Section 5.3, the evaluation method is presented to explain how the statistical models are 
validated. Section 5.4 described our parametric analysis in terms of bearable load, cache 
usage, and memory access time by each hypervisors and demonstrated the statistical data 
analysis observation used in this thesis to evaluate and synthesis the result. Finally, 
Section 5.5 conclude the chapter. 
5.1 Evaluation Process  
The proposed prevention mechanism (HBP-DCP) is designed to prevent the cross-VM 
cache-based SC attacks using dynamic cache partition. In this prevention mechanism, the 
page coloring technique is implemented to divide the cache dynamically according to the 
new VM request and demand. An efficient algorithm is developed to measure the cache 
for new created VM and assign the specific color to the new requesting page of VM. Then 
the color-aware page migrator component in the (HBP-DCP) receive these input and 
allocate a separate partition in the cache to the new requesting VM on the fly. Multiple 
compute intensive benchmarks application are selected from the Phoronix test suit to 
analyze and evaluate the performance of the system. Since our solution is based on the 
hypervisor source code, thereby, the data is collected is to run the application benchmark 
in the unmodified, static partitioned, and modified (dynamic partitioned) hypervisors. For 
load testing of the three hypervisors, we used Apache benchmark. For evaluating the 
cache utilization of unmodified, static partitioned and dynamic partitioned hypervisors, 
the data is collected through the cachebench benchmark. Similarly, the memory access 
rate of unmodified, static partitioned, and our modified (dynamic partitioned) hypervisors 
are evaluated through collecting data through our designed customized benchmarks. The 
evaluation of our secure HBP-DCP hypervisor is based on acquiring the answers to the 
two research questions: Does our secure hypervisor prevent the cross-VM cache based 
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SC attacks and what is the performance difference between our secure (modified/dynamic 
partitioned) and insecure (unmodified/default) and static partitioned hypervisors. In order 
to answer these questions, we have simulated a single server cloud environment. We have 
conducted a cross-VM cache-based SC attack by using PTP technique in this 
environment. Moreover, we have subject both static partitioned and our dynamic 
partitioned hypervisor to a series of workload under different configuration for the 
purpose of checking system behavior. The resulting completion indicates system 
overhead. 
5.1.1 Experimental Setup 
In this section, we explain the needed hardware and software for conducting our 
experiment and describe the methodology used to benchmark the unmodified, static 
partitioned and our modified (dynamic cache partitioned) hypervisors when collecting the 
data about load testing, cache usage, memory access pattern. We conducted real-time 
experimental analysis for the evaluation of our proposed prevention mechanism. There 
are various reason behind the utilization of real-time experiments. Firstly, in the field of 
CC environment, simulation tools are not much mature and is unable to provide the 
technical capabilities to conduct the research work of this nature. Secondly, simulation 
tools simulate the real time metrics and consequently generates probabilistic estimation 
and more overhead. Therefore, simulation tools are more vulnerable to result in 
estimation that can lead to low accuracy. Moreover, the real-time analysis provides the 
detailed knowledge of the system evaluation parameters that affect the performance of 
the prevention mechanism.  
Our performance evaluation for the proposed prevention was conducted on a machine 
with Intel processor i7 having the quad-core processor and one hardware thread per core 
and 4GBytes memory. We created two VMs namely the victim VM1 and attacker VM2. 
These two co-located VMs can evict each other data to form a cross VM cache-based SC 
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attack by sharing the same hardware. We have solved this problem by using HBP-DCP 
mechanism to prevent the two co-located VM from being able to evict each other data 
from the cache by using dynamic cache partition. By using HBP-DCP we have assign 
separate part of cache to each VM, so these two VMs are unable to access each other 
cache. By assigning such partition, each VM would be able to use a part of the shared 
cache without interfering with each other to ensure that no VM outside of its partition can 
access the cache lines. To comply with the cloud model our dynamic partition would need 
to be implemented entirely through software means.  
The studied literature showed that some authors have done static cache partition, 
however, this static partition degrades the cache usage that further degrades the overall 
performance. Some authors have done dynamic cache partition, but that solution would 
need to be required the clients to change their software’s or the underlying hardware 
which does not obey the cloud model. Therefore, we need a prevention mechanism based 
on dynamic cache partition that obey or comply with the cloud model. Since our 
prevention mechanism is hypervisor-based, we changed the source code of Xen 
hypervisor by implementing our solution in the page allocation algorithm of Xen memory 
management. Now we need to evaluate our proposed prevention mechanism performance 
in term of load testing, cache utilization, and memory access rate by analyzing the 
benchmark results in the unmodified, static partitioned, and our HBP-DCP (dynamic 
partitioned) hypervisors. To evaluate the performance of the proposed prevention 
mechanism, we selected two standard and different synthetic benchmark. The selected 
synthetic benchmarks are Apache and cachebench from the Phoronoix test suit for 
evaluation of load testing and utilization of cache. These benchmarks have been discussed 
in Chapter 3 in detail for the purpose of problem analysis. 
The primary data for evaluating the performance of our proposed prevention 
mechanism is gathered by conducting the experiments in three scenarios. In the first 
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scenario, the attacks and the benchmarks are executed in the unmodified or default 
hypervisor. In the second scenario, the attacks and the benchmarks application are 
executed in the modified hypervisor is known as a statically partitioned hypervisor. 
Finally, in the third scenario, the attacks and the benchmarks are executed in our modified 
hypervisor is referred to as dynamic partitioned hypervisor. In our solution, we changed 
the source code of the open source customized hypervisor. The outcome of our solution 
is a new hypervisor which dynamically assigned the cache to individual VM based on 
their cache requirement. Consequently, no two VMs are able to evict or extract each other 
data nor disrupt each other communication. The limitations of the static partition can be 
solved here by assigning the cache partition during runtime based on the need and number 
of executing VMs. 
5.1.2 Effect of our HBP-DCP based Hypervisor on the Cross-VM SC Attack 
The hypervisors (Unmodified, Static partitioned, and our modified based on the 
dynamic cache partition (HBP-DCP)) are evaluated under the same cache-based SC 
attack. The cache-based attacks were conducted by using prime + probe and flush & 
reload methods as we explained in detail in Section 3.2.3 in Chapter 3. We have 
implemented cache-based SC attack in three scenario namely in native OS, in single VM, 
and across-VMs in virtualized environment. In the PTP technique, the side channel 
receiver and sender programs are installed on two separate guests VMs. The receiver 
program is called the probing instance while the receiver program performs the function 
of the target instance. Both sender and receiver programs were executed simultaneously 
by co-located VMs on the test-bed machine and pinned to separate CPU cores such that 
L3 cache could not be used as an SC attacks. The attack was conducted between the target 
(victim) and the probing instance (attacker) by sending an identifiable string of 160 bits 
from the target to probing. In order to verify the consistency, the attack was executed on 
each hypervisor ten times. Similarly, in order to conduct the cross-VM cache-based SC 
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attack by using the flush & reload technique, the flush & reload process (attacker) is 
installed in one VM and the AES process (victim) is installed in another VM. Both 
attacker and victim processes were executed simultaneously by co-located VMs on the 
same physical machine and pinned to separate CPU cores. Consequently, the attacker 
extract the encryption key of AES algorithm which we have explained in the chapter 3 in 
detail. 
The SC attacks were given an ideal condition for working to verify the secure (HBP-
DCP) and insecure hypervisor ability. Specifically, the Dom0, target instance, and the 
probing instance were pinned to separate CPU cores and were the only VMs running on 
the hypervisor. This configuration depicts the best possible condition for cache-based SC 
attacks. Any variation in this setup would prevent the attack success. Our experimental 
analysis concludes that if an attack can be prevented under these favorable conditions 
then the same prevention mechanism would work for the environment more unfriendly 
to the success of attacks. The viability of the implemented prevention mechanism should 
not be affected by these configurations. The experimental results of our proposed 
prevention mechanism on the PTP and F&R techniques are presented in Figure 5.1. 
Dynamic cache partition as a solution would be able to assign different partition of shared 
cache to the individual VM so each VM would be unable to access each other data as 
shown in the Figure 5.1. 
As we see in Figure 5.1, there are two VMs accessing the shared cache, so our 
prevention mechanism divides the cache into two partitions according to the requirement 
of each individual VM. The red dotted line part is reserved for VM1 and green dotted line 
shows the VM2 partition. For instance, VM1 is the probing instance and the partition of 
VM1 maps to the first two cache lines and the partition for VM2 (Target instance) maps 
to the last six cache lines out of the eight shown. When the probing instance tries to access 
and prime the cache lines it would be able to access the partition of the first two cache 
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lines which has already been assigned to it and cannot access the other six lines. Now 
when the target instance tries to access and modify the cache lines it can just access their 
own assigned six partitions and therefore unable to evicting VM1’s data from the cache 
lines. 
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Figure 5.1: Effect of Dynamic Cache Partition on the PTP technique 
When the probing instance once again tries to access cache lines it would see no 
difference from when it is left and therefore no communication would occur. Our 
prevention mechanism is more than preventive as compared to reactive, it prevents the 
cache-based SC attacks from occurring rather than reactive response after occurring the 
attacks. Since there are two types of response for attacks namely preventive and reactive 
response. In prevention response, the attacks would be able to prevent at the start before 
occurring and it would not be occur. While, in reactive response, once the attacks occur 
then the attacks would be cured or blocked after occurring. Therefore, the preventive 
 140 
response is better than reactive response because once the attack occur it can damage the 
system or extract the confidential information in a very short time.  
If a VM is given a cache of half the size but does not have to worry about data being 
evicted from it by other VMs then it may end up yielding a greater cache hit/miss ratio. 
We are partitioning the entire memory pool to guarantee the complete security of the 
system as compared to the work done by Shi et al. (Shi, Song et al. 2011) which have 
attempted to partition a small memory of the cache and given a portion of memory by 
using secure color to the encryption algorithm. By default, the hypervisor’s memory is 
not bound to a specific partition as we are not aware of any side-channel attack that targets 
the hypervisor. However, this could be easily implemented using the same technique.  
Table 5.1 describes the correctly recovered whole key in number of bytes in both single 
VM and cross-VM. Single VM means that attack is conducted in single in which the 
attacker and victim programs are in the same VM. In cross-VM scenario, both the attacker 
and the victim programs are in different VM and in different cores.  
Table 5.1: Comparison of Correctly Recovered Key in Single and Cross-VM in 
Unmodified Hypervisor (Insecure/Default) 
In Single Virtual Machine (Single-Core) In Cross-Virtual Machine(Multi-Core)  
Number of requested 
encryption 
Number of 
correctly recovered 
key bytes 
Number of requested 
encryption 
Number of 
correctly 
recovered key 
bytes 
10,000 1 30,000 2 
90,000 6 60,000 2 
130,000 10 100,000 4 
150,000 10 200,000 8 
200,000 13 260,000 9 
250,000 13 300,000 11 
260,000 14 350,000 12 
265,000 14 450,000 13 
270,000 15 500,000 15 
275,000 16 650,000 16 
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Table 5.1 shows that the required number of requested encryption for correctly 
recovered the 16 bytes of key in single VM is 275,000 and in cross-VM is 650,000. Since 
in cross VM the external noise effect the results, therefore, the number of requested 
encryption in single VM is less than as compared to cross-VM. We believe that due to 
noise SC attacks require a high number of encryption in the cloud environment as 
compared to non-cloud environment. 
The cross-VM cache-based attack is conducted in the modified (Secure/HBP-DCP 
based) hypervisor. The evaluation result of cross-VM cache-based attacks is shown in 
Table 5.2. The result in Table 5.2 describes the correctly recovered key in number of 
bytes in both single VM and cross-VM in the presence of our HBP-DCP prevention 
mechanism. Single VM means that attack is conducted in single VM in which the attacker 
and victim programs are in the same guest VM/operating system.  
Table 5.2: Comparison of Correctly Recovered Key in Single and Cross-VM in 
Modified Hypervisor (Secure/Dynamic Partitioned/HBP-DCP) 
In Single VM (Single-Core) In Cross-VM (Multi-Core)  
Number of requested 
encryption 
Number of 
correctly recovered 
key bytes 
Number of requested 
encryption 
Number of 
correctly 
recovered key 
bytes 
20,000 0 20,000 0 
60,000 0 70,000 0 
100,000 0 100,000 0 
130,000 0 200,000 0 
180,000 0 280,000 0 
200,000 0 300,000 0 
250,000 0 350,000 0 
265,000 0 475,000 0 
270,000 0 520,000 0 
275,000 0 650,000 0 
 
As shown in the Table 5.2, in cross-VM scenario, both the attacker (Flush & Reload) 
and the victim (AES) programs are in different VMs and in different cores. The correctly 
recovered key in both cases is zero. This zero byte result shows that our HBP-DCP 
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prevention mechanism is capable to prevent cross-VM cache-based SC attacks. Because 
by implementing our HBP-DCP mechanism, no VM has the ability to communicate with 
each other for the purpose to leak confidential information.  
5.2 Benchmark Applications 
This section describes the evaluation process of our HBP-DCP solution. It presents the 
criteria by which we evaluate the effectiveness of our proposed solution and the 
environment in which we conducted the experiments. We also describe the evaluation 
metrics by which we compare our proposed solution to the existing state-of-the-art 
prevention mechanisms. To evaluate the performance behavior of our proposed 
prevention mechanism, we have considered two synthetic benchmarks namely Apache 
and cachebench. We also ustilized two customized benchmarks namely: one is a program 
for checking the memory access time and the other is a synthetic compute intensive 
program with the different granularity of execution input. 
We have discussed these benchmarks in Chapter 3 also because the same benchmarks 
were utilized for the evaluation of performance of the static cache partitioning 
mechanism. Selected benchmark applications investigate the load that modified (dynamic 
partitioned) hypervisor can tolerate, the cache utilization, and the memory access rate 
after partitioning the cache dynamically. These evaluation metrics are used to determine 
under what condition our solution can be practically implemented into a commercial 
cloud environment. There are different reasons behind choosing these benchmark 
application. Firstly, selecting the benchmark applications, it is ensured that the chosen 
benchmark is an open source. Secondly, our solution is based the on Xen hypervisor 
source code (coded in C/C++). Therefore, it is considered during the selection process 
that the selected benchmark is coded in C/C++ language. According to the above 
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constraints, we have selected Apache benchmark1, cachebench2, cachegrind3 and 
customized benchmark namely memory access time. 
5.2.1 Apache Benchmark 
The Apache benchmark is a standard command line program used as HTTP web server 
benchmarking tool. Apache benchmark was chosen because it is open source, commonly 
available, frequently used a benchmarking service, and mostly used for web services one 
would see as cloud-based applications. In addition, this benchmark was selected for 
performance experiments because we believe that being a robust benchmark it constitutes 
a credible Cloud workload. Apache benchmark is used to fire requests to a server in order 
to find that in how much time and how fast the server could process these requests. We 
used the apache benchmark to analyze the performance difference between our modified 
based on dynamic cache partitioning, static partitioned, and unmodified hypervisors in 
term of load testing. 
5.2.2 Cachebench Benchmark 
Since our HBP-DCP prevention mechanism is based on the dynamic cache partition 
that is directly related to the cache. Thereby, in order to check the impact of our solution 
on the cache usage, we must choose a benchmark which gives a more detailed information 
about the cache usage. In our case, cachebench is a more suitable benchmark because it 
is designed for the cache usage description. Cachebench is a synthetic benchmark 
designed to evaluate the performance of the memory architecture and also to empirically 
parameterize the performance of cache levels namely L1, L2, and L3 present on and off 
the CPU processor. The performance is calculated in term of raw bandwidth in megabytes 
                                                 
1 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ApacheBench 
2 https://openbenchmarking.org/test/pts/cachebench 
3 http://valgrind.org/info/tools.html 
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per second such as cache read/modify/write, cache read and cache write bandwidth. The 
objective of this benchmark is to establish high computation rate which gives the optimal 
cache usage and to verify the effectiveness of compiler optimization. Moreover, the 
purpose of using this benchmark is to verify the memory footprint of our proposed 
prevention mechanism because the requirement for many application depends on the 
resources in term of memory footprint. We check the memory footprint in term of the 
cache hit and cache miss. Thus this benchmark gives us a good basis for our proposed 
prevention mechanism performance.  
5.2.3 Cachegrind Benchmark 
We have used the cachegrind benchmark from the valgrind test suit for conducting the 
data about cache miss and cache hit rate of all level cache including L1, L2, and L3. These 
cache miss and cache hit is then used by our designed program to calculate the average 
memory access rate and the effective memory access rate in case of our modified 
(dynamic partitioned), static partitioned, and unmodified hypervisor. The parameters 
along their measurement unit calculated as a result of these benchmarks are shown in the 
following Table 5.3 in detail. Since our prevention mechanism is based on the partition 
of cache memory, therefore by using this benchmark we analyzed the result of cache 
access rate and memory access rate by executing matrix program in the modified, static 
partitioned, and unmodified hypervisor. 
Table 5.3: Parametric Evaluation with Benchmarking 
Factor Parameters Calculated by Unit 
Load 
Testing 
To calculate the load of modified 
(partitioned) and unmodified 
hypervisor in request per seconds 
Apachebench Seconds 
Cache 
Utilization 
To calculate bandwidth of a memory by 
changing array sizes in MB/s 
Cachebench MB/Sec 
Memory 
Access 
Time 
To calculate the time in nanoseconds 
required to access data from memory 
Customized 
Benchmark + 
Cachegrind 
Nanoseconds 
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5.3 Evaluation methods 
In order to analyze the reliability and validity of our research, several statistical 
analyses are performed on the collected data through benchmark tools and executing 
experiments in a different scenario. A statistical model is used to represent and analyze 
generated data by an average and a standard deviation. The statistical model always 
implies dependent and explanatory variable. Computation behind the statistical modeling 
allows us to show the significance of our research. We present each of the statistical 
methods that are used in this research in the following section. 
5.3.1 Descriptive statistics 
The descriptive statistics is used in this research in order to analyze data and to 
highlight the significance of achievement of our modified HBP-DCP based hypervisor in 
terms of cache utilization and prevention capability as compared to the static partitioned 
and unmodified (insecure) hypervisors. In descriptive statistic, minimum, maximum, 
mean and the standard deviation are determined. The desire descriptive data is acquired 
based on the collected data are summarized in the graphical and tabular form to 
accomplish the desired objectives. 
5.3.2 Confidence Interval 
According to the sample central limit theorem, approximately 95 % of the sample 
means fall within 1.96 standard deviations of the population mean, showed that the 
sample is greater than or equal to 30 (n ≥ 30). Therefore, all the experiments in this 
research are executed 30 times for the performance evaluation of individual variable to 
verify that the obtained value is under one of the representative samples. In the data 
sample, the measurement of the central tendency of each experiment is calculated based 
on the sample mean (-X), for the reason to discover that sample mean is a better point 
estimate of the population mean as compared to median or mode. Data sampling includes 
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a range of intervals determined from the specified confidence level, a statistics, and the 
factor of sampling error; hence the sample mean can differ from the population mean. 
The level of confidence is the probability that the parameter is truly captured by the 
confidence range. The most common Confidence Levels (CL) are 90%, 95%, and 99%. 
Therefore, the interval estimate of each sample is determined in order to signify the 
goodness of the calculated point estimate. The interval estimate for each sample mean of 
the primary data is calculated with approximately 95% confidence interval of the sample 
means within 1.96 standard deviations by using the following equation. Therefore, for 
reporting the parametric results we raise the readability and confidence of the results up 
to 95%. Equation 5.1 is used to calculate the margin of error in the sample (Intervals 
2004).  
 M=  Z ∗  (
𝜎
√𝑛
)  (5.1) 
Whereas, M is the margin of error and Z indicates the value based on the confidence 
interval percentage and σ is the standard deviation and n is the number of samples. 
Equation 5.2 is used to calculate the confidence interval estimates for each sample mean 
(X) of the primary data with a 95% confidence interval (Intervals 2004). 
 µ = X ± 1.96 (
𝜎
√𝑛
) (5.2) 
Whereas, σ is used to indicate the standard deviation in the sample values and n shows 
the size of sample space.  
5.3.3 Paired Samples T-Test 
In this research, we performed the Paired Samples T-Test to ensure that there is a 
significant difference between the mean values of the identical measurement performed 
in three different hypervisors namely unmodified (insecure), static partitioned, and 
modified (dynamic partitioned–based, the case of our solution) execution modes. In our 
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study, the unmodified, static partitioned and the modified (dynamic partitioned) 
hypervisors parametric values are paired data of the same workload into three different 
execution modes. We use this test to ensure that the execution modes of the unmodified, 
static partitioned, and modified (dynamic partitioned) hypervisors have a significant 
impact on the load, cache utilization, and memory access time or not. In other words, we 
can conclude with the help of the generated results from the Paired Sample T-Test that 
the bearable load, cache utilization, and memory access time in the unmodified (insecure) 
static partitioned, and modified (secure as a case of our solution) hypervisors modes have 
a significant difference. Furthermore, our modified HBP-DCP based hypervisor has the 
ability to prevent cross-VM cache based SC attacks in the cloud environment. 
5.3.4 Linear Regression 
In this section, we explain our statistical analysis modeling. Using the statistical model 
results, we can verify and validate the results of the conducted experiments in this 
research work. We produce the statistical modeling of our performance parameters 
including load testing, cache utilization, and memory access rate by employing the 
independent replication method to generate independent datasets. These datasets consist 
of load testing, cache utilization, and memory access rate for the new independent 
workload in the unmodified (default/insecure), static partitioned and modified (dynamic 
partitioned/HBP-DCP) hypervisors.  
Moreover, we train the linear regression model to identify the correlation between the 
load and the transferred number of request per seconds as well as between the cache size 
and memory bandwidth in term of memory access rate. These regression models are used 
to generate the load, cache utilization, memory access rate to validate the findings of the 
performance evaluation parameters generated via experimental analysis. We leverage 
split-sample approach and perform calibration-validation exercise to validate our 
regression model. Therefore, partial datasets are used to build and train the model and the 
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remaining for validation of the model. We randomly split the sample into two different 
size samples to perform validation and identification of the correlation between 
dependent and independent variable. The model is valid in the case if the result values 
support each other. The following section describe the parametric evaluation 
5.4 Evaluation Metrics 
In this section, we present the data collected in a number of experiments by using the 
aforementioned benchmarks for the evaluation of the modified hypervisor based on the 
proposed prevention mechanism (HBP-DCP) for the cache-based attacks across VMs. 
The data are presented from the perspective of performance metrics (i) load testing, (ii) 
cache utilization, and (iii) memory access time in three different scenario, namely (i) 
conducting of attack in the static partitioned hypervisor, (ii) conducting of attack in the 
unmodified (default/insecure) (iii) conducting of attack in the modified (dynamic 
partitioned/ HBP-DCP) hypervisors. The experimental setup used in benchmarking 
analysis is shown in the following Table 5.4. 
Table 5.4: Experimental Environment in benchmarking Analysis 
Items Detail 
CPU Processor Intel Core i5-3450 CPU @ 3.10GHz, 4 cores, Hyper Threading disabled 
L1 Data-cache 32KB, 8 way associative, line size 64  
L1 Instruction-cache 32KB, 8 way associative, line size 64 
L2 Cache 256KB, 8 way associative, line size 64 
L3 Cache 6144KB, 12 way associative, line size 64 
Memory 11915MB DDR3 @1333MHz 
VMM Xen Hypervisor with dynamic cache partition 
Virtual Machines HVM guest, 1GB memory, 1 dedicated core for individual VM 
Guest OS Ubuntu 12.04.5 
5.4.1 Load Testing 
The load testing is investigated in order to support the load that a modified hypervisor 
based on our proposed method HBP-DCP can tolerate. We have tested a load of 
hypervisors in three modes, namely unmodified (default/insecure), static partitioned, and 
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modified (dynamic partitioned/secure) hypervisor by sending multiple requests through 
Apache benchmark. We have created 10 VMs on each hypervisor namely unmodified, 
static, and our modified hypervisors and have checked a load of each hypervisor by 
sending many concurrent requests. For this, first, we have checked a load of unmodified 
(insecure), static partitioned, and modified (secure is our solution) hypervisors without 
creation of any VMs. Then after this, we have created 1VM, 2VM, 3VM, 4VM, 5VM, 
6VM, 7VM, 8VM, 9VM, and 10 VMs on each hypervisor respectively and have checked 
the bearable load of each hypervisors in each case. In each hypervisor, for load testing, 
we have analyzed the average response time and the maximum number of requests per 
second that hypervisors can tolerate under a large number of connections or simultaneous 
users.  
Table 5.5 shows the load testing of the unmodified, static partitioned, and dynamic 
partitioned (HBP-DCP) hypervisors in term of sending the concurrent requests and 
checking the average response time per request. We generate the different types of loads 
for the system in form of sending the concurrent requests to the server and run the 
experiment 30 times for 1 to 30 concurrent users. The Min and Maximum in the Table 
5.5 representing the minimum and maximum ranges of generated number of requests per 
second and average response time per request for varying number of concurrent 
requests/users. In order to analyze that for what scenario the system will fail to work, we 
executed the system for the different workload. In this case, we do not have created any 
VM. The number of concurrent requests varies from 10 to 150. The number of concurrent 
requests means that our modified hypervisor can handle how many numbers of concurrent 
users. Table 5.5 shows that the difference in the average number of requests per second 
and the response time per request in the unmodified, static partitioned ,and in our 
modified (dynamic partitioned) hypervisors is significant as the T-test and P-test prove it. 
As shown in the table, the p-values for number of request per seconds and response time 
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in the static and dynamic partitioned hypervisors are .037 and .421 and T-values are 2.323 
and 1.923 respectively. These values prove the significance of the results.  
Table 5.5: Load Testing of Unmodified, Static Partitioned, and Dynamic Partitioned 
Hypervisors without any VM and with Varying Number of Concurrent Requests 
 Unmodified 
(Default/insecure) 
Static Partitioned Hypervisor Modified (Dynamic 
Partitioned/secure) 
Concurrent 
Requests 
Number of 
Requests per 
Second 
Average 
Response Time 
per request 
Number of 
Requests per 
Second 
Average 
Response Time 
per request 
Number of 
Requests per 
Second 
Average 
Response 
Time per 
request 
10 5502 1.749 5070 12.222 5105 5.851 
20 5530 3.480 5007 25.324 5115 15.806 
30 5047 5.882 4834 36.234 4949 20.65 
40 4943 7.827 4237 38.765 4462 22.988 
50 4904 9.788 4317 52.342 4535 25.629 
60 4999 12.218 4295 54.232 4910 38.979 
70 4980 13.995 4805 68.454 4827 39.954 
80 4903 16.517 4628 79.345 4843 45.271 
90 5150 18.162 4400 85.332 4924 49.13 
100 5199 19.894 4349 98.393 4964 55.837 
110 5280 22.823 4255 106.347 4970 58.846 
120 5301 24.766 4195 120.776 4618 59.481 
130 5377 30.858 4322 158.711 4751 65.154 
140 4998 50.101 4275 185.872 4695 98.152 
150 3640 159.041 3408 245.743 3430 201.03 
Mean 5050.2 26.47 4426.47 91.21 4739.86 53.52 
Median 5047 16.517 4322 79.345 4843 45.271 
Min 3640 1.749 3408 12.222 3430 5.851 
Maximum 5530 159.041 5070 245.743 5115 201.03 
Std. 
Deviation 
442.592 38.664 407.70 64.63 410.050 47.00 
Confidence. 
Int. 
223.978 19.566 206.32 32.71 207.510 23.78 
P-Value .037 .0421 0.022 0.039 .0283/0.022 0.039 
T-Value 1.992 1.721 2.099 1.826 1.992/2.099 1.826 
The relationship between the number of requests and response time is that the average 
response time per request is increasing as the number of the concurrent users are 
increasing. Although there is a small increase in load in the case of modified (HBP-DCP) 
hypervisor as compared to unmodified as shown in a table. However, the modified (HBP-
DCP/secure) hypervisor has the ability to secure the CC environment from cache-based 
SC attacks as compared to the unmodified (insecure) hypervisor. Since we know that 
security always comes with some overhead, therefore this is not a big difference in both 
hypervisors. 
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Table 5.6 shows the load testing of unmodified (default/insecure) hypervisor in term 
of sending the concurrent requests. In this case, we have created multiple VMs namely 
1VM to 10VMs and have checked the bearable load in case of each VM. For instance, 
first, we have created 1VM and have checked the load for 10 to 100 concurrent users. 
Similarly, we repeated the same experiment for 2VM, 3VM, 4VM, 5VM, 6VM, 7VM, 
8VM, 9VM, and 10VM respectively. The bearable load in term of number of requests per 
second is shown in the following table. 
Table 5.6: Number of Requests per Second in Unmodified (Default/insecure) 
Hypervisor with Varying Number of VMs and Concurrent Users/Requests 
Execution 
Traces 
Number of Requests per Second 
Number of 
concurrent users 
1VM 2VM 3VM 4VM 5VM 6VM 7VM 8VM 9VM 10VM 
10 3311 3246 3302 3198 3186 3203 3222 3240 3207 3150 
20 3256 3225 3124 3154 3106 3162 3208 3204 3099 3132 
30 3180 3207 3223 3134 3223 3144 3198 3229 3213 3128 
40 3298 3185 3258 3118 3218 3132 3182 3284 3282 3112 
50 3238 3162 3285 3110 3284 3127 3166 3289 3285 3173 
60 3258 3146 3244 3107 3229 3120 3150 3248 3247 3168 
70 3189 3121 3240 3112 3192 3112 3142 3259 3238 3072 
80 3156 3102 3162 3102 3185 3114 3123 3172 3211 3039 
90 3138 3088 3203 3105 3216 3112 3105 3198 3202 3023 
100 3094 3066 3265 3069 3215 3110 3090 3208 3195 2988 
Mean 3211.8 3154.8 3230.6 3120.9 3205.4 3133.6 3158.6 3233.1 3217.9 3098.5 
Median 3213.5 3154 3242 3111 3215.5 3123.5 3158 3234.5 3212 3120 
Std. Deviation 71.502 60.818 54.922 34.824 45.043 29.507 44.485 38.173 52.669 64.429 
Confidence .Int. 44.317 37.694 34.040 21.584 27.918 18.289 27.572 23.659 32.644 39.933 
Table 5.7 shows the load testing of our modified (secure/dynamic partitioned) 
hypervisor in term of sending the concurrent request. In this case, we have repeated the 
same procedure as we done for the unmodified hypervisor. We have created multiple 
VMs namely 1VM to 10VMs and have checked the bearable load in case of each VM. 
For instance, first, we have created 1VM and have checked the load for 10 to 100 
concurrent users. Similarly, we repeated the same experiment for 2VM, 3VM, 4VM, 
5VM, 6VM, 7VM, 8VM, 9VM, and 10VM respectively. We have calculated the average 
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for each VMs. The approximate difference in average for each VM is 10 number of 
request in both unmodified and modified hypervisors. 
Table 5.7: Number of Request per Second in Modified (Dynamic Partitioned) 
Hypervisor with Varying Number of Virtual Machines and Concurrent Requests 
Execution 
Traces 
Number of Requests per Second 
Number of 
concurrent 
users 
1VM 2VM 3VM 4VM 5VM 6VM 7VM 8VM 9VM 10VM 
10 3301 3209 3301 3226 3164 3202 3228 3201 3238 3250 
20 3243 3195 3114 3176 3085 3141 3192 3082 3076 3092 
30 3171 3166 3219 3142 3138 3119 3214 3201 3204 3218 
40 3286 3145 3247 3130 3119 3093 3274 3242 3200 3212 
50 3225 3130 3236 3115 3112 3075 3273 3255 3253 3233 
60 3249 3120 3224 3103 3105 3068 3232 3237 3149 3168 
70 3178 3102 3210 3081 3093 3122 3241 3221 3159 3072 
80 3141 3080 3192 3065 3071 3090 3162 3155 3122 3039 
90 3120 3038 3187 3043 3055 3033 3181 3192 3113 3023 
100 3043 3006 3175 3022 3021 3017 3201 3182 2992 2988 
Mean 3195.7 3119.1 3210.5 3110.3 3096.3 3096 3219.8 3196.8 3150.6 3129.5 
Median 3201.5 3125 3214.5 3109 3099 3091.5 3221 3201 3154 3130 
Std. Deviation 80.38 65.00 49.32 61.83 41.25 53.69 37.18 50.37 79.19 97.54 
Confidence 
.Int. 
49.82 40.29 30.57 38.32 25.57 33.28 23.04 31.22 49.08 60.45 
 
Table 5.8 shows the number of requests and the average response time per request for 
both unmodified (insecure) and modified (dynamic partitioned/secure) hypervisor. The 
average number of requests per second is for the unmodified hypervisor is 3189.42 and 
for modified is 3150.1. Similarly, the average response time per request for the 
unmodified hypervisor is 18.42 and for modified is 19.52. There is only 1.24% difference 
in bearable load in term of number of requests per second in both hypervisor and only 
5.8% difference in the average response time per request. However, this is acceptable 
because our modified (dynamic partitioned) hypervisor has the ability to prevent cross-
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VM cache-based SC attacks. The T-test in the following Table 5.8 proves the significant 
difference in the load of both unmodified and modified hypervisor.  
Table 5.8: Load Testing in Modified and Unmodified Hypervisor with Varying 
Number of VMs (Average for 10 to 100 Concurrent Request/users for each VM) 
 Unmodified (Default Hypervisor) Modified (Dynamic Partitioned/secure) 
Hypervisor 
Number of VMs Average Number 
of Requests per 
Second 
Average Response 
Time per request 
Average Number 
of Requests per 
Second 
Average Response 
Time per request 
1 3231.8 16.024 3210.7 18.132 
2 3228.8 17.108 3189.1 18.203 
3 3216.6 17.901 3172.5 19.209 
4 3210.9 18.479 3160.3 19.111 
5 3198.4 18.551 3146.3 19.351 
6 3187.6 18.732 3142.4 19.232 
7 3172.6 18.98 3134.8 19.34 
8 3161.1 19.201 3123.8 20.001 
9 3149.9 19.57 3115.6 21.37 
10 3136.5 19.611 3105.5 21.211 
Min 3136.5 16.024 3105.5 18.132 
Mean 3189.42 18.42 3150.1 19.52 
Median 3193.0 18.6 3144.4 19.3 
Maximum 3231.8 19.6 3210.7 21.4 
Std. Deviation 33.46 1.13 33.30 1.08 
Confidence Int. 20.74 0.70 20.64 0.67 
P-Value 0.008 0.019 0.008 0.019 
T-Value 2.53 2.220 2.53 2.220 
Table 5.9 shows the bearable load in a statically partitioned hypervisor with varying 
number of VMs and number of partitions. Since the partition is created during boot time, 
therefore, we are unable to change the partitions during execution of VMs. As shown in 
the table the bearable load in term of the number of request per second is decreasing as 
the number of VMs and partitions are increasing. For instance, if we created 16 number 
of partitions in the cache or we divided the cache into 16 parts and during runtime, we 
need only one VM. Then this configuration cannot be changed during runtime and 
therefore, one part of the cache would be assigned to single created VM and the remaining 
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15 parts of cache will be wasted. Consequently, degrade the performance in term of 
bearable load because this single VM having limited part of cache accept the low number 
of requests per second. For instance, if the number of created VM is one and the number 
of partitions is 16, then the number of request per second will be very low regardless the 
number of VMs. As shown in Table 5.9, if the number of VMs is greater than the number 
of partition then the performance will be degraded. For instance, if there are 16 VMs and 
the number of partitions is 2 then during runtime it will be difficult to manage the 
partitions accordingly.  
Table 5.9: Load Testing with Varying Number of VMs and Partitions in Static 
Partitioned Hypervisor 
  Number of Requests per Second  
Number of 
concurrent users 
Number of 
Partitions 
With 1 VM With 2VM With 4VM With 8 VM With 16 VM 
10 1 3200 3500 3200 1500 700 
10 2 3200 3200 3100 1500 700 
10 4 2800 2900 3100 1500 600 
10 8 2300 1900 1700 1400 600 
10 16 1900 1800 1600 1100 400 
Conversely to the static partitioned mechanism, in the dynamic partitioned based 
hypervisor, the number of cache partitions is not decided during boot time as shown in 
Table 5.10. When VM is created then the cache is divided into partition accordingly. For 
instance, if one VM is created then the whole cache is assigned to single VM during 
runtime. While in the case of 8 or 16 VMs the whole cache is divided into 8 or 16 parts 
respectively. As compared to static partition, the dynamic partition improves the 
performance in term of the bearable load. For example, in the static partition, once we 
create 16 partitions at boot time then in the case of one VM creation the cache is divided 
into 16 parts. Consequently, degrade the performance because the other 15 parts of cache 
will be idle during execution. While in dynamic partition the case is different because the 
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whole cache is assigned to that single VM. In the case of 8 or 16 VMs creation, the cache 
will be divided into 8 or 16 parts respectively.  
Table 5.10: Load Testing with Varying Number of VMs in Dynamic Partitioned 
Hypervisor 
 Number of Requests per Second   
Number of 
concurrent 
users 
1VM/Partition 2VM/Partition 4VM/Partition 8 VM/Partition 16VM/Partition 
10 3301/1 3209/2 3197/4 3176/8 2764/16 
20 3243/1 3195/2 3186/4 3162/8 2726/16 
30 3221/1 3166/2 3169/4 3140/8 2698/16 
40 3196/1 3145/2 3147/4 3125/8 2645/16 
50 3175/1 3132/2 3116/4 3104/8 2622/16 
Table 5.11 shows the comparison of load testing in static and dynamic partitioned 
hypervisors. In both hypervisors, the bearable load is compared in term of the average 
number of requests per second and response time per request for the 1,2,4,8, and 16 cache 
partitions. As shown in the table, in the static partitioned hypervisor, the number of 
requests per second is decreasing with the increasing number of VMs and partitions. For 
instance, the average number of request per second 1977.28 in the static partitioned 
hypervisor and 3157.88 in our dynamic partitioned (HBP-DCP) hypervisor. Similarly, 
the average response time in the static partitioned hypervisor is 19.33 and 18.28 in our 
dynamic partitioned (HBP-DCP). The number of request per second is increased by 
45.33% and the average response time per request is decreased by 5.58%. Therefore, the 
bearable load in term of request per second and average response time is improved in our 
dynamic partitioned (HBP-DCP based) hypervisor. Since the number of partitions is 
predefined during boot time, we cannot change during runtime. For instance, if we 
partitioned the entire cache into 16 parts and we are executing one VM then only single 
part of the entire cache will be assigned to that executing VM and the remaining 15 parts 
will be idle. Consequently, degrade the performance in term of the load. While in our 
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dynamic partitioned hypervisor, the cache partition is not predefined but decided during 
runtime according to the number of executingVMs. For instance, if we create one VM 
then the entire cache will be assigned to that single VM while if we create 16 VMs then 
the cache the cache will be divided into 16 parts. Therefore, the overall performance will 
be improved.  
Table 5.11: Comparison of Load Testing in Static-Partitioned and Dynamic-
Partitioned-based Hypervisors with Varying Number of VMs and Partitions 
(Average for 10 to 100 Concurrent Request for each VM) 
 Static Partitioned-based Hypervisor  
(1,2,4,8,16 Static Partitions) 
Dynamic Partitioned-based Hypervisor 
(Dynamic Partition) 
Number of VMs Average Number 
of Requests per 
Second 
Average Response 
Time per request 
Average Number 
of Requests per 
Second 
Average Response 
Time per request 
1 2684.5 18.132 3210.7 17.024 
2 2660.8 18.203 3189.1 17.108 
4 2540.2 19.111 3160.3 17.479 
8 1400.6 20.001 3123.8 18.201 
16 600.3 21.211 3105.5 19.611 
Min 600.3 18.132 3105.5 17.024 
Mean 1977.28 19.33 3157.88 18.28 
Median 2540.2 19.111 3160.3 18.479 
Maximum 2684.5 21.211 3210.7 19.611 
Std. Deviation 937.13 1.30 43.81 1.18 
Confidence Int. 821.42 1.14 38.40 1.04 
T-Value 2.813 1.927 2.813 1.927 
P-Value 0.11 .045 0.11 .045 
Figure 5.2 shows the result of sending 170 concurrent request during execution. It 
shows that with increasing number of concurrent request in each hypervisor namely 
unmodified (default/insecure), static partitioned, and our modified HBP-DCP (dynamic 
partitioned) hypervisors the number of request per second is decreasing. While the 
average response time per request in increasing. The response time per request is 126ms. 
The 126ms response time is showing the fastest request. If the response time per request 
is or less than 175ms then it will be considered the fastest requests while the slowest 
requests have the response time is or greater than 224ms. 
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Figure 5.2: Result of Apache Benchmark with Varying Number of Concurrent 
Requests 
Statistical model is designed in order to validate the results of performance 
evaluation produced via experimental analysis. The result of statistical model for 
load testing are presented here. We have designed the load estimation model to test 
the load value for each VM based on the two variables namely request per seconds 
and the average time per request. In order to build the statistical model, we have 
taken 80 % data for the training and 20% for the validation. We have taken these 
two values to train our model as much as possible to avoid biased results. The output 
of the statistical model is shown in the following Table 5.12. The statistical model 
for load is shown in the following Eq.5.3. 
R       lm (Load ∼ Number of Request + Time per Request) 
𝑊 = ∑ (𝐿𝑉𝑀𝑖 + 𝑁𝑅𝑉𝑀𝑖 +  𝑇𝑃𝑅𝑉𝑀𝑖)
10
𝑖=1       (5.3) 
Where i is = 1 to 10 (Number of Virtual Machines from 1 to 10) 
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The detail statistics of the statistical model of our linear regression are summarized in 
Table 5.12. The R value shows significance correlation between the number of request 
per second and the response time per request. The average R-squared value in the table 
testifies that 99.20% of the load value can be explained using number of request per 
second and response time per request. The F-statistics in the table ensure that available 
data is appropriate to be used for linear regression and P-value shows the significance of 
the result. 
Table 5.12: Regression Statistics Summary for Load Testing of Varying VMs 
Number of VM P-Value R-Squared Adjusted R-Squared F-Statistic 
1VM 4.968e-05 0.993 0.9894 281.8 
2VM 0.0008928 0.9907 0.9845 160.3 
3VM 7.348e-07 0.991 0.988 329.5 
4VM 3.633e-12 0.9998 0.9998 1.951e+04 
5VM 2.77e-09 0.9999 0.9999 3.8e+04 
6VM 1.09185-03 0.5488 0.9884 3.649 
7VM 4.819e-06 0.9978 0.0067 909 
8VM 1.529e-07 0.9996 0.9994 5112 
9VM 5.636e-14 1 0.9999 7.824e+04 
10VM 8.348e-11 0.9996 0.9994 6861 
5.4.2 Cache Utilization 
Since our HBP-DCP prevention mechanism for cross-VM cache-based SC attacks is 
based on the dynamic partition of cache for each VM and the performance impact of our 
prevention system depends on the cache functionality. Therefore, we used cache 
utilization as our evaluation parameter that how much our solution effect the cache 
bandwidth in term of cache read/write/modify, cache read, and cache write. Cache 
utilization is investigated for unmodified, static partitioned, and modified (HBP-
DCP/Dynamic partitioned) hypervisors to check the amount of data accessed in bytes by 
each one. We used the cache write, cache read and cache Read/Modify/Write from the 
cachebench benchmark to evaluate the different level of cache in term of accessed data. 
Each one executes repeated access to data items on varying vector lengths. For each 
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vector length, timings are taken based on the number of iterations. The total amount of 
accessed data in bytes is calculated by computing the product of vector length and number 
of iteration. A bandwidth figure (e.g., Megabytes as being 10242 or 1048576) in 
megabytes per second is then computed by dividing this total data accessed by the total 
time. Moreover, the average access time in nanoseconds per each data item is computed 
and reported. For cache usage metric, the cache writes, cache read, cache 
read/modify/write are conducted to evaluate both unmodified (insecure) and modified 
(secure: our solution) hypervisor. Cachebench is used to run these three benchmarks in 
order to measure the time in nanoseconds and bandwidth in MB/sec. Cache read 
calculates the read bandwidth by varying vector length. The resulting bandwidth will be 
high for the cases, where the vector length is less than cache size because the data will be 
coming from the cache. 
 Cache size and vector size are both independent variables. Cache size is how much 
data is stored "locally" in some sense. Vector length is the amount of data to transmit and 
can thus be any number. The measures of interest come when the vector is larger than the 
cache as shown in the Table. As shown in Table 5.15, there is no significant difference 
between the modified (dynamic partitioned) and unmodified (default) hypervisor with 
increasing number of VMs despite the expectation to the contrary. To investigate why we 
analyzed the source code of cachebench. It is clear from the code that cachebench obtain 
its reading by measuring the response time for cache small sections at any specific time. 
The dynamic cache partition will not affect the cache performance because these sections 
are very small and have enough cache to work.  
This benchmark shows that a program with both low and high memory footprint 
should not be negatively affected by the dynamic partitioning of the cache. In contrast, 
static partition does not affect the program with low partition, however, it has a negative 
impact on the program with high memory footprint. Because, in the static partition, the 
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small program can entirely fit in the assigned smaller partition of cache to each VM while 
the large memory footprint program can not fit entirely in the small partition assigned to 
each VM at boot time. Conversely, in a dynamic partition, the program with both small 
and large memory footprint can fit entirely in the assigned cache to each VM. Because in 
the dynamic partition, if for example, 2 VMs are running then the whole cache would be 
assigned to these 2 VMs and therefore large memory footprint program will not degrade 
the overall performance. For instance, if a program just needs 8KB or 200KB of the cache 
at any specific time then it will have no negative impact on the cache performance if there 
are more than 10 partitions because, during dynamic partition, 512kb is assigned to each 
VMs. However, if one or two VMs are running then the whole cache memory will be 
assigned to one or two VM, in Core i5 the 2MB cache will be assigned to both VM. 
Therefore, a program with the low memory footprint has no negative impact on the cache 
performance during cache partitioning.  
Table 5.13 and 5.14 present the data related to the cache utilized by varying vector 
lengths in each VM e.g., 1VM, 2VMs, 3VMs, 4VMs, 5VMs, 6VMs, 7VMs, 8VMs, 
9VMs, and 10VMs, which are collected in unmodified (insecure/default) and modified 
(Secure/HBP-DCP/dynamic partitioned) hypervisors. Each Table summarizes the 
bandwidth for varying vector lengths with 95% confidence interval for 30 number of 
iteration for each VM e.g., 1VM to 10VMs. Similar to load testing for each VM, we 
present bandwidth in MB/Sec for Cache Read/Modify/Write e.g., the total amount of data 
accessed in bytes with 95% confidence interval to enable reliability of our data. The 
benchmark Read/Modify/Write in cachebench is used to determine the bandwidth (how 
much data is accessed) by varying vector lengths. The data in both tables show that there 
is an acceptable difference between the cache utilization in term of bandwidth MB/Sec in 
both hypervisors even the modified hypervisor has the ability to prevent cross-VM cache-
based SC attacks.  
  
 
1
6
1 
Table 5.13: Cache Utilization of Unmodified Hypervisor 
  Bandwidth (MB/Sec) for Read/Modify/Write of Varying Virtual Machines 
Execution 
Traces 
C-Size 1VM 2VM 3VM 4VM 5VM 6VM 7VM 8VM 9VM 10VM 
1 256 18010.78 16320.03 18256.65 18374.66 18141.36 17673.91 18284.43 18238.125 17875.55 17407.48 
2 336 17444.21 17436.02 17457.82 17422.24 17386.05 16942.28 17339.97 17350.963 16928.82 16410.65 
3 424 18974.97 18986.7 18945.75 18856.22 18751.78 18322.14 18853.09 18800.384 18362.71 17874.6 
4 512 20105.25 20115.28 20052.72 20023.84 19463.41 19475.4 19977.81 19914.018 19428.63 19272.44 
5 680 21626.97 21622.58 21562.56 21515.29 20.941.81 20967.44 21505.72 21399.052 20785.12 20229.52 
6 848 22669.82 22657.75 22573.36 22589.29 21877.59 21968.81 22543.28 22422.787 21678.64 21255.02 
7 1024 23445.77 23420.64 23232.63 23360.52 22723.52 22716.04 23204.62 23123.022 22385.02 22119.99 
8 1360 24449.76 24442.52 24338.14 24404.33 23706.65 23698.67 24335.17 24064.946 23251.82 23678.41 
9 1704 25102.69 25120.47 25057.39 25002.8 24339.59 24354.7 24983.84 24711.307 23901.93 24322.07 
10 2048 25571.66 25580.1 25541.13 25480.36 24769.92 24809.76 25470.57 25241.943 24329.22 24760.35 
11 2728 26168.16 26145.53 26085.84 26030.6 25354.95 25398.21 26060.53 25892.23 24811.41 25340.84 
12 3408 26540.02 26520.56 26457.35 26437.22 25731.23 25719.91 26410.5 26235.549 25208.98 25704.39 
13 4096 26774.5 26779.57 26650.52 26695.41 25913.12 25894.68 26667.05 26499.885 25381.6 25930.89 
14 5456 27044.14 27061.88 27038.92 27045.49 26313.17 26277.96 27000.67 26839.088 24930.03 26262.08 
15 6824 27276.03 27300.06 27240.12 27254.47 26466.41 26475.72 27199.62 27048.748 25161.71 26457.36 
16 8192 27422.45 27445.8 27344.61 27355.97 26526.88 26599.68 27340.21 27156.973 8192 27422.45 
17 10920 27607.14 27608.08 27522.84 27519.55 26758.4 26771.99 27468.5 27318 10920 27607.14 
18 13648 27597.66 27707.58 27633.22 27610.15 26864.49 26867.85 27561.91 27459.636 13648 27597.66 
19 16384 27778.46 27771.29 27690.99 27708.51 26943.71 26925.28 27612.92 27512.886 16384 27778.46 
20 21840 27863.58 27862.95 27784 27788.43 27021.39 27012.86 27697.67 27589.881 21840 27863.58 
21 27304 27913.91 27913.22 27875.83 27821.62 27069.35 27063.09 27791.73 27607.307 27304 27913.91 
22 32768 27944.52 27931.52 27885.8 27704 27090.11 26997.19 27809.4 27699.925 32768 27944.52 
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Table 5.13: Continue… 
 
 
  
23 43688 27977.26 27982.49 27909.43 27895.51 27065.76 27126.44 27870.49 27536.417 43688 27977.26 
24 54608 28017.56 27994.23 27949.03 27890.55 27161.52 27160.8 27893.35 27589.301 54608 28017.56 
25 65536 28033.89 28025.99 27944.67 27910.99 27173.82 27156.75 27887.54 27764.86 65536 28033.89 
26 87376 28046.01 28042.92 27983.92 27945.97 27184.51 27214.36 27853.62 27674.065 87376 28046.01 
27 109224 28051.91 28063.72 27998.85 27960.02 27204.26 27211.66 27787.4 27803.388 109224 28051.91 
28 131072 28063.83 28073.39 27993.38 27947.32 27204.54 27221.6 27975.84 27696.146 131072 28063.83 
29 714760 28079.79 28082.25 27978.91 27927.25 27232.66 27242.34 27951.38 27783.632 714760 28079.79 
30 218448 28132.23 28120.33 27989.24 27950.55 27240.56 27250.34 27982.32 27790.339 218448 28132.23 
 Min 17444.21 16320.03 17457.82 17422.24 17386.05 16942.28 17339.97 17350.96 16928.82 16410.65 
 Median 27349.24 27372.93 27292.37 27305.22 26526.88 26537.70 27269.92 27102.86 25314.25 26331.57 
 Maximum 28132.23 28120.33 27998.85 27960.02 27240.56 27250.34 27982.32 27803.39 27848.38 27002.85 
 Std. Deviation 3302.39 3451.20 3271.43 3258.45 3051.04 3190.86 3269.59 3227.04 2936.11 3254.17 
 Confidence Int. 1181.72 1234.97 1170.65 1166.00 1091.78 1141.81 1169.99 1154.76 1050.65 1164.47 
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Table 5.14: Cache Utilization of Modified Hypervisor 
 
  Bandwidth (MB/Sec) for Read/Modify/Write of Varying Virtual Machines 
Execution 
Traces 
C-Size 1VM 2VM 3VM 4VM 5VM 6VM 7VM 8VM 9VM 10VM 
1 256 17490.78 16300.03 18236.65 18354.66 18121.36 17653.91 18264.43 18218.125 17855.55 17387.48 
2 336 17419.21 17411.02 17432.82 17397.24 17361.05 16917.28 17314.97 17325.963 16903.82 16385.65 
3 424 18555.97 18967.7 18926.75 18837.22 18732.78 18303.14 18834.09 18781.384 18343.71 17855.6 
4 512 20073.25 20093.28 20030.72 20001.84 19441.41 19453.4 19955.81 19892.018 19406.63 19250.44 
5 680 21577.97 21599.58 21539.56 21492.29 20100.11 20944.44 21482.72 21376.052 20762.12 20206.52 
6 848 22630.82 22636.75 22552.36 22568.29 21856.59 21947.81 22522.28 22401.787 21657.64 21234.02 
7 1024 23393.77 23393.64 23205.63 23333.52 22696.52 22689.04 23177.62 23096.022 22358.02 22092.99 
8 1360 24414.76 24417.52 24313.14 24379.33 23681.65 23673.67 24310.17 24039.946 23226.82 23653.41 
9 1704 25065.69 25103.47 25040.39 24985.81 24322.59 24337.7 24966.84 24694.307 23884.93 24305.07 
10 2048 25535.66 25564.11 25525.13 25464.36 24753.92 24793.76 25454.57 25225.943 24313.22 24744.35 
11 2728 26121.16 26125.53 26065.84 26010.6 25334.95 25378.21 26040.53 25872.23 24791.41 25320.84 
12 3408 26502.02 26497.56 26434.35 26414.22 25708.23 25696.91 26387.5 26212.549 25185.98 25681.39 
13 4096 26735.35 26753.57 26624.52 26669.41 25887.12 25868.68 26641.05 26473.885 25355.6 25904.89 
14 5456 27023.14 27040.88 27017.92 27024.49 26292.17 26256.96 26979.67 26818.088 24909.03 26241.08 
15 6824 27214.03 27273.06 27213.12 27227.47 26439.41 26448.72 27172.62 27021.748 25134.71 26430.36 
16 8192 27375.15 27419.8 27318.61 27329.97 26500.88 26573.68 27314.21 27130.973 25220.89 26492.44 
17 10920 27473.24 27580.08 27494.84 27491.55 26730.4 26743.99 27440.5 27290.12 25561.34 26701.01 
18 13648 27532.36 27688.58 27614.22 27591.15 26845.49 26848.85 27542.91 27440.636 25960.02 26818.27 
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Table 5.14: Continue… 
19 16384 27741.4 27751.29 27670.99 27688.51 26923.71 26905.28 27592.92 27492.886 26024.53 26832.16 
20 21840 27831.28 27833.95 27755.21 27759.43 26992.39 26983.86 27668.67 27560.881 25670.56 26879.6 
21 27304 27790.91 27890.22 27852.83 27798.62 27046.35 27040.09 27768.73 27584.307 26147.74 26943.03 
22 32768 27793.32 27901.52 27855.81 27674.21 27060.11 26967.19 27779.4 27669.925 25913.64 26967.68 
23 43688 27884.12 27959.49 27886.43 27872.51 27042.76 27103.44 27847.49 27513.417 26315.71 26979.85 
24 54608 27975.22 27969.23 27924.03 27865.55 27136.52 27135.8 27868.35 27564.301 26828.74 26878.88 
25 65536 27970.82 28002.99 27921.67 27887.99 27150.82 27133.75 27864.54 27741.86 26082.77 26711.79 
26 87376 27995.41 28021.92 27962.92 27924.97 27163.51 27193.36 27832.62 27653.065 26283.22 26591.34 
27 109224 28016.86 28038.72 27973.85 27935.02 27179.26 27186.66 27762.4 27778.388 26367.67 26504.82 
28 131072 28028.22 28047.39 27967.38 27921.32 27178.54 27195.6 27949.84 27670.146 27108.16 26445.88 
29 714760 27997.21 28060.25 27956.91 27905.25 27210.66 27220.34 27929.38 27761.632 27163.41 26379.05 
30 218448 28107.33 28100.33 27969.24 27930.55 27220.56 27230.34 27962.32 27770.339 27828.38 26135.57 
 Min 17419.21 16300.03 17432.82 17397.24 17361.05 16917.28 17314.97 17325.96 16903.82 16385.65 
 Median 27294.59 27346.43 27265.87 27278.72 26470.15 26511.20 27243.42 27076.36 25288.25 26310.07 
 Maximum 28107.33 28100.33 27973.85 27935.02 27220.56 27230.34 27962.32 27778.39 27828.38 26979.85 
 Std. Deviation 3357.68 3450.40 3270.67 3257.68 3129.66 3190.09 3268.82 3226.26 2935.50 3253.39 
 Confidence Int. 1201.51 1234.69 1170.37 1165.72 1119.92 1141.54 1169.71 1154.48 1050.43 1164.19 
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Similarly, Table 5.15 shows the bandwidth of cache read and cache writes by varying 
vector length i.e., c-size for both unmodified and modified hypervisor generated via 
experiment.  
Table 5.15 Average Bandwidth (MB/Sec) of Cache Read and Cache Write of Varying 
VMs (1VM-10VM) in Un-Modified and Modified Hypervisor 
Average Bandwidth (MB/Sec) of Varying VMs (VM1-VM10) 
  Unmodified (default/insecure) 
Hypervisor (1VM-10VMs) 
Modified (Dynamic-Partitioned) 
Hypervisor (1VM-10VMs) 
Execution 
Traces 
C-Size Bandwidth of 
Cache Read 
(MB/Sec) 
Bandwidth of 
Cache Write 
(MB/Sec) 
Bandwidth of 
Cache Read 
(MB/Sec) 
Bandwidth of 
Cache Write 
(MB/Sec) 
1 256 1935.88 2139.74 1903.88 2127.74 
2 336 1938.39 2173.34 1908.39 2161.34 
3 424 1949.24 2178.98 1917.24 2166.98 
4 512 1948.09 2042.00 1923.09 2030.00 
5 680 1323.09 1933.28 1288.09 1921.28 
6 848 1931.31 2068.73 1916.31 2056.73 
7 1024 1939.8 2163.17 1924.8 2151.17 
8 1360 1921.37 2156.73 1896.37 2144.73 
9 1704 1952.07 2225.12 1927.07 2213.12 
10 2048 1957.94 2224.35 1942.94 2212.35 
11 2728 1969.46 2236.61 1954.46 2224.61 
12 3408 1963.77 2273.94 1948.77 2261.94 
13 4096 1975.43 2293.04 1960.43 2281.04 
14 5456 1963.89 2214.23 1948.89 2199.23 
15 6824 1968.47 2096.07 1947.47 2081.07 
16 8192 1976.26 2182.09 1941.26 2167.09 
17 10920 1397.06 2157.74 1342.06 2142.74 
18 13648 1331.05 2019.30 1306.56 2004.30 
19 16384 1330.59 2142.71 1235.59 2127.71 
20 21840 1317.53 2296.77 1302.53 2281.77 
21 27304 1313.01 2528.70 1268.01 2513.70 
22 32768 1300.64 2310.62 1275.64 2295.62 
23 43688 1009.88 2005.95 1044.88 1990.95 
24 54608 1085.77 2329.79 1070.77 2314.79 
25 65536 1310.22 1935.00 1295.22 1920.00 
26 87376 1297.13 1930.16 1272.13 1915.16 
27 109224 1353.34 2019.69 1328.34 2004.69 
28 131072 1330.98 2233.06 1335.98 2218.06 
29 174760 1191.13 2385.88 1276.13 2370.88 
30 218448 1086.98 2133.25 1271.98 2118.25 
Mean  1608.99 2167.67 1595.82 2153.97 
Std. 
Deviation 
 358.86 138.41 346.29 138.36 
Confidence 
Int. 
 128.41 49.53 123.92 49.51 
T-Value  1.981 2.012 1.981 2.012 
P-Value  .0437 .0411 .0437 .0411 
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Cache read and cache write perform repeated access to the data item on varying vector 
lengths such as varying c-size in Table 5.14. The average of cache read for unmodified is 
1595.82 and for modified is 1608.99 and the average for cache write is 2153.97 for 
unmodified and 2167.67 for modified are almost 14. The difference between the cache 
read of both unmodified and our modified (dynamic partitioned) is .821% and in the cache 
write is .634%. This is acceptable difference because our modified hypervisor has the 
ability to prevent cross-VM cache-based SC attacks. The T-test proves the significant 
difference of cache read and cache write in both unmodified and modified hypervisor. 
Table 5.16 shows the average bandwidth of cache read/write/modify benchmark in the 
static partitioned hypervisor. As the expected performance of our dynamic partitioned 
hypervisor depends on the utilization of cache. Therefore, we execute the cache 
read/write/modify to evaluate the cache utilization of static partitioned hypervisor. In 
Table 5.16, the Min and Maximum in the first column representing the minimum and 
maximum ranges of cache Read/write/Modify bandwidth in case of varying number of 
VMs and partitions.  
Table 5.16: Bandwidth of Cache Read/Write/Modify in Static Partitioned Hypervisor 
 Average Bandwidth of cache Read/Write/Modify (MB per Second) 
Number of Partition 1VM 2VMs 4 VMs 8 VMs 16 VMs 
1 17923 17128 15289 13567 13889 
2 15628 14035 13878 11228 12556 
4 14289 13582 12728 10988 10454 
8 10989 9366 8800 8487 8000 
16 4896 4098 3789 3567 3089 
Min 4896 4098 3789 3567 3089 
Maximum 17923 17128 15289 13567 13889 
Mean 12363.4 11347.9 10508.9 9281.6 9280.9 
Std. Deviation 5054.6 5041.8 4648.9 3806.1 4266.6 
Confidence Int. 4430.5 4419.2 4074.9 3336.1 3739.8 
In static partitioned hypervisor, the average bandwidth of cache read/write/modify is 
decreasing with increasing number of VMs and partitions. Even in the case of 1VM or 2 
VMs, if the partitions are 16 then the cache bandwidth will be low because the cache is 
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divided into 16 parts. While in dynamic partitions, the bandwidth will be high in case of 
1 or 2 VMs because the entire cache will be divided into 1 or 2 partitions. For instance, 
in a static partition, if for 1VM the number of partition is 1 the bandwidth will be 17923 
as shown in Table 5.16. While for 1VM, if the number of partitions is 16 then the 
bandwidth will 4896 which is very low as compared to 17923 in the case of 1 partition. 
Table 5.17 shows the comparison of cache read/write/modify in both static and 
dynamic partitioned hypervisors. We have created 1VM, 2VM, 4VM, 8VM, and 16VM 
in both hypervisors for checking the bandwidth of cache read/write/modify with varying 
number of partitions. As compared to the dynamic partitioned hypervisor, the average 
bandwidth of cache read/write/modify in the static partitioned hypervisor is decreasing 
with increasing number of VMs and partitions. For instance, the average bandwidth of 
cache read/modify/write in the static partitioned hypervisor is 13012.8 and 18234.7 in our 
dynamic partitioned (HBP-DCP) hypervisor.  
Table 5.17: Average Bandwidth of cache Read/Modify/Write in Static and Dynamic 
Partitioned Hypervisors 
Average Bandwidth (MB/Sec) of Cache Read/Modify/Write with varying VMs and partitions 
Number of 
Partitions 
Static Partitioned  
(Average of 1VM, 2VM, 4VM, 8VM 
and 16VMs) 
Dynamic partitioned (HBP-DCP) 
(Average of 1VM, 2VM, 4VM, 8VM 
and 16VMs) 
1 14745.5 19645.848 
2 13641.8 18629.448 
4 13896.8 18110.181 
8 11567.4 17012.904 
16 11246.3 17585.894 
Min 11246.3 17012.9 
Maximum 14745.5 19645.85 
Mean 13012.8 18234.7 
Std. 
Deviation 
1532.059 1008.6 
Confidence 
Int. 
1342.884 884.1 
P-Value 0.00012 
T-Value 6.311 
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Thus the average bandwidth of cache Read/Modify/Write is improved by 33.32% in 
our HBP-DCP based hypervisor as compared to static partitioned hypervisor. 
Consequently improves the cache utilization. Moreover, the T-test values namely P-value 
and T-value in the Table 5.17 shows the validity of the results. Because in the static 
partitioned hypervisor, the number of partitions is static and predefined during boot time. 
Therefore, 16 partitions cannot change for 1 VM while in the case of the dynamic 
partitioned hypervisor, the number of partitions will be changed according to created 
VMs.  
Similarly, Table 5.18 shows the comparison of cache read in both static and dynamic 
partitioned hypervisors. We have analyzed the cache read bandwidth by varying number 
of VMs and partitions in both static partitioned and dynamic partitioned hypervisors. The 
average bandwidth of the cache read in static partitioned hypervisor is decreasing with 
increasing number of VMs and partitions as shown in Table 5.18. For instance, the 
average cache read bandwidth for 2 VMs in the case of 16 partitions is 946.3 in the static 
partitioned hypervisor while in the dynamic partitioned hypervisor is 1225.375. The 
cache read bandwidth of dynamic partitioned (HBP-DCP) is more as compared to static 
partitioned. Since the 16 partitions are defined during boot time so the partition cannot 
change even 2 VMs are running. 
 Consequently, degrade the cache read bandwidth. While in dynamic if 2 VMs are 
executing then the partitions will be changed into 2 according to the executing VMs. Thus 
improve the average cache read bandwidth. For instance, the average bandwidth of cache 
read in the static partitioned hypervisor is 1164.16 and 1474.07 in our dynamic partitioned 
(HBP-DCP) hypervisor. Thus the average bandwidth of cache write is improved by 
23.493% in our HBP-DCP based hypervisor. Furthermore, the P-value and T-value shows 
the validity of the result as the P-value is less than 0.05. This improvement in the cache 
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read bandwidth improves the cache performance in term of cache utilization as compared 
to static partitioned hypervisor.  
Table 5.18: Average Bandwidth of Cache Read in Static and Dynamic Partitioned 
Hypervisors  
Average Bandwidth (MB/Sec) of Cache Read with varying VMs and partitions 
Number of 
Partitions 
Static Partitioned  
(Average of 1VM, 2VM, 4VM, 8VM 
and 16VMs) 
Dynamic partitioned (HBP-DCP) 
(Average of 1VM, 2VM, 4VM, 8VM 
and 16VMs) 
1 1345.5 1585.212 
2 1264.8 1552.323 
4 1196.8 1532.333 
8 1067.4 1475.134 
16 946.3 1225.375 
Min 946.3 1225.375 
Maximum 1345.5 1585.212 
Mean 1164.16 1474.07 
Std. 
Deviation 
158.827 144.673 
Confidence 
Int. 
139.215 126.809 
P-Value 0.006 
T-Value 3.225 
Similarly, in Table 5.19, the bandwidth of cache write for both static partitioned and 
modified (dynamic partitioned) hypervisors is shown. Similarly to the other two 
bandwidth cache read bandwidth for the static partitioned hypervisor is less than the 
dynamic partitioned hypervisor. The average bandwidth of cache write in the static 
partitioned hypervisor is 1383.374 and 1908.416 in our dynamic partitioned (HBP-DCP) 
hypervsior. Thus the average bandwidth of cache write is improved by 32% in our HBP-
DCP based hypervisor. Furthermore, the P-value and T-value shows the validity of the 
result. Consequently, improves the cache performance in term of cache utilization as 
compared to static partitioned hypervisor. 
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Table 5.19: Average Bandwidth of Cache Write in Static and Dynamic Partitioned 
Hypervisors  
Average Bandwidth (MB/Sec) of Cache Write with varying VMs and partitions 
Number of 
Partitions 
Static Partitioned  
(Average of 1VM, 2VM, 4VM, 8VM 
and 16VMs) 
Dynamic partitioned (HBP-DCP) 
(Average of 1VM, 2VM, 4VM, 8VM 
and 16VMs) 
1 1710.201 2024.191 
2 1630.451 2010.763 
4 1445.134 1975.354 
8 1202.543 1910.541 
16 928.541 1621.232 
Min 928.541 1621.232 
Maximum 1710.201 2024.191 
Mean 1383.374 1908.416 
Std. 
Deviation 
320.644 166.462 
Confidence 
Int. 
281.052 145.908 
P-Value 0.005 
T-Value 3.249 
Table 5.20, 5.21, and 5.22 shows the average bandwidth in MB/Sec calculated from 
the cache Read/Modify/Write, cache read, and cache write benchmarks for each VM 
including VM 1 to 10VMs in the unmodified and modified hypervisor. The cache 
read/write/modify generate much more memory traffic as compared to the cache read and 
cache write because in the cache read/write/modify the data items must be first read from 
the cache to register and then back to memory/cache. Therefore, the bandwidth for cache 
read and cache write is less than the bandwidth of read/write/modify as shown in Table 
5-20. The average for unmodified is 25625.64 and 25572.21 for modified hypervisor. The 
difference is almost .208% between both unmodified and modified hypervisor. This 
difference is acceptable because the modified hypervisor has the ability to prevent cross-
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VM cache-based SC attacks. The T-test result proves the significant difference between 
both values.  
Table 5.20: Comparison of cache Read/Modify/Write in Unmodified and Modified 
(HBP-DCP) Hypervisors  
 Average Bandwidth (MB/Sec) of Cache Read/Modify/Write 
Number of VMs Unmodified (Insecure) Modified (dynamic-partitioned) 
1 25683.831 25645.848 
2 25680.515 25629.448 
3 25634.193 25610.181 
4 25644.917 25612.904 
5 25667.956 25585.894 
6 25670.929 25613.862 
7 25594.038 25570.093 
8 25572.166 25543.093 
9 25558.599 25538.542 
10 25542.249 25522.272 
Min 25542.25 25522.27 
Maximum 25683.93 25645.85 
Mean 25622.96 25586.69 
Std. Deviation 53.77 42.11 
Confidence Int. 33.32 26.10 
T-Value 1.746 
P-Value 0.0417 
Table 5.21 shows the result of bandwidth in MB/Sec calculated by cache read 
benchmark in the unmodified and modified (dynamic partitioned/HBP-DCP) hypervisor. 
The average bandwidth of Cache Read for unmodified is 1546.433 and for our modified 
(dynamic partitioned) hypervisor is 1514.567. The difference in cache Read bandwidth 
of both is 2.08% which is acceptable because our modified hypervisor has the ability to 
prevent cross-VM cache-based SC attacks. Since the cache Read/Modify/Write 
benchmark first read the values from the cache and then will write in the cache. Therefore, 
the resulting bandwidth for cache Read/Modify/Write benchmark will be high as 
compared to cache read and cache write benchmarks for both modified and unmodified 
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hypervisor as shown in Table 5.20, 5.21, and 5.22. Furthermore, the T-test (P-value and 
T-value) shows the validity of the result.   
Table 5.21: Comparison of Cache Read in Unmodified and Modified (HBP-DCP) 
Hypervisor 
 Average Bandwidth (MB/Sec) of Cache Read 
Number of VMs Unmodified (Insecure) Modified (dynamic-partitioned) 
1 1610.157 1585.22 
2 1585.222 1552.323 
3 1572.211 1549.333 
4 1566.777 1532.134 
5 1553.221 1525.888 
6 1540.554 1518.122 
7 1529.212 1484.111 
8 1519.454 1475.223 
9 1505.291 1467.989 
10 1482.234 1455.323 
Mean 1546.433 1514.567 
Std. Deviation 38.820 42.466 
Confidence Int. 24.060 26.320 
T-Value 1.751 
P-Value 0.0421 
Table 5.22 show the resulting bandwidth of the cache write benchmark in both 
unmodified and modified (dynamic partitioned/HBP-DCP) hypervisor. The average 
bandwidth for cache write in the unmodified hypervisor is 2184 and in the modified 
hypervisor is 2126. The resulting difference in percentage in both hypervisor is almost 
2.69%. Which is acceptable because our modified (partitioned hypervisor) has the ability 
to prevent cache-based SC attacks between VMS. Furthermore, the T-value and P-value 
show that the result is significant as the T-value is less than 2.2 and P-value is less than 
0.05. 
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Table 5.22: Comparison of Cache Write in Unmodified and Modified (HBP-
DCP) Hypervisor 
 Average Bandwidth (MB/Sec) of Cache Write 
Number of VMs Unmodified (insecure) Modified (dynamic-partitioned) 
1 2273.121 2224.191 
2 2252.256 2210.763 
3 2245.177 2195.354 
4 2225.878 2162.823 
5 2197.891 2134.871 
6 2183.199 2117.783 
7 2162.872 2101.234 
8 2135.752 2067.553 
9 2113.882 2047.812 
10 2059.432 2006.232 
Mean 2184.946 2126.862 
Std. Deviation 67.897 72.739 
Confidence Int. 42.082 45.083 
T-Value 1.854 
P-Value 0.0307 
We have designed the cache bandwidth model to test the cache utilization for each VM 
e.g., 1VM, 2VMs, 3VMs, 4VMs, 5VMs, 6VMs, 7VMs, 8VMs, 9VMs, and 10VMs based 
on the two variables namely total time in nanoseconds and the total amount of data 
accessed in bytes. In order to build the statistical model, we have taken 80 % data for the 
training and 20% for the validation. We have taken these two values to train our model 
as much as possible to avoid biased results. Similar to a statistical model for load testing, 
in order to present a reliable and accurate estimation model of cache utilization in term of 
cache read/modify/write, cache read, and cache write, we perform linear regression using 
measured real data in cachebench benchmark in both unmodified and modified 
hypervisor. We use data set of cache utilization including cache read/modify/write, cache 
read, and cache write and use them for training the regression model to produce the 
bandwidth model. For validation of our proposed model, we use the split sample 
approach. Hence the cache utilization model can be presented as follow:  
R       lm (Data Accessed ∼ Total Iteration × (C-size) 
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R       lm (C-utilization∼ Total Time × (Total Amount of Data Accessed in Bytes) 
𝐵𝑚(𝑊𝑖) = ∑ (𝑇𝑉𝑀𝑖  ×  𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑉𝑀𝑖)
10
𝑖=1       (5.4) 
Where Bm (Wi) is the total bandwidth in MB/Sec calculated by the total amount of data 
accessed in bytes divided by the total time. The bandwidth is totally depends on the vector 
length. Because if the vector length is less than cache size then, in this case, the whole 
data will come from the cache and the resulting bandwidth will be high otherwise the 
resulting bandwidth will be low. Timings are taken for every vector length based on a 
number of iteration. The number of iteration is then multiplied by the vector length to 
compute the total amount of accessed data in bytes. Finally, the total amount of accessed 
data in bytes is divided by the total time to compute the bandwidth. The output of the 
statistical model is shown in the following Table 5.23. 
Table 5.23: Regression Statistics Summary for Cache Utilization of Virtual 
Machines 
The R value shows the significant correlation between the vector length and the 
bandwidth. The P-value and R-squared values in Table 5.23 for each VM testify the 
significance of the result using the statistical model for cache utilization. The detail 
statistics of the statistical model are summarized in Table 5.23. The R value shows 
significance correlation between the number of cache size and the bandwidth of 
Number of VM P-Value R-Squared Adjusted R-Squared F-Statistic 
1VM 3.238e-05 0.9910 0.9899 1.502e+04 
2VM 0.0008928 0.9907 0.9889 3.8e+04 
3VM 4.338e-04 0.9991 0.9899 3.649 
4VM 2.633e-03 0.9997 0.9999 1.951e+04 
5VM 1.2345e-09 0.9998 0.9998 3.8e+04 
6VM 1.09185-04 0.9898 0.9887 3.649+04 
7VM 4.323e-05 0.9989 0.9941 2.345e+03 
8VM 2.512e-04 0.9996 0.9994 40189e+02 
9VM 3.623e-08 0.9930 0.9989 7.824e+04  
10VM 5.316e-11 0.9986 0.9999 2.502e+03 
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cache/read/write. The average R-squared value in the table testifies that 99.61% of the 
load value can be explained using cache-size and cache read/modify/write. The F statistics 
in the table ensure that available data is appropriate to be used for linear regression and 
p-value shows the significance of the result. 
5.4.3 Memory Access Rate 
CPU cache is used to increase the speed of the memory access for the data which is 
most commonly accessed. However, our proposed HBP-DCP prevention mechanism 
divides the cache on the fly according to VMs requirement. Therefore, it is needed to 
check memory access rate as a performance parameter in order to check the evaluation of 
our prevention mechanism whether it will effect on the memory access rate or not. 
Although profiling cache memory operation requires collaboration from the hardware, 
however, it is also possible to collect information through software. The average memory 
access time is a valuable parameter to evaluate the performance of a memory hierarchy 
configuration. When a processor demand to execute an item from the main memory, it 
sends a load request to the cache memory. If the item resides in the cache it will generate 
the cache hit and in the case of absence, it will generate the cache miss. These cache miss 
and hit rate are used to calculate the memory access rate. We have checked the memory 
access rate in each hypervisor namely unmodified (Default), static partitioned, and 
modified (dynamic partitioned) to check the performance difference between each one.  
As compared to the RAM storage, the access to the cache memory is faster due to the 
high latency of RAM storage. The total memory access time is calculated by the Eq. 5.8 
while considering the cache and memory of the system as a target location. In Eq. 5.5, 
HitRate represents the amount of data accessed from the cache memory. Alternatively, 
MissRate describes the fraction of data accessed from the main memory. Moreover, 
CacheAccessTime and RAMAccessTime represent the total time to access the data from the cache 
and main memory respectively (Rixner, Dally et al. 2000). For instance, time to access 
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main memory is 100 ns in the majority of the system. The cache access time is proven to 
be 10 times faster than the main memory. Consider a program that yields a hit ratio with 
.92 for a reading request then the effective memory access time will be calculated by the 
following Eq. 5.5 and Eq. 5.6. 
EffectiveAccessTime = HITRate × CacheAccessTime + MissRate × RAMAccessTime   (5.5) 
EffectiveAccessTime =.092 × 10 + (1-0.92) × 100 ≈ 17ns    (5.6) 
The browsing experience can be improved by a high cache hit ratio while reducing 
costs in terms of energy, bandwidth, and computation power. Therefore the effectiveness 
of the caching system by monitoring the cache hit and cache miss ratio. We have written 
a customized program for checking the total memory access rate of a matrix program in 
the unmodified, static partitioned and HBP-DCP based hypervisors. For the program, we 
calculated the cache miss and cache hit for the matrix program by using cachegrind which 
is under the valgrind tool suit. We have collected the results for the average memory 
access time by executing our programs in the unmodified (default), static partitioned, and 
modified (dynamic partitioned) hypervisors. 
Table 5.24 and 5.25 present the data related to the memory access rate by a matrix 
program which is collected in the unmodified (insecure/default) and modified 
(secure/dynamic partitioned) hypervisors execution modes for eight granularity levels of 
matrices, respectively. Each Table summarizes the memory access rate in term of total 
LLC memory access with 95% confidence interval for 30 number of iteration for each 
VM e.g., 1VM, 2VM, 3VM, 4VM, 5VM, 6VM, 7VM, 8VM, 9VM,10VM in eight 
intensity levels. Similar to cache utilization, we present the LLC references e.g., memory 
access with 95% confidence interval to enable reliability of our data. The small value of 
error estimate based on 95% confidence interval at the end of Table 5.24 and 5.25 testify 
the result of collected LLC references data.  
 
 177 
Table 5.24: Last Level Cache (LLC) Memory Accesses in Unmodified Hypervisor 
 Total LLC Memory References in the Unmodified (Insecure) Hypervisor 
 Matrix Multiplication Granularity 
Number of VMs/ 
Partitions 
 300x300 400x400 500x500 600x600 700x700 800x800 900x900 1000x1000 
1/1 60973 114071 2315516 4054171 5065081 7212454 9121649 11264682 
2/2 60974 114070 2315544 4054171 5065083 7212455 9121651 11264683 
3/3 60975 114072 2316643 4054294 5065084 7212457 9121653 11264685 
4/4 60978 114082 2316651 4054297 5065088 7212461 9121655 11264687 
5/5 60979 114084 2316652 4054299 5065089 7212463 9121657 11264688 
6/6 60980 114084 2316654 4054200 5065088 7212465 9121658 11264689 
7/7 60982 114085 2316658 4054201 5065090 7212466 9121660 11264691 
8/8 60984 114086 2316659 4054301 5065091 7212469 9121661 11264693 
9/9 60980 114088 2316663 4054302 5065094 7212470 9121664 11264693 
10/10 60981 114089 2316664 4054308 5065095 7212471 9121667 11264698 
Min 60973 114070 2315516 4054171 5065081 7212454 9121649 11264682 
Mean 60978.6 114081.1 2316430.4 5054248.44 5065087.55 7212462.22 9121657.5 11264688.9 
Median 60979.5 114084 2316653 4054294 5065088 7212463 9121657.5 11264688.5 
Maximum 60984 114089 2316664 4054302 5065094 7212470 9121667 11264698 
Std. Deviation 3.60 7.26 474.64 60.43 4.16 5.89 5.70 4.98 
Confidence Int. 2.23 4.50 294.18 37.45 2.58 3.65 3.53 3.08 
 
Table 5.25: Last Level Cache (LLC) Memory Accesses in Modified Hypervisor 
 Total LLC Memory References in the dynamic partitioned Hypervisor 
 Matrix Multiplication Granularity 
Number of 
VMs/Partitions 
300x300 400x400 500x500 600x600 700x700 800x800 900x900 1000x1000 
1/1 60970 114069 2315503 4054168 5065080 7212452 9121644 11264678 
2/2 60969 114068 2315501 4054168 5065079 7212450 9121645 11264677 
3/3 60966 114058 2316640 4054291 5065080 7212455 9121644 11264677 
4/4 60976 114080 2316648 4054294 5065087 7212459 9121650 11264683 
5/5 60972 114082 2316649 4054296 5065088 7212461 9121652 11264684 
6/6 60973 114082 2316651 4054197 5065087 7212463 9121653 11264685 
7/7 60963 114083 2316655 4054198 5065089 7212464 9121655 11264687 
8/8 60965 114084 2316656 4054298 5065090 7212467 9121656 11264689 
9/9 60976 114086 2316660 4054299 5065093 7212468 9121659 11264689 
10/10 60977 114087 2316661 4054305 5065094 7212469 9121662 11264694 
Min 60963 114058 2315501 4054168 5065079 7212450 9121644 11264677 
Mean 60970.7 114077.9 2316422.4 4054251.4 5065086.7 7212460.8 9121651 11264684.3 
Median 60971 114082 2316650 4054292.5 5065087.5 7212462 9121652 11264684.5 
Maximum 60977 114087 2316661 4054305 5065094 7212469 9121662 11264694 
Std. Deviation 4.95 9.56 485.13 60.00 5.38 6.70 6.29 5.72 
Confidence Int. 3.07 5.93 300.68 37.19 3.33 4.15 3.90 3.54 
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Table 5.25 shows the average memory access for the varying matrix granularity level. 
The average memory access of modified (HBP-DCP base) hypervisor is less as compared 
to the unmodified (default/insecure) hypervisor. Since in modified hypervisor, the cache 
is divided into partitions, therefore, it effect the average cache access and it will be 
reduced. The average memory refernces rate is increasing with increasing number of 
matrix size. For instance the average memory access for 300×300 is less than as compared 
to 1000×1000. The average standard deviation for unmodified (insecure) hypervisor is 
70.83 and for modified (HBP-DCP) is 72.96. This small difference validate the result. 
Table 5.26 shows the descriptive statistics of experimental results in unmodified 
(default/insecure) and HBP-DCP (dynamic partitioned /secure) hypervisors including 
minimum, maximum, and mean of the total cache references are summarized in eight 
intensity levels. This statistics shows that there is minor difference between the standard 
deviation of both hypervisors e.g., .05% difference in both modes is acceptable. As 
descriptive statistics in the Table 5.26 shows that the difference between both hypervisors 
is significant even the HBP-DCP based hypervisor has the ability to prevent cross-VM 
cache-based SC attacks. 
The total memory references are calculated by using cachegrind benchmark as shown 
in Table 5.24 and 5.25. Then these cache references are used to calculate the cache hit 
rate and average memory access rate. The equations for LLC hit rate and for memory 
access time are as follows:  
Cache Hit Rate = (Cache Hits / (Cache Hits + Cache Misses)) × 100%   (5.7) 
Avg. Memory Access Time = Hit Rate × TC + Miss Rate × M   (5.8) 
Where cache hit rate is calculated by the above Eq.5.7 and miss rate=1-hit rate. TC is 
the time to access data from the cache which is mostly 10ns. LL cache miss is the memory 
accesses percentage that does not find the desired information in the main memory and is 
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determined by the cachegrind benchmark and miss rate is calculated from the formula (1-
hit rate). 
Table 5.26: Descriptive statistics of LLC Memory Accesses Data Generated by 
Standard Experimentation 
 Mode Min Mean Median Maximum Std.Dev Conf.Int 
Mat. Mult. 
(300×300) 
Unmodified 
(HBP-DCP) 
60967 
60963 
60967 
60970.7 
60975 
60971 
60983 
60977 
5.51 
4.95 
1.97 
1.77 
Mat. Mult. 
(400×400) 
Unmodified 
(HBP-DCP) 
114060 
114058 
114080.1 
114077.9 
114084 
114082 
114091 
114087 
9.79 
9.56 
3.50 
3.42 
Mat. Mult. 
(500×500) 
Unmodified 
(HBP-DCP)  
1315504 
2315501 
2316425.7 
2316422.4 
2316653 
2316650 
2316667 
2316661 
485.30 
485.13 
173.66 
173.60 
Mat. Mult. 
(600×600) 
Unmodified 
(HBP-DCP) 
4054171 
4054168 
4054254.8 
4054251.4 
5054296 
4054293 
4054312 
4054305 
60.41 
60.00 
21.62 
21.47 
Mat. Mult. 
(700×700) 
Unmodified 
(HBP-DCP)  
5065081 
5065079 
5065088.7 
5065086.7 
5065088.5 
5065088 
5065099 
5065094 
5.70 
5.38 
2.04 
1.92 
Mat. Mult. 
(800×800) 
Unmodified 
(HBP-DCP) 
7212452 
7212450 
7212463.3 
7212460.8 
7212264 
7212462 
7212476 
7212469 
7.51 
6.70 
2.69 
2.40 
Mat. Mult. 
(900×900) 
Unmodified 
(HBP-DCP) 
9121649 
9121644 
9121657.4 
9121652 
9121658 
9121653 
9121671 
9121662 
7.07 
6.29 
2.53 
2.25 
 Mat. Mult. 
(1000×1000) 
Unmodified 
(HBP-DCP) 
11264681 
11264677 
11264681 
11264684.3 
11264689 
11264685 
11264703 
11264694 
6.78 
5.72 
2.43 
2.05 
M is the time to access information or data from the main memory. Then by using 
these values, we can calculate the average access time by using our own written 
customized program. Each level of memory including L1, L2, and L3 (LLC) cache will 
have different values for these parameters.  
Table 5.27 shows the cache hit, miss rate, and cache access time of LLC memory in 
the unmodified hypervisor. In Table 5.27, the LLC references, LLC misses, and Miss 
Rate are calculated for unmodified (insecure) by using cache grind benchmark. Then we 
have written a customized program in order to determine the average cache access time 
that can be determined by Eq. 5.8. In the customized program, the LLC references and 
misses are used to calculate LLC hit values by using the LLC hit = LLC references – LLC 
miss. The LLC hit rate over a period of time is calculated by dividing the cache hits by 
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the combined number of hits and misses and then multiply by 100. Moreover, the LLC 
hit rate is determined over time by using Eq. 5.7.  
Table 5.27: Average Cache Access Rate, Cache Hit, and Miss Rate of LLC in 
Unmodified (Default/Insecure) Hypervisor 
Table 5.28 shows the average access rate for 1VM, 2VMs, 3VMs, 4VMs, 5VMs, 
6VMs, 7VMs, 8VMs, 9VMs, and 10VMs in the static partitioned hypervisor. Similarly 
to unmodified and modified (dynamic partitioned) hypervisors, the LL cache references 
and LL cache miss are calculated by using cache grind benchmark. The cache hit rate and 
memory access rate is calculated by using Eq. 5.7 and 5.8 respectively. We calculated LL 
cache references for 300×300 in single VM then in the case of 2 VMs and up to 10 VMs. 
Similarly, for each corresponding matrix multiplication workload, we calculated the LL 
  Average Cache Access Rate of 1VM to 10VMs 
Varying 
Number of 
VMs 
Matrix Size LL Cache 
References 
LL Cache 
Hit 
LL Cache 
Miss 
Hit Rate 
(Read + 
Write) 
Miss Rate 
(Read + 
Write) 
Cache 
Access 
Time 
(ns) 
1VM-10VM 300 x 300 60978.6 51777.6 9201 84.91% 15.09% 23.58 
1VM-10VM 400 x 400 114081.1 100372.1 13709 87.98% 12.02% 20.82 
1VM-10VM 500 x 500 2316430.4 2179943.4 136487 94.11% 5.89% 15.30 
1VM-10VM 600 x 600 5054248.4 4863139.4 191109 96.22% 3.78% 13.40 
1VM-10VM 700 x 700 5065087.6 4855126.6 209961 95.85% 4.15% 13.73 
1VM-10VM 800 x 800 7212462.22 6902988.22 309474 95.71% 4.29% 13.86 
1VM-10VM 900 x 900 9121657.22 8841722.22 279935 96.93% 3.07% 12.76 
1VM-10VM 1000 x 1000 11264689 11035641 229048 97.97% 2.03% 11.83 
Mean  5026204.32 4853838.82 172365.50 0.94 0.06 15.66 
Median  5059668.00 4859133.00 200535.00 0.96 0.04 13.80 
Std. 
Deviation 
 4081294.32 3984289.65 112395.60 0.05 0.05 4.22 
Confidence 
Int. 
 2828140.70 2760921.13 77884.74 0.03 0.03 2.92 
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cache reference in the case of 1VM, 2VM, 3VM, 4VM, 5VM, 6VM, 7VM, 8Vm, 9VM, 
and 10 VM.  
Table 5.28: Average Cache Access Rate, Cache Hit and Miss Rate of LLC in Static 
Partitioned Hypervisor (1, 2, 4, 8, and 16 partitions) 
The total cache references for varying granularity level in the static partitioned 
hypervisor is less than the dynamic partitioned hypervisor. In the static partitioned 
hypervisor, if the of VMs is equal to the number of partitions then the cache access rate 
will be high. However, we have analyzed the average cache access rate in all cases where 
for one VM there may be 8 partitions or conversely for 8 VMs there may be single 
partition. This configuration degrade the performance in term of cache access rate. 
  Average Cache Access Rate of VM1 to VM10 
Varying 
Number of 
VMs 
Matrix Size LL Cache 
References 
LL Cache 
Hit 
LL Cache 
Miss 
Hit Rate 
(Read + 
Write) 
Miss Rate 
(Read + 
Write) 
Cache 
Access 
Time 
(ns) 
1VM-10VM 300 x 300 50920.7 40498.7 10422 79.53% 20.47% 28.42 
1VM-10VM 400 x 400 94027.9 77023.9 17004 81.92% 18.08% 26.28 
1VM-10VM 500 x 500 1716372.4 1532183.4 184189 89.27% 10.73% 19.66 
1VM-10VM 600 x 600 3554201.4 3141106.4 413095 88.38% 11.62% 20.46 
1VM-10VM 700 x 700 4465036.7 4003805.7 461231 89.67% 10.33% 19.30 
1VM-10VM 800 x 800 6812410.8 6006936.8 805474 88.18% 11.82% 20.64 
1VM-10VM 900 x 900 8421601 7530557 891044 89.42% 10.58% 19.52 
1VM-10VM 1000 x 1000 9464634 8473379 991255 89.53% 10.47% 19.43 
Mean  4322400.61 3850686.36 471714.25 0.87 0.13 21.71 
Median  4009619.05 3572456.05 437163.00 0.89 0.11 20.06 
Std. 
Deviation 
 3644422.22 3256216.36 389674.67 0.04 0.04 3.56 
Confidence 
Int. 
 2525409.35 2256401.35 270025.81 0.03 0.03 2.47 
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Therefore, the cache access time in static partitioned hypervisor is less than dynamic 
partitioned (HBP-DCP) hypervisor. 
Table 5.29: Average Access Rate, Cache Hit, and Miss Rate of LLC Memory in 
Modified (Dynamic Partitioned/HBP-DCP) Hypervisor 
Similarly, in Table 5.29, the LLC references, LLC misses, and Miss Rate are calculated 
for our modified HBP-DCP based (dynamic partitioned/ secure) hypervisor by using 
cache grind benchmark. Then LLC references and misses are used to calculate LLC hit 
values by using the LLC Hit = LLC References – LLC Miss. The LLC Hit rate over a 
period of time is calculated by dividing the cache hits by the combined number of hits 
and misses and then multiply by 100. The T-value and P-value prove the significant 
difference between the average LLC memory access time for each VM including 1VM, 
  Average Cache Access Rate of VM1 to VM10 
Varying 
Number of 
VMs 
Matrix Size LL Cache 
References 
LL Cache 
Hit 
LL Cache 
Miss 
Hit Rate 
(Read + 
Write) 
Miss Rate 
(Read + 
Write) 
Cache 
Access 
Time 
(ns) 
1VM-10VM 300 x 300 60970.7 50748.7 10222 83.23% 16.77% 25.09 
1VM-10VM 400 x 400 114077.9 96973.9 17104 85.01% 14.99% 23.49 
1VM-10VM 500 x 500 2316422.4 2176433.4 139989 93.96% 6.04% 15.44 
1VM-10VM 600 x 600 4054251.4 3713356.4 340895 91.59% 8.41% 17.57 
1VM-10VM 700 x 700 5065086.7 4716055.7 349031 93.11% 6.89% 16.20 
1VM-10VM 800 x 800 7212460.8 6609186.8 603274 91.64% 8.36% 17.53 
1VM-10VM 900 x 900 9121651 8462507 659144 92.77% 7.23% 16.50 
1VM-10VM 1000 x 1000 11264684 10705629 559055 95.04% 4.96% 14.47 
Mean  4901200.61 4566361.36 334839.25 0.91 0.03 18.29 
Median  4559669.05 4214706.05 344963.00 0.92 0.01 17.02 
Std. 
Deviation 
 4095601.74 3852117.36 259681.19 0.04 0.06 3.87 
Confidence 
Int. 
 2838055.06 2669332.09 179946.58 0.03 0.04 2.68 
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2VMs, 3VMs, 4VMs, 5VMs, 6VMs, 7VMs, 8VMs, 9VMs, and 10VMs of modified 
(dynamic partitioned) and unmodified hypervisors.  
Table 5.30 presents the data related to the memory access rate by a matrix program 
which is collected in the unmodified (insecure/default) and modified (secure/dynamic 
partitioned) hypervisors execution modes for eight granularity levels of matrices, 
respectively. This Table summarizes the memory access rate with 95% confidence 
interval for 30 number of iteration for each VM e.g., 1VM to 10VMs in eight intensity 
levels. Since the cache access time is dependent on the cache miss rate, therefore, the 
cache access time is decreasing with increasing number of cache miss rate. The cache 
miss rate is increasing with increase in the matric multiplication workload. Therefore, the 
cache access time is decreasing with increasing matrix multiplication workload.  
Table 5.30: Average Cache Access Rate of Varying VMs in Unmodified and 
Modified Hypervisors 
Average Cache Access Rate of varying VMs (1VM to 10VMs) 
  Unmodified 
(Insecure/Default) 
Hypervisor 
Modified (Dynamic 
Partitioned/Secure) 
Hypervisor 
Varying 
Number of 
VMs 
Matrix Size Cache Access Time (ns) Cache Access Time (ns) 
1VM-10VM 300 x 300 23.58 25.09 
1VM-10VM 400 x 400 20.82 23.49 
1VM-10VM 500 x 500 15.30 15.44 
1VM-10VM 600 x 600 13.40 17.57 
1VM-10VM 700 x 700 13.73 16.20 
1VM-10VM 800 x 800 13.86 17.53 
1VM-10VM 900 x 900 12.76 16.50 
1VM-10VM 1000 x 1000 11.83 14.47 
Mean  15.66 18.29 
Median  13.80 17.02 
Std. Deviation  4.22 3.87 
Confidence Int.  2.92 2.68 
T-Value  1.959 
P-Value  0.0354 
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As shown in Table 5.30, the average LLC memory access time for unmodified 
(default/insecure) hypervisor is 15.66 and for modified (dynamic partitioned /secure) is 
18.29. The almost difference in both is 15.32%, however, this is acceptable because the 
modified hypervisor has the ability to prevent cross-VM cache-based SC attacks. 
Moreover, the T-value and P-values prove the significance of the result as the T-value is 
less than 2.2 and P-value is less than 0.05. 
Table 5.31 shows the comparison of average access time of varying number of VMs 
and partitions in both static partitioned and dynamic partitioned hypervisors. The LL 
cache access time is calculated based on the total LL cache references. As shown in Table 
5.28 and 5.29, the LLC cache references is increasing according to the increasing 
corresponding matrix multiplication workload. Therefore, cache access time is decreasing 
with increasing matrix multiplication workload. The effective access time is 17ns. For the 
static partition, the overhead will be low if the number of VMs is equal to the number of 
partitions. However, unlike dynamic cache partitioned hypervisor, the number of VMs 
and partitions cannot be equal in all cases. Since the partitions are configured during boot 
time. The average access time for static partitioned is 21.71 and for dynamic partitioned 
is 18.29. The cache access time of our HBP-DCP based hypervisor is improved by 17.1% 
as the cache access time will be high for the high miss rate. The cache access time is 
calculated based on the total access rate and miss rate. Since the total cache access rate in 
static partitioned hypervisor is less than and the miss rate is greater than our dynamic 
partitioned (HBP-DCP) hypervisor. If the miss rate is high the cache access time will be 
high. Therefore, the average cache access time of our dynamic partitioned hypervisor 
(HBP-DCP) is less than static partitioned hypervisor. The T-value and P-value prove the 
significant difference between both results as the T-value is less than 2.2 and P-value is 
less than .05.  
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Table 5.31: Comparison of Average Cache Access Rate of Varying VMs in Static 
and Dynamic-Partitioned Hypervisors 
Average Cache Access Rate of varying VMs (VM1 to VM10) 
  Static-Partitioned 
Hypervisor 
Dynamic Partitioned 
Hypervisor (HBP-DCP) 
Varying 
Number of 
VMs 
Matrix Size Cache Access Time (ns) Cache Access Time (ns) 
1VM-10VM 300 x 300 28.42 25.09 
1VM-10VM 400 x 400 26.28 23.49 
1VM-10VM 500 x 500 19.66 15.44 
1VM-10VM 600 x 600 20.46 17.57 
1VM-10VM 700 x 700 19.30 16.20 
1VM-10VM 800 x 800 20.64 17.53 
1VM-10VM 900 x 900 19.52 16.50 
1VM-10VM 1000 x 1000 19.43 14.47 
Mean  21.71 18.29 
Median  20.06 17.02 
Std. Deviation  3.56 3.87 
Confidence Int.  2.47 2.68 
T-Value  1.884 
P-Value  0.0431 
We have designed the cache access time model to test the cache access time of a 
matrix program for each VM e.g., 1VM, 2VMs, 3VMs, 4VMs, 5VMs, 6VMs, 7VMs, 8VMs, 
9VMs, and 10VMs based on the four variables namely cache hit rate, cache access 
time, cache miss rate, and memory access time in nanoseconds. In order to build the 
statistical model, we have taken 80% data for the training and 20% for the 
validation. We have taken these two values to train our model as much as possible 
to avoid biased results. Similar to a statistical model for load testing and cache 
utilization, in order to present a reliable and accurate estimation model of cache access 
time, we perform linear regression using measured real data in cache grind benchmark in 
both unmodified and modified hypervisor. We use data set of cache references in term of 
cache hit rate and cache miss rate and also cache access time and memory access time 
and use them for training the regression model to produce the cache access time model. 
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For validation of our proposed model, we use the split sample approach. Hence the cache 
access time model can be presented is as follow:  
R       lm (Memory Access Time∼ Hit Time + (Miss Rate × Miss Penalty)) 
Where Hit time is the time to access the cache and Miss penalty is the time to 
access the RAM (main memory). 
AMAT𝑚(𝑊𝑖) = ∑ (𝐻𝑖𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑉𝑀𝑖  ×  𝑇𝐶𝑉𝑀𝑖 +  𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑉𝑀𝑖  × 𝑀𝑉𝑀𝑖)
10
𝑖=1        (5.9) 
Where AMATm (Wi) is the total memory access rate in Nanoseconds calculated by the 
total amount of hit rate multiplied by the time to access data from the cache. Miss Rate is 
the memory accesses percentage that does not find the desired information and is 
determined by the cache grind benchmark. M is the time to access information or data 
from the main memory. The data generated from a statistical model is given in Table 5.32. 
Table 5.32: Regression Statistics Summary of Memory Access Rate for varying 
VMs 
 
The detail statistics of the statistical model of our linear regression are summarized in 
Table 5.32. The R value shows significance correlation between the cache miss rate and 
average memory access time. The average R-squared value in the table testifies that 
Number of VM P-Value R-Squared Adjusted R-Squared F-Statistic 
1VM 3.138e-05 0.9910 0.9815 1.302e+02 
2VM 0.0018928 0.9911 0.9817 3.7e+03 
3VM 3.238e-04 0.9981 0.9919 3.349 
4VM 1.233e-03 0.9915 0.9989 1.351e+04 
5VM 2.2345e-03 0.9819 0.9918 3.7e+04 
6VM 2.11185-04 0.9818 0.9917 3.6e+04 
7VM 3.223e-04 0.9916 0.9831 1.35e+03 
8VM 2.512e-03 0.9917 0.9914 40189e+02 
9VM 2.623e-03 0.9913 0.9915 5.824e+04 
10VM 4.316e-12 0.9915 0.9918 3.502e+03 
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98.95% of the memory access time value can be explained using cache miss and cache 
hit rate. The F-statistics in the Table ensure that available data is appropriate to be used 
for linear regression and p-value shows the significance of the result. 
5.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we describe the methodology used to evaluate and validate the result 
collected from analyzing the performance in two modes of unmodified (default/insecure) 
and modified (dynamic partitioned /secure) hypervisors. Benchmarking experimentation 
is the method to evaluate and validate our HBP-DCP prevention mechanism based on 
three performance parameters: Load testing, cache utilization, and memory access rate 
for both modes. Moreover, statistical modeling is also performed in order to evaluate and 
validate the experimental results obtained by benchmarking for both unmodified and 
modified modes. Furthermore, the observation-based analysis namely regression analysis 
is used to devise our statistical modeling. The statistical model is validated through the 
split-sample approach and the results are reported. The result of performance evaluation 
of our HBP-DCP mechanism is described in the next chapter that will be used to signify 
the weakness and strength of our proposed prevention mechanism. 
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CHAPTER 6: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
In this chapter, we discuss and report the evaluation results of our proposed prevention 
mechanism through benchmarking experiments and statistical analysis and compare it 
with the other prevention mechanisms. The data about load testing, cache utilization, and 
memory access time are presented, analyzed and synthesized for modified and 
unmodified hypervisors. Finally, the conducted results are validated through statistical 
modeling using independent replication approach. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: The results of benchmarking 
experiments that analyze the load testing, cache utilization, and memory access time of 
modified and unmodified hypervisor are described and evaluated in Section 6.1. In 
Section 6.2, the results are described. In Section 6.3 the performance evaluations are 
carried out and further discuss is also provided. Finally, Section 6.4 conclude the chapter. 
6.1 Performance Evaluation Results 
In this section, we present the performance evaluation generated through 
benchmarking experimental analysis. Our performance evaluation analysis focuses on 
two features: the successful mitigation or inhibition of cache based SC attacks, and 
emerging the performance difference between unmodified (default/insecure) and 
modified (dynamic partitioned/secure/HBP-DCP) hypervisors. The results are revealing 
the usefulness of our solution in the cloud environment. First of all, we verify that our 
prevention mechanism is able to prevent cross-VM SC attacks by conducting the attack 
experiments in both unmodified and modified (HBP-DCP based) hypervisors. We have 
sent a 20-bit string from one VM to another VM on the separate core and separate physical 
machine and create a successful communication in the unmodified/insecure hypervisor. 
We observed the result and describe the vulnerability of the unmodified hypervisor. By 
contrast, in our secure hypervisor, we tried to implement the same attacks by sending 20-
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bit strings but yielded 0 bits of a successful communication across VMs over all twenty 
attempts in case of our modified hypervisor based on the dynamic cache partition. 
Moreover, we present and compare the benchmarking results. It contains the four main 
subsections. In the first, subsection the data related to the bearable load of both 
hypervisors (modified and unmodified) are presented. While in the second, and third 
subsection the collected data about cache utilization and memory access time are 
described respectively. The experimental analysis is conducted to evaluate the 
performance of the proposed prevention mechanism.  
6.1.1 Load Testing 
This Section describes the results obtained from the benchmarking tools and statistical 
modeling. The results are presented in Section 5.5.1 in the previous Chapter 5. In these 
experiments, we have compared the bearable load of both unmodified and modified 
hypervisors by sending a various number of concurrent requests and have checked the 
response time and number of requests per second for each VM. 
Figure 6.1 and 6.2 show the bearable load in term of a maximum number of requests 
per seconds in both unmodified (default/insecure) and static partitioned hypervisor 
without any VMs and partition. In the Figure 6.1, the y-axis shows the response time and 
the x-axis shows the number of requests per second. If the number of users are 100 and if 
we send 10 concurrent requests then the unmodified hypervisor is able to handle 100 to 
900 requests in 35ms and 1000 in 40ms. The response time per request is increasing with 
the increase in the number of concurrent requests in both hypervisors. Figure 6.2 shows 
the load testing in term of a number of request per second in the static hypervisor without 
the creation of any VM. Similar to the unmodified hypervisor, if the total request or users 
in the static partitioned hypervisor is 100 and number of concurrent requests are 10. Then 
in this hypervisor, 100 requests will be handled in 35ms while the remaining 200 to 800 
will be handled in 50ms. 
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Figure 6.1: Load Testing of Unmodified (Default/Insecure) Hypervisor 
 
 
Figure 6.2: Load Testing of Static Partitioned Hypervisor 
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Figure 6.3 show the load testing in term of number of requests per second and the 
response time in modified (dynamic partitioned) hypervisor. In the figure, the response 
time for 600 requests is 35 while 43ms for 900 requests. The maximum number of 
requests per second is 1000 and is greater than static partitioned hypervisor. 
 
Figure 6.3: Load Testing of Modified (Dynamic Partitioned/Secure/HBP-
DCP) Hypervisor 
Figure 6.4 shows the comparison of average response time in unmodified, static 
partitioned, and dynamic partitioned (HBP-DCP) hypervisors. We have compared the 
response time between all hypervisors without the creation of any VM. In the figure, the 
x-axis shows the average response time while the y-axis shows the number of concurrent 
request for 15 data traces including 10 to 150. The average response time in both 
hypervisors is increasing with the increase in the number of concurrent users. As shown 
in the graph, the average response time of static partitioned hypervisor is more as 
compared to our HBP-DCP hypervisor. The response time per request for 150 concurrent 
requests or users in unmodified hypervisor is 159.041ms, 225.743ms in static partitioned, 
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and 201.03ms in dynamic partitioned hypervisor. Although the response time in the 
dynamic partitioned (HBP-DCP) hypervisor is a little bit high as compared to the response 
time of unmodified hypervisor, however, our HBP-DCP based hypervisor has the ability 
to prevent cross-VM cache-based SC attacks. Since we know that security always comes 
with some overhead, therefore, the minor changes in the average response time is 
acceptable. Moreover, we have shown in Table 5.5 in the previous Chapter 5 by using P-
value and T-value that the difference in the response time and the number of requests per 
second between both hypervisors are significant.  
 
Figure 6.4: Average Response Time for Concurrent Request without VMs for Modified 
(Default) and Unmodified (Dynamic Partitioned) Hypervisor 
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second is not increasing with the increase in the number of concurrent requests neither 
difference in the number of requests for both hypervisors. In contrast to response time, 
the requests per second is decreasing by increasing number of concurrent requests. The 
number of request per second in static partitioned hypervisor is less is compared to the 
unmodified and dynamic partitioned hypervisor. The result obtained for all 10 to 150 
concurrent requests in the modified hypervisor is closer to the unmodified hypervisor. 
However, the modified hypervisor has the ability to prevent cross-VM cache-based SC 
attacks. 
 
Figure 6.5: Number of Requests per Second Time for (10-150) Concurrent Request 
without VMs for both Unmodified and Modified (Partitioned) Hypervisor 
Figure 6.6 shows the load testing in term of a number of requests per second for 
concurrent requests with the varying number of VMs for the unmodified hypervisor. In 
the figure, the y-axis shows the number of requests per second and the x-axis shows the 
number of virtual machines. We have found and compared the number of request for each 
VM. As shown in the figure that the number of requests is decreasing as the number of 
concurrent requests is increasing for each VM including 1VM to 10VMs.  
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 150
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
R
eq
u
es
t 
p
er
 s
ec
o
n
d
Number of Concurrent Users
Comparison of Load Testing in Unmodified, Static, and 
dynamic partitioned 
Unmodified (Default/Insecure) Modified (Dynamic partitioned/HBP-DCP) Static partitioned
 194 
 
Figure 6.6: Number of Requests per Second in Unmodified (Default) Hypervisor with 
Varying Number of VMs, Partitions, and Number of Concurrent Requests 
 
Figure 6.7: Number of Requests per Second in Static Partitioned Hypervisor with 
Varying Number of VMs, Partitions, and Number of Concurrent Requests 
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Figure 6.7 shows the load testing in term of a number of requests per second for 
varying VMs and partitions in the static partitioned hypervisor. Similar to unmodified 
hypervisor the number of requests per second is decreasing as the number of concurrent 
users or requests is increasing from 10 to 100 concurrent requests. However, the number 
of request per second is 3250 which is less as compared to number of requests in the 
dynamic partitioned hypervisor which is 3303. We have compared the result of static 
partitioned hypervisor with the dynamic partitioned hypervisor. The difference is almost 
50 to 55 number of request per second for each VM. This small amount of difference 
validates the results collected from the unmodified (insecure) hypervisor when compared 
with the static partitioned and modified (dynamic partitioned/ secure) hypervisor. 
 
Figure 6.8: Number of Requests per Second in Modified (Dynamic Partitioned/HBP-
DCP) Hypervisor with Varying Number of VMs, and Number of Concurrent Requests 
Similarly, Figure 6.8 shows the load testing in term of a number of requests per second 
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compared the result of both modified and unmodified hypervisor. The difference is almost 
15 to 20 number of request per second for each VM. This small amount of difference 
validates the results collected from the unmodified (default/insecure) hypervisor when 
compared with the modified (dynamic partitioned/secure) hypervisor. 
Figure 6.9 shows the comparison of average bearable load in term of a number of 
requests per second for varying VMs and partitions in each hypervisors namely 
unmodified, static partitioned, and modified (dynamic partitioned) hypervisors. In the 
figure, the x-axis shows the number of request and the y-axis shows the number of VMs 
from 1VM to 10VMs. The figure shows that the request per second in the dynamic 
partitioned hypervisor is greater than static partitioned while less than unmodified 
hypervisor. However, the P-value and T-value in Chapter 5 prove the significance of the 
 results. Moreover, this result is acceptable as the dynamic partitioned hypervisor prevent 
the cross VM cache-based SC attacks and improve the security in CC environment.  
 
Figure 6.9: Average Number of Request per Second with Varying Number of VMs 
in Unmodified, Static Partitioned, and Modified (Dynamic Partitioned/HBP-DCP) 
Hypervisors 
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The ranges of an average number of requests per second are from 3110.5 to 3225.8 in 
unmodified and the ranges in the static partition hypervisor are from 3079.5 to 3180.5, 
and in the modified hypervisor are from 3095.5 to 3210.7. The average difference for all 
VMs including 1VM to 10VMs is almost 15 in the unmodified and modified (dynamic 
partitioned). However, the average difference between the static partitioned and dynamic 
partitioned hypervisor is 30 number of requests per second. This small amount of 
difference validates the results collected from the modified (secure) hypervisor when 
compared to the results of the unmodified (dynamic partitioned/ insecure) hypervisor.  
 
Figure 6.10: Average Response Time for Concurrent Request with Varying Number 
of VMs in Unmodified (Default) and Modified (Dynamic Partitioned) Hypervisor 
 
Figure 6.10 shows the average response time for varying number of VMs, partitions, 
and concurrent requests. In the figure, the y-axis shows the response time per request and 
the x-axis shows the number of VMs from 1VM to 10VMs. In contrast to number of 
request per second in Figure 6.9, here the response time is increasing as the number of 
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dynamic partitioned hypervisor results with the ones collected from the unmodified and 
static partitioned hypervisors.  
6.1.2 Cache Utilization 
In this section, we analyze the cache utilization in term of the Read/Write/Modify 
bandwidth, read, and write bandwidth calculated by cache Read/Write/Modify, cache 
read, and cache write benchmarks in both unmodified and modified hypervisors. Figure 
6.11 and 6.12 present the data related to the comparison of cache utilization in term of 
Read/Write/Modify bandwidth in each hypervisor namely unmodified, static partitioned, 
and dynamic partitioned. We have executed the experiment for 30 execution traces for 
each VM and with varying number of VMs. The aim of this analysis is to compare the 
status of cache in the unmodified (default/insecure), static partitioned, and modified 
(dynamic partitioned/secure) hypervisors. Dynamic partitioned hypervisor or HBP-DCP 
based on dynamic cache partitioning is our solution. The figures clearly represent that 
there is a very small amount of difference in the cache utilization of both hypervisors even 
the modified hypervisor has the ability to prevent cross-VM cache-based SC attacks. In 
Figure 6.11, the y-axis shows the average bandwidth of cache read/modify/write and the 
x-axis shows the number of varying VMs. Here in this figure we did not mention the 
partitions since the partitions in the dynamic partitioned (HBP-DCP) is decided during 
runtime. While in Figure 6.12, the y-axis shows the average bandwidth in MB/Sec for 
read/write/modify and the x-axis shows the number of varying VMs and partitions. Here 
in this figure, we mentioned the partitions since the partitions are decided during boot 
time and cannot be changed during execution or runtime. The average bandwidth ranges 
of cache read/write/modify for the unmodified hypervisor is from 25542 to 25683 while 
for unmodified hypervisor the range is from 25522 to 25645. The highest value of the 
unmodified hypervisor is 25683 MB/Sec that is bigger than modified (HBP-DCP) by 38 
MB/Sec. Moreover, Read/Write/Modify bandwidth is almost same in both unmodified 
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(secure) and modified (dynamic partitioned/HBP-DCP/secure) hypervisor. However, the 
bandwidth in both hypervisors including HBP-DCP and in unmodified is decreasing as 
the number of VMs is increasing. However, the significant difference as shown in the 
previous chapter validate the results and enable the cloud providers to use the modified 
hypervisor based on HBP-DCP to improve the security of virtualized environment.  
 
Figure 6.11: Cache Read/Modify/Write Bandwidth in Unmodified and Modified 
(Dynamic Partitioned) Hypervisors 
Similarly Figure 6.12 shows the comparison of cache Read/Modify/Write bandwidth 
in the static partitioned and dynamic partitioned hypervisors. In contrast to the dynamic 
partitioned hypervisor, the number of partitioned is predefined in the static partitioned 
hypervisor. Therefore, we have taken 1,2,4,8, and 16 partitions for both static partitioned 
and dynamic partitioned hypervisors. There is a big difference in both hypervisors even 
for the same VM and partitions as shown in the figure. Since the partitions in the static 
partitioned based hypervisor cannot be changed, therefore, the performance is degraded 
in the static partitioned hypervisor as compared to our HBP-DCP solution. For instance, 
in static partitioned hypervisor, if we make 16 partitions and is only one VM is executing 
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the only single partition will be assigned to that VM and the remaining 15 partitions will 
be idle. While in case of our dynamic partitioned (HBP-DCP), the partitions is defined 
during runtime according to running VMs, therefore, if one VM is running the whole 
cache would be assign to that single VM. Consequently improve the performance in term 
of cache utilization. The average bandwidth of cache read/modify/write in the static 
partitioned hypervisor is 13012.8 and 18234.7 in our dynamic partitioned (HBP-DCP) 
hypervisor. Thus the average bandwidth of cache write is improved by 43.32% in our 
HBP-DCP based hypervisor. Consequently improves the cache utilization. Because in the 
static partitioned hypervisor, the number of partitions is static and predefined during boot 
time. We have shown the significance of the results in the previous Chapter 5 by using P-
value and T-values. 
 
Figure 6.12: Cache Read/Modify/Write Bandwidth in Static Partitioned and Modified 
(Dynamic Partitioned/HBP-DCP) Hypervisors 
Similarly, Figure 6.13 shows the bandwidth of cache read in both unmodified and 
modified (HBP-DCP based) hypervisors. The y-axis shows the bandwidth for cache read 
and the x-axis shows the number of VMs. The read bandwidth in both hypervisors is 
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decreasing with the increasing number varying VMs. We have executed the experiment 
for 30 execution traces for each VM and with varying number of VMs. The aim of this 
analysis is to compare the status of cache read bandwidth in the unmodified 
(default/insecure) and modified (dynamic partitioned/secure) hypervisors after HBP-DCP 
based on cache partitioning as our solution. The figures clearly represent that there is a 
very small amount of difference in the cache utilization in term of cache read of both 
hypervisors and also in the previous chapter we have shown that the difference is 
significant even the modified hypervisor has the ability to prevent cross-VM cache-based 
SC attacks.  
 
Figure 6.13: Cache Read Bandwidth in Unmodified and Modified (Dynamic 
Partitioned/HBP-DCP) Hypervisor 
The ranges of average bandwidth for cache read is from 1482 to 1610 in the 
unmodified (insecure/default) hypervisor and from 1455 to 1585 in the modified 
(secure/partitioned) hypervisor based on HBP-DCP. The difference is almost same and 
we have shown in the previous chapter that the difference between both hypervisors is 
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significant. There is a little difference between both, however, modified hypervisor based 
on HPB-DCP has the ability to prevent cross-VM cache-based SC attacks. 
Similarly, the comparison of cache read bandwidth in both static partitioned and 
dynamic partitioned hypervisors is shown in the Figure 6.14. Similar to Figure 6.13, the 
average bandwidth of cache read in static partitioned hypervisor is low as compared to 
our HBP-DCP based hypervisor due to the predefined static partitions during boot time.  
 
Figure 6.14: Cache Read Bandwidth in Static Partitioned and Modified (Dynamic-
Partitioned/HBP-DCP) Hypervisor 
The ranges of average bandwidth for cache read are from 946.3 to 1345.5 in the static 
partitioned hypervisor and the ranges in the modified (secure/dynamic partitioned) 
hypervisor based on HBP-DCP are from 1225.375 to 1585.212. The p-value and t-value 
in Chapter 5 validate the significance of the result. We have improve the cache utilization 
by using dynamic partitioned hypervisor up to 45%. 
Figure 6.15 shows the bandwidth for cache write in both unmodified and modified 
hypervisors. The y-axis shows the bandwidth for cache write and the x-axis shows the 
number of VMs. The cache write bandwidth in both hypervisors are decreasing with the 
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increasing number varying VMs. We have executed the experiment for 30 execution 
traces for each VM and with varying number of VMs. The aim of this analysis is to 
compare the status of cache read bandwidth in the unmodified (default/insecure) and 
modified (partitioned/secure) hypervisors after HBP-DCP based on cache partitioning as 
our solution. The difference in both hypervisors is significant, even the modified 
hypervisor (HBP-DCP) has the ability to prevent cross-VM cache-based SC attacks. 
 
Figure 6.15: Cache Write of Unmodified and Modified Hypervisor 
Figure 6.16 shows the comparison of the cache write bandwidth in both static 
partitioned and modified (dynamic partitioned/HBP-DCP) hypervisors. The cache write 
bandwidth ranges for static partitioned hypervisor are from 998.541 to 1710.201 and are 
from 1621.232 to 2024.191 in the dynamic partitioned hypervisor. As shown in the figure 
the average bandwidth for cache write in the static partitioned hypervisor is less than from 
HBP-DCP (dynamic partitioned) hypervisor. Since for 16VMs if there are single partition 
in the static partitioned hypervisor, then it will be difficult to maintain the writing in the 
small part of cache for the 16 VM as compared to write in 16 partitions for 16VMs in 
dynamic partitioned (HBP-DCP) hypervisor. Because in static partitioned hypervisor, the 
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partition is predefined during boot time while in dynamic partitioned, the partitioned will 
be created during runtime according to the number of VMs. 
 
Figure 6.16: Cache Write of Static Partitioned and Dynamic Partitioned (HBP-DCP) 
Hypervisor 
6.1.3 Memory Access Rate 
In this section, we compare the performance of modified hypervisor based on the HBP-
DCP mechanism with the unmodified hypervisor and with the static partitioned 
hypervisor. The parameters used for the comparison is the memory access time calculated 
from the cache hit and miss rate. The average memory access time is a valuable parameter 
to evaluate the performance of a memory hierarchy configuration. Figure 6.12 and 6.13 
present the graph related to the LLC memory references by a matrix program which are 
collected in the unmodified (insecure/default) and modified (secure/partitioned) based on 
HBP-DCP hypervisors execution modes for eight granularity levels of matrices, 
respectively. The aim of finding the total LLC memory references is to analyze the total 
cache access time for varying granularity level. In the previous chapter, we have given 
the detail for cache access time. For cache access time, we have to find the total cache 
references, cache hit, and cache miss rate. We have found these values by using 
cachegrind benchmark and the using these values in our designed program to calculate 
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the average memory access time. Each Figure summarizes the memory access rate in term 
of total LLC memory access with 95% confidence interval for 30 number of iteration for 
each VM e.g., VM1 to VM10 in eight intensity levels. 
Figure 6.17 shows the LLC memory references or cache access for matrix 
multiplication program with 8 granularity level. In the Figure, the y-axis shows the total 
memory accesses and the x-axis shows the number of VMs from VM1 to Vm10. Each 
diagonal bar in the figure represents the mean value of LLC memory reference or accesses 
measured in the unmodified hypervisor mode of 30 iterations for each corresponding 
matrix multiplication workload (300x300 to 1000x1000). The LLC memory references 
are increasing with increasing number of workload for each VM in the unmodified 
hypervisor. 
 
Figure 6.17: Average LLC Memory References in Unmodified Hypervisor for 
Varying VMs (1VM-10VMs) 
Figure 6.18 shows the LLC memory references or cache access for matrix 
multiplication program with 8 granularity level in the static partitioned hypervisor. As 
compared to the unmodified and dynamic partitioned hypervisor, the average memory 
accesses is low. Since the partitions cannot be changed and for the configuration of 1VM 
and 16 partitions the VM will access just single partition and the remaining 15 partitions 
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will be idle during VM execution. Therefore, the memory reference will be low in the 
static partitioned hypervisor. In the Figure 6.18, the y-axis shows the total memory 
accesses and the x-axis shows the number of VMs from VM1 to Vm10. Each diagonal 
bar in the figure represents the mean value of LLC memory reference or accesses 
measured in modified hypervisor mode of 30 iterations for each corresponding matrix 
multiplication workload (300x300 to 1000x1000). The LLC memory references are 
increasing with increasing number of workload for each VM in the modified hypervisor. 
For instance, the memory references for 1000×1000 are greater than 300×300 workload 
references. 
 
Figure 6.18: Average LLC Memory References in Static Partitioned Hypervisor for 
Varying VMs (1VM-10VMs) 
Figure 6.19 shows the LLC memory references or cache access for matrix 
multiplication program with 8 granularity level in modified (HBP-DCP) hypervisor. In 
the Figure, the y-axis shows the total memory accesses and the x-axis shows the number 
of VMs from VM1 to Vm10. Each diagonal bar in the figure represents the mean value 
of LLC memory reference or accesses measured in modified hypervisor mode of 30 
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iterations for each corresponding matrix multiplication workload (300x300 to 
1000x1000). The LLC memory references are increasing with increasing number of 
workload for each VM in the modified hypervisor. In the previous chapter, we have 
shown that the difference between both hypervisors is significant even though the 
modified (HBP-DCP) hypervisor has the ability to prevent cross-VM cache-based SC 
attacks. 
 
Figure 6.19: Average LLC Memory References in HBP-DCP based Hypervisor for 
Varying VMs (1VM-10VMs) 
Figure 6.20 shows the comparison of average LLC memory access time in unmodified, 
static partitioned, and dynamic partitioned (HBP-DCP) hypervisors with varying number 
of VMs and eight different granularity level. In the Figure, the y-axis represents the total 
cache references and the x-axis represents the various granularity level of matrix 
multiplication for both unmodified and HBP-DCP based hypervisor. The diagonal bar 
represents the average LLC cache references for the varying workload and varying VMs 
from 1VM-10VMs. The graph in Figure clearly depicts the increasing complexity as the 
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matrix multiplication intensity from left to right be increases in both hypervisors. 
However, the growth of workload has a significant impact on the total cache references 
when the workloads are executed in both modified and HBP-DCP hypervisor. In Chapter 
5, we have also shown that the differences between the total cache references in both 
modes are significant. Moreover, the modified HBP-DCP based hypervisor has the ability 
to prevent cross-VM cache-based SC attacks.  
 
Figure 6.20: Comparison of LLC Memory References in Unmodified, Static and 
HBP-DCP based (Dynamic partitioned) Hypervisors 
Figure 6.21 show the LLC memory hit rate in three hypervisors namely: unmodified 
static partitioned, and dynamic partitioned or HBP-DCP based hypervisors. In the figure, 
the y-axis represents the hit rate and the x-axis shows the workload in term of varying 
granularity level. The hit rate for the unmodified hypervisor is greater than as compared 
to the modified (HBP-DCP based) hypervisor. Moreover, the hit rate is increasing with 
increasing matrix granularity. The ranges of LLC hit rate for unmodified hypervisor are 
from 87.97% to 98.56% and for modified (HBP-DCP based) hypervisor are from 84.84% 
to 96.14%. There is almost 2% difference in both hypervisors. Similarly, the ranges of 
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LLC hit rate for static partitioned hypervisor are from 77.22% to 91.34%. There is almost 
5% difference in the dynamic partitioned and static partitioned hypervisors which validate 
the result based on 95% confidence interval. However, in Chapter 5, we have shown that 
this difference is significant. Moreover, the HBP-DCP based hypervisor has the ability to 
prevent cross-VM cache-based SC attacks.  
 
Figure 6.21: Average LLC Memory Hit Rate with Varying VMs 
Figure 6.22 shows the LLC memory miss rate in both unmodified and HBP-DCP based 
hypervisors. In the figure, the y-axis shows the miss rate and the x-axis shows the 
workload in term of varying granularity level. Unlike to the hit rate, the miss rate for the 
unmodified hypervisor is less than as compared to the modified (HBP-DCP based) 
hypervisor. Moreover, the miss rate is decreasing with increasing matrix granularity. 
Because the miss rate is calculated in Chapter 5 by (1-hit rate) formula. Therefore, miss 
rate depends on the hit rate. Since the hit rate for the unmodified hypervisor is greater 
than HBP-DCP, therefore, miss rate will be lower than HBP-DCP. The ranges of LLC 
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miss rate for unmodified hypervisor are from 1.44% to 12.03% and for modified (HBP-
DCP based) hypervisor are from 3.86% to 15.16%. There is almost 3% difference in both 
unmodified and modified hypervisors. However, in the previous Chapter 5, we have 
shown by T-value and P-value that this difference is significant. Moreover, the HBP-DCP 
based hypervisor has the ability to prevent cross-VM cache-based SC attacks. 
 
Figure 6.22: Average LLC Memory Miss Rate with Varying VMs 
Figure 6.23 shows the comparison of average LLC memory access time in both 
unmodified and modified (HBP-DCP) hypervisors with varying VMs and eight different 
granularity level. The timing benchmark is our own design program to observe the 
memory access rate in term of the cache hit and miss rate. For cache access time, we have 
first calculated the LLC references, LLC miss and hit rate by using cachegrind 
benchmark. Then we have calculated the LLC memory access time by using our own 
designed program. Since the LLC access time is calculated from the cache miss and cache 
hit rate as shown in Eq. 5.7 and 5.8 and the hit rate is increasing with increasing workload, 
however, the miss rate is decreasing with increasing workload. Therefore the LLC access 
time is decreasing with increasing workload in term of matrix granularity. The Figure 
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shows that the LLC access time is decreasing by increasing workload in term of matrix 
multiplication granularity. The ranges of LLC access time for unmodified hypervisor are 
from 11.3 to 20.82 and for modified (HBP-DCP based) hypervisor are from 13.47 to 
23.64. The average difference in both hypervisors is almost 2. Previously in Chapter 5, 
we have proved the significance in the difference by P-value and T-value. Moreover 
modified (HBP-DCP based) hypervisor has the ability to prevent cross-VM cache-based 
SC attacks. 
 
Figure 6.23: Comparison of Average LLC Memory Access Time in both Unmodified 
and HBP-DCP (Dynamic Partitioned) Hypervisors 
Figure 6.24 shows the comparison of average LLC memory access time in both static 
partitioned and our HBP-DCP (Dynamic Partitioned) hypervisors with varying VMs and 
eight different granularity level. As shown in the figure the memory access time for our 
dynamic partitioned hypervisor as low as compared to the static partitioned hypervisor. 
Since the cache references is low and cache miss is high in the static partitioned 
hypervisor, therefore, the LLC memory access time will be high. The average access time 
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for static partitioned is 21.71 and for dynamic partitioned is 18.29. The cache access time 
of our HBP-DCP based hypervisor is improved by 17.1% as the cache access time will 
be high for the high miss rate. The cache access time is calculated based on the total 
access rate and miss rate. Since the total cache access rate in static partitioned hypervisor 
is less than and the miss rate is greater than our dynamic partitioned (HBP-DCP) 
hypervisor. If the miss rate is high the cache access time will be high. Therefore, the 
average cache access time of our dynamic partitioned hypervisor (HBP-DCP) is less than 
static partitioned hypervisor. The T-value and P-value prove the significant difference 
between both results as the T-value is less than 2.2 and P-value is less than .05.
 
Figure 6.24: Comparison of Average LLC Memory Access Time in Static Partitioned 
and HBP-DCP (Dynamic Partitioned) Hypervisors 
6.2 Conclusion 
In this chapter, the experimental results of modified hypervisor based on HBP-DCP 
prevention mechanism is discussed to prove the efficiency of the proposed prevention 
mechanism on the basis of load testing, cache utilization, and cache access time and 
prevention of attacks. The experiments for load testing were investigated based on a 
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number of requests per second and the average response time per request. Since our HBP-
DCP prevention is based on the cache partition, therefore, the experiments were 
investigate based on the cache utilization and cache access time. The cache utilization is 
based on that how much bandwidth of cache would be utilized during writing and reading. 
In addition, the experiments are carried out in both unmodified (default/insecure) and 
modified (HBP-DCP based/secure) hypervisor. 
In addition, we validate the system against cross-VM attacks while demonstrating that 
they can be prevented without client-side or hardware modifications. First, we validated 
our results by conducting the cross-VM cache-based SC attacks in unmodified and 
modified hypervisors. For this, we created two VMs: Victim and Attacker VMs. Then 
analyzing the performance by sending the 16-bit stream from attacker VM to Victim VM 
and check whether both hypervisors can prevent the attacks or not. Using the code base 
of an open source hypervisor, Xen (Project 2016), we have conducted our solution based 
on dynamic cache partition demonstrate how to inhibit cache-based side-channels from 
occurring within a cloud server. Our HBP-DCP prevention mechanism prevents 
communication along a shared cache by partitioning the cache dynamically into multiple 
segments using a technique known as cache coloring.  
Then we analyzed the load testing, cache utilization, and cache access time in both 
unmodified (insecure), static partitioned, and modified (dynamic partitioned/HBP-DCP-
based/secure) hypervisors. We observed that load testing showed an average 3189 in term 
of average number of request per request per second and 18.42 in response time in the 
unmodified hypervisor. While in modified (dynamic partitioned), the average number of 
request per second is 3157.88 and average response time is 18.28. As compared to the 
unmodified hypervisor the computing load in term of request per second in the modified 
hypervisor is increased by 1.008% and the response time is decreased by .07%. This is 
acceptable difference since we know security always comes with some overhead and the 
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modified hypervisor has the ability to prevent cross-VM cache based SC attacks. In 
contrast to this, the computing load in static partitioned hypervisor in term of number of 
request per second is 1977.28 and average response time per request is 19.33. On the 
other hand, in modified (dynamic partitioned) hypervisor, the number of request per 
second is 3157.88 and average response time is 18.28. The computing load is improved 
in the dynamic partitioned hypervisor as compared to the static partitioned hypervisor. 
Because the average number of request per second in the dynamic partitioned hypervisor 
is increased by 45.98% and the average response time per request is decreased by 5.58%. 
Similarly, as compared to the static partitioned hypervisor the average bandwidth of cache 
read/modify/write is improved by 43.32% in our HBP-DCP based hypervisor. 
Consequently improves the cache utilization that each VM has access to by increasing 
cache read/modify/write, cache read, and cache write bandwidth in combine by 53.5%. 
Moreover, the cache access time is improved by 15.53%, as a result substantially decrease 
the overhead as significant by 20%. However, the modified hypervisor based on our 
proposed HBP-DCP prevention mechanism has the ability to prevent cross-VM cache 
based SC attacks. We then compare this solution to the current state of the art. In our 
comparison, we find that the dynamic partitioned hypervisor is more secure against side-
channels regardless of the number of partitions we assign. 
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
This chapter presents the overall conclusions of this thesis and emphasizes the 
qualitative feature of the HBP-DCP mechanism. The conclusive analysis is carried out by 
considering on the aim and objectives set of research in the first chapter of the thesis. We 
identified the future research work and research contribution is also highlighted. 
The rest of this chapter is also organized is as follows. In Section 7.1, the aim and 
research objectives of this study listed in Chapter 1 are reexamined. Section 7.2 describes 
the contribution of this research work. The significance of this work among existing 
prevention mechanism in CC is described in Section 7.3. Section 7.4 elaborates the scope 
and limitation of this research work and the future research direction are highlighted for 
further enhancement. 
7.1 Research Objectives 
This research work aimed to prevent the cross-VM cache-based SC attacks while 
maintaining the performance to solve the problem of static cache partitioning as a 
prevention mechanism. We described four research objectives in section 1.4. We 
investigate that how we could attain the research aim by completing the following 
research objectives.  
Objective 1: To study the cache-based SC attacks in the non-virtualized and 
virtualized environment from the perspective of conducting and preventing these 
attacks to gain insights into performance limitations of current state-of-the-art 
prevention solutions. 
The first objective was to investigate critically analyze the current state-of-the-art cross 
VM cache-based SC attacks and their prevention mechanisms such that insight is gained 
leading to their prevention and performance limitations. This research objective was 
conducted by a thorough review of the most credible work published in articles collected 
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from online scholarly digital libraries, such as IEEE, ACM, Elsevier, and Web of Science 
using the University Malaya access portal. In order to ensure thorough browsing of the 
recent literature in the journals and conferences about cross VM cache-based SC attacks 
in CC, techniques for conducting SC attacks in OS, single VM and across VM, and 
prevention mechanisms for these attacks are visited. We organized the recent work, 
devised proposed taxonomy, and provided a qualitative comparison for cross-VM cache-
based SC attacks, and prevention mechanisms for these attacks. 
The main purpose of this thorough study was to analyze and synthesize the recent work 
in order to identify the research problems and challenges in the prevention mechanism 
for cross-VM cache-based SC attacks. We found that current prevention mechanism 
based on static cache partition is unable to handle attacks prevention efficiently. 
Therefore, a dynamic cache partition is required to prevent the cross-VM cache-based SC 
attacks in the CC. 
Objective 2: To investigate the identified problem by conducting the cache-based SC 
attacks in the real environment and applying the existing prevention mechanism based 
on the static cache partition and unveiling the impact of existing prevention mechanism 
on the cache utilization as well as on the cloud model. 
The second objective of this research study was to investigate and analyze the 
overhead in the existing prevention mechanisms in CC. Prevention of SC attacks can be 
applied by using hardware and software. We investigated the aforementioned SC 
prevention mechanism with the perspective of hypervisor-based (software) prevention 
mechanism for the cross-VM cache-based SC attacks. The investigation revealed that 
hardware based solution is costly, as they need to change the underlying hardware and is 
unable to provide the pro-active prevention. Furthermore, it does not comply with the 
cloud model as they need to change the client software and the underlying hardware. On 
the other hand, the software-based mechanisms provide security to the encryption 
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algorithms rather than the overall information leakage across VMs and is comply with 
the cloud model. We further examined the cross-VM execution of cache-based SC 
attacks. We found that static cache partition, an existing software solution for prevention 
of cross-VM cache-based attacks degrade the performance in term of bearable load, cache 
utilization, and cache access time and consequently generated overhead. 
Objective 3: To propose a prevention mechanism based on the dynamic cache 
partition for the prevention of cache-based SC attacks across VMs that leads to an 
efficient cache utilization among various VMs. 
The third objective of this research study was to design a hypervisor-based prevention 
mechanism using dynamic cache partition (HBP-DCP) for the prevention of cross-VM 
cache-based SC attacks. The HBP-DCP is a hypervisor-based (e.g., software-based) 
mechanism complies with the cloud model which indicates that it does not need the 
changing in client software or the underlying hardware. For the cache monitoring, we 
devised a cache monitoring algorithm based upon the VM creation in the Xen Scheduler. 
This algorithm analyzes and reports the current state of the cache to the cache partitioner 
algorithm. The cache partitioner algorithm then re-partition the cache according to the 
number and requirement of VM based on the cache coloring approach.  
Objective 4: To evaluate and validate the performance of our dynamic cache based 
prevention mechanism considering three metrics namely: computing load, cache 
utilization, and memory access rate and compare it with the state-of-the-art prevention 
mechanisms. 
The fourth objective of this study was attained by evaluating the proposed mechanism 
via benchmarking experiment by creating 10 VMs on a desktop computer having all level 
cache (e.g., L1, L2, L3). We performed the performance experiments for all parameters 
and observe the results for 30 workload execution under the identical condition and every 
workload is repeated for 30 times for the sake of reliability for each of 10 VMs in both 
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modified and unmodified hypervisor to experiments. Our performance results unveil that 
utilizing our proposed prevention mechanism prevent the cross-VM cache-based SC and 
also improve the cache utilization to 53.5% , load by 45% and cache access time by 
15.53% while generating less than 5% overhead as compared to the static partitioned 
prevention mechanism.  
We develop a statistical model in order to validate the performance results of our 
proposed HBP-DCP prevention mechanism. Regression analysis is used for the purpose 
to derive the accurate statistical model of our four performance evaluation parameters 
namely: load testing, cache utilization, and memory access rate. We validate our 
performance results of the HBP-DCP mechanism by using split-sample validation 
approach. We compared the findings of benchmarking to the statistical modeling to 
validate our proposed prevention mechanism. Validation results confirm that leveraging 
our proposed prevention mechanism can prevent cross-VM cache-based SC attacks 
without affecting the performance of the system and improve the load, cache utilization, 
and cache access time. 
7.2  Contribution 
In this Section, we have highlighted the contribution of this research work. We 
presented the contribution in term of the scholarly articles in list of publications and 
presented papers at the end of thesis. This research work produced several contributions 
to the body of knowledge in following aspects. 
 Taxonomy of Cross-VM Cache-based Side Channel Attacks: We produced 
taxonomies from the existing literature for the cache-based SC attacks and 
prevention mechanisms. We comprehensive reviewed the Cache-based SC 
attacks from the cross-VM point of view and prevention mechanism by critical 
analyzing of the selected state-of-the-art research work extracted from scholarly 
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articles such as ACM, IEEE, and Elsevier. Our comprehensive studied literature 
is presented in Chapter 2 and published in (Anwar, Inayat et al. 2017) led to the 
identification of our research problem. 
 Cache Monitoring Algorithm: We devised a cache monitoring algorithm for 
the page allocator system of hypervisor. The cache monitoring algorithm 
examines the cache status upon the new request from the admission control for 
new VM creation. In addition, this algorithm is efficient in assigning the 
different partition of the cache to each VMs according to the VMs requirement. 
 Hypervisor-based Prevention Mechanism (HBP-DCP): We devised a 
hypervisor-based prevention mechanism (HBP-DCP) for the prevention of 
cross-VM cache-based SC attacks. HBP-DCP mechanism is based on the 
dynamic cache partition for each VMs. The cache monitoring was integrated 
with the cache partitioning (page allocating) algorithms in the existing page 
allocator of hypervisor to enable the hypervisor to partition the cache 
dynamically according to the new VM requirement when new VM is created.  
 Performance Evaluation and Validation: The analytical evaluation results of 
the system are generated through benchmarking and statistical modeling. 
Performance evaluation using benchmark analysis is performed on the modified 
(Dynamic partitioned/secure) and unmodified (Default/insecure) hypervisor. We 
developed a statistical model of the benchmarking parameters of HBP-DCP 
mechanism for the prevention of cross-VM cache-based SC attacks. The 
statistical model is generated via observation-based modeling approach in which 
dataset of independently replicated data is generated to train the regression 
model. The model is validated using split-sample approach is used to validate 
the performance of our proposed prevention mechanism. The process and result 
of performance evaluation and validation are presented in Chapters 5 and 6 
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respectively. Statistical and schematic analysis of the results unveiled the 
feasibility, functionality, lightweight nature of our proposed prevention 
mechanism and advocate that the objectives and aim of this study are fulfilled 
and is realized. 
7.3 Significance of the work 
Several significant features that are considered during design and development of 
HBP-DCP prevention mechanism could distinguish it from the existing prevention 
mechanism for cache-based SC attacks are briefly presented as follows: 
First, HBP-DCP prevention mechanism complies with the cloud model. In particular, 
unlike hardware mechanism, HBP-DCP is hypervisor based (e.g., software based) 
prevention mechanism which does not need changes in any client software or the 
underlying hardware. Therefore, it can be embedded into the hypervisor and in the cloud 
model, because, it obey the cloud rules. 
Second, this attack is based on the cache (the most interactive device). Since our 
prevention mechanism is based on the dynamic cache partition, therefore, it is 
generalizable in the sense that it can prevent all types of SC attacks which is based on the 
cache and in all type of hypervisor (e.g., XEN and VMWare) in which VMs can be 
created.  
Third, our HBP-DCP prevention mechanism can be ported to any type of the supported 
software (hypervisor) and computing infrastructure. Since our HBP-CP prevention 
mechanism is hypervisor-based means we have implemented by using the source code of 
an open source hypervisor. Therefore, HBP-DCP can be installed almost on every type 
of computing infrastructure and it is applicable to the commodity OS. 
Fourth, HBP-DCP is based on the dynamic partition of the cache. Therefore the overall 
performance has improved by increasing the cache utilization for each VMs because each 
VM is only giving as much more cache memory as they are requested at runtime. For 
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instance, if there is 2MB L3 cache, and 1 VM is running the whole 2MB would be 
assigned to 1VM, consequently improve the overall performance in term of load, cache 
utilization, and memory access rate. 
Fifth, HBP-DCP is a preventive mechanism rather than reactive. Since we cannot 
examine when SC attacks might occur, we simply ensure that the two VMs would not be 
able to access the same cache lines for the purpose to create SC attacks. Preventive means 
early prevention before occurring of the attacks while reactive means prevents attacks 
after occurring. Because once the attack occurs, it will harm the system even in a minute, 
therefore, early prevention of attack is more beneficial than post prevention. 
7.4 Limitation and Future Work 
The HBP-DCP prevention mechanism prevent cross-VM cache-based SC attacks with 
a minimum cache access rate and by improving computing load, cache utilization, and 
memory access rate. Our HBP-DCP (dynamic partitioned) mechanism can be entirely 
implemented within the hypervisor and do not interfere to the cloud model (does not need 
to change the client side’s software or the underlying hardware). The HBP-DCP 
prevention mechanism can prevent any type of attacks in which cache is involved and 
therefore it is generalizable to all types of the hypervisor which is used for VM creation. 
However, HBP-DCP is always activated upon the VM creation, and assign the specific 
color page of the cache memory that matches the color of the requested VM, the limitation 
of this prevention mechanism is it is unable to detect the cache memory requirement of 
each VMs upon the creation time. For instance, if two VMs are requested for cache then 
it is unable to detect that how much amount of cache is required to VM1 and how much 
to VM2. On the other hand, the decision that how many pages should be migrated and 
which one page among all pages should be migrated first is very difficult. 
In our future work, we will consider cache management policy. We will focus on that 
when VM is created then we should be able to predict all the cache requirements of that 
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specific VM. Furthermore, the cloud computing environment is also vulnerable to other 
SC attacks likewise the cache-based SC attacks. It arises difficulty for the cloud provider 
because SC attacks based on a specific medium often require their own unique solutions. 
Therefore, each channel will required further work to develop a solution customized to 
its specific vulnerabilities.  
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